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ABSTRACT 
This research applies social network analysis, the study of relationships between actors, 
to identify stakeholder relationships that support institutional development for rural 
water service delivery. Whereas technical aspects of water engineering are well 
understood, building institutional capacity for sustaining rural water services remains a 
challenge. Institutions exist with other stakeholders in a complex environment of 
relationships and power dynamics that influence how these institutions develop, and this 
research provides insight into how these influences can be both rigorously and 
practically understood.  
Social network analysis is appropriate for studying relationships around institutions 
because it focuses on ties between actors. Recognition of its potential is growing in the 
water sector, but its utility for understanding how stakeholder networks in rural water 
sectors influence institutional development remains largely unexplored. Social network 
analysis deserves closer attention because the quantitative aspect of networks has 
potential to rigorously investigate the many relationships that institutions have, while 
visual representations of networks might help practitioners to better engage with these 
complex environments.  
This research therefore tests the applicability of social network analysis in a broad range 
of contexts through cases studies in Africa, Asia, and South America. Each case study 
focuses on a specific instance of institutional development in rural water sectors – either 
government offices or community operator committees. Primary data collection in 
Ghana, Malawi, India, Tajikistan, Bangladesh, and Bolivia involved 162 interviews 
with governments, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, academic 
institutions, donor agencies, and community members. Each participant mapped their 
network during a facilitated exercise to identify who they interact with and how, and 
then commented on the importance of specific relationships. Data from these interviews 
were then combined to produce networks for analysis along with qualitative 
descriptions of network characteristics.  
When viewed through a social network perspective, the case studies consistently reveal 
three characteristics of stakeholder networks that support institutional development. The 
first network characteristic is multiple information and skill ties between an institution 
and local stakeholders. Through these ties the institution can provide support to local 
stakeholders, and receive feedback on how to improve performance. The second 
 network characteristic is strong information and skill ties between an institution and 
higher levels of sector hierarchy. These ties can provide ongoing support to overcome 
challenges and improve institutional performance. The third characteristic is 
coordination between stakeholders at higher levels of sector hierarchy that have strong 
information and skill ties with an institution. Strong information and skill ties between 
these support providers can help them to align their efforts behind the same outcomes, 
and collaborate to complement each other’s work.  
These three network characteristics were identified as positive influences supporting 
institutional development for rural water supply in multiple countries. Although 
stakeholder relationships are nuanced and contextual, social network analysis can be 
used to identify where network characteristics that might support institutional 
development are missing. Practically, methods from this research can be used to analyse 
stakeholders and relationships around specific institutions in order to inform strategies 
for coordination and support to institutions. This research also contributes to the 
academic discourse on how complex stakeholder interactions can be studied through 
social network analysis, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to add rigour to the 
investigation of factors supporting institutional development. The academic and 
practical benefits identified in this research suggest that there is considerable potential 
for advancing the application social network analysis for understanding influences that 
support institutional development in rural water supply. 
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GLOSSARY 
Alter – A node that is directly connected to the ego node in an ego network.  
Ego – The central node in an ego network that is directly connected to all other nodes 
(its alters).  
Ego Network – A specific kind of network that examines the network of nodes with 
direct ties to a specific node of interest (the ego).  
Heterophilic – The tendency of an ego node to be linked to nodes with a different 
property than the ego node.  
Homophilic – The tendency of an ego node to be linked to nodes with the same 
property as an ego node. 
Homophily – A measure of the proportion of alters with similar versus dissimilar 
properties to the ego in an ego network.  
Institution – In the context of this research, these are either government departments or 
community operator committees. These institutions have permanent and formally 
recognised roles in the management of rural water services, either directly or indirectly. 
Multiplex – Multiple tie types between nodes that exist in parallel.  
Node – A point within a network that is connected by ties. Nodes in the context of this 
research are stakeholders and institutions.  
Reciprocity – The tendency for network ties to be two-way instead of one-way.  
Stakeholder – Any organisation, department, or group of individuals that influences or 
is influenced by rural water service delivery. Stakeholders include, but are not limited 
to: non-governmental organisations; government departments; private companies; water 
system operators; bi-lateral or multi-lateral organisations; and civil stakeholders such as 
communities or water users. 
Tie – Nodes in a network are connected by ties. In the context of this research there are 
four tie types investigated: information, skills, resources, and authority.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Safe drinking water access is important globally. An estimated 663 million people did 
not have access to improved drinking water sources when the Millennium Development 
Goals concluded in 2015 (United Nations, 2015), and a Sustainable Development Goal 
is now committed to achieving universal safe water access by 2030 (United Nations, 
2016). The goal is clear, but questions remain about how to achieve it.  
Infrastructure plays an important role. Investment in infrastructure was critical in the 
success of the Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of people without 
access to water, and continued investment will be important for achieving universal 
access to safe drinking water. The required capital investment of extending basic water 
supply services to the unserved is estimated at USD$37.6 billion per year (Hutton & 
Varughese, 2016).  
But the goal of universal access cannot be achieved through infrastructure alone. Pumps 
and pipes eventually break. An estimated USD$1.2-$1.5 billion has been lost over the 
past 20 years in sub-Saharan Africa alone due to infrastructure non-functionality 
(Narkevic, Harvey, & Morgan, 2009). The presence of infrastructure alone also does not 
guarantee that everyone nearby can access safe water. Challenges with sustaining 
functionality of infrastructure and recognition of water access as a service have gained 
increasing attention internationally, and addressing these issues will be an essential 
complement to infrastructure development.  
Safe water is increasingly recognised as a service that requires both infrastructure and 
people to manage it. Users, operators, and regulators are a few of the important actors 
with roles in ensuring that safe drinking water is reliably accessible. Institutions, 
 including governments, also have permanent roles in directly or indirectly sustaining 
safe water access (Lockwood & Smits, 2011). Supporting these institutions to play their 
roles effectively is therefore an essential complement to the role of technology in 
providing safe water. 
The importance of institutional development raises questions about how to best support 
it, and this proves to be challenging. How institutions develop can vary with context. 
These contexts contain influential power dynamics and complex stakeholder 
interactions which complicate how change happens (Ramalingam, 2013). Some argue 
that institutional change cannot simply be designed and implemented, suggesting 
instead that it is influenced though a complex process of adaptation and adoption that is 
more evolutionary than strategically planned (F Cleaver, 2012; Ostrom, Janssen, & 
Anderies, 2007). These arguments suggest a need to understand institutional 
development differently: as a complex result of many influences instead of the 
successful implementation of a detailed design (Merrey & Cook, 2012).  
Supporting institutional development is important even if the process is complex. If 
multiple influences can affect institutional development simultaneously, understanding 
the breadth of stakeholders interacting with an institution might help to identify 
relationships that support institutional development. This view is supported by writing 
on the importance of stakeholder power dynamics and the broader institutional 
structures in water sectors (Mollinga, 2008). Investigating stakeholder relationships 
might be useful for identifying the types of relationships that support institutions to 
develop. Although methods such as Political Economy Analysis exist for analysing the 
complex power dynamics in water sectors (Edelmann, 2009), there is still a gap in 
approaches for rigorously studying these environments while cutting through the 
complexity to offer actionable insights for policy-makers (Whaley & Cleaver, 2017).  
Social Network Analysis (SNA), with its focus on the ties between actors, might offer 
solutions. SNA can be used to study relationships between stakeholders, making it 
suited to investigating the simultaneous relationships influencing an institution. Ego 
network analysis, a specific type of SNA, is particularly relevant because it analyses 
relationships around a specific node of interest (Crossley, Bellotti, & Edwards, 2015). 
Ego network analysis might therefore be used to study the relationships that influence 
institutional development, and this research is designed to test its potential.   
This research therefore studies specific institutions that are developing in order to 
identify characteristics of their stakeholder networks. The chosen scope is broad. 
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Geographical regions for case studies includes Africa, Asia, and South America, and the 
types of institutions includes national government, district government, and community 
operator committees. This diversity of contexts and institution types is selected to 
explore how certain common characteristics of stakeholder networks might support 
institutional development across different circumstances. Even if the contexts are 
different, perhaps similarities exist in the relationships of these institutions that might be 
identified from a stakeholder network perspective.  
Findings intend to offer insight into how stakeholder relationships support institutional 
development, and how these relationships can be understood from a network 
perspective. Such findings are intended to have both academic and practical value. 
Academically, SNA might provide a basis for quantitatively studying complex 
stakeholder interactions in water sectors and beyond. Practically, identification of 
institutional relationships and supportive influences might help practitioners to 
strategically strengthen certain relationships, and to monitor change in networks over 
time. At the outset, however, these intended results are aspirational because the 
potential of SNA for characterising influences on institutional development is a new 
area of inquiry.  
 
 
 2 BACKGROUND 
This chapter explores how the fundamentally technocratic challenge of safe water 
access necessarily extends to include institutional development, and how change in 
institutions must be approached differently from implementation of an engineered 
design. New approaches are needed that can rigorously account for the complex 
stakeholder interactions that shape institutions, while also providing practical value that 
can inform strategic interventions. To this end, social network analysis is identified as 
an underexplored opportunity for studying influences on institutional development that 
might provide valuable and pertinent insights to support the global effort towards 
universal safe water access.   
2.1 The Global Effort Towards Safe Water Access 
The case for the importance of safe drinking water is easy to make. Water, Sanitation, 
and Hygiene (WASH) services are essential for both human health and economic 
development. An estimated USD$5-28 is returned for each USD$1 invested in WASH 
(Hutton & Haller, 2004), and poor access to WASH services is a cause of diarrhoea, a 
leading cause of death for children in Africa (Black et al., 2010). The necessity of 
improving WASH services has almost universal appeal, and organisations, 
governments, and people around the world have united behind this cause.  
Progress is being made. The Millennium Development Goal target for water access was 
met by 116 countries, and over 2 billion people have gained access to clean water since 
1990 (World Health Organization and UNICEF, 2014). The trend is encouraging, but 
achieving universal access to safe water is anything but guaranteed.  
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Despite the importance of safe water access, and considerable progress towards 
reducing the number of people without access, 663 million people still used unimproved 
drinking water sources when the Millennium Development Goals concluded in 2015 
(United Nations, 2015). Aggregate numbers can also hide disparities, such as 
differences between regions or between rural and urban areas (RWSN, 2009), and the 
number of people without access to safe water in rural Africa actually increased from 
1990 to 2006 due to both population growth and infrastructure breakdowns (RWSN, 
2009). The global commitment towards water services has been renewed to engage 
these challenges, and the Sustainable Development Goals aim to achieve universal safe 
water access by 2030 (United Nations, 2016).  
Part of the solution involves continuing to build on what is working. Efforts during the 
Millennium Development Goals supported an increase in the global population using 
improved drinking water sources from 76 percent to 91 percent (United Nations, 2015). 
The Millennium Development Goals themselves also build on a longer history of 
international efforts towards safe water access, including the International Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade from 1981-1990, that have prioritised international 
financing and the development of country infrastructure investment plans (United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, 1990).  
Investment in infrastructure will continue to be an essential part of the global water 
access agenda. An assessment of water access in sub-Saharan Africa finds that 
substantial investment will be needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal for 
water (Roche, Bain, & Cumming, 2017), and a global assessment of investment 
requirements estimates that capital investments in water supply require USD$37.6 
billion annually, which is considerably higher than current investment levels  (Hutton & 
Varughese, 2016). Investment requirements can be difficult to estimate, however, 
because of the  difficulty of ascertaining actual costs (Smits et al., 2011), and a 2014 
global financial analysis found 80% of countries reporting insufficient financing for 
water and sanitation, despite official development assistance of USD$6.7 billion (UN 
Water, 2014). All of these figures indicate that technology, infrastructure, and finance 
will be important parts of achieving the Sustainable Development Goal for water by 
2030.  
But other issues have also come to the forefront. The same report that estimated 
investment requirements cautions that sustaining universal coverage will require more 
than just capital inflows for infrastructure (Hutton & Varughese, 2016). Challenges with 
 ongoing maintenance and operations of water facilities were noted even at the 
conclusion of the International Drinking Water Decade (United Nations Economic and 
Social Council, 1990), and an advancing agenda of international commitments are 
actively considering the broader factors influencing service delivery. The Dublin 
Principles are one such example,  highlighting the importance of integrated water 
resource management, multi-stakeholder participation, and gender and equity issues 
(ICWE, 1992). Even if gaps exist between the rhetoric of commitments such as the 
Dublin Principles and actual practice (Moriarty et al., 2000), there is broad 
acknowledgement that continuing business as usual is unlikely to be enough, and 
achieving universal safe water access will need to engage broader issues that include the 
institutional environment around infrastructure and service delivery (Doczi et al., 2013).  
2.2 Barriers to Safe Water Access 
Safe water access is ultimately about people. Infrastructure needs maintenance to 
continue functioning, and people need to be able to access the infrastructure in order to 
benefit from it. Although investing in infrastructure will continue to be important, 
investing in infrastructure alone does not necessarily translate into more people 
accessing safe water (Koestler et al., 2010).  
Ensuring that infrastructure continues to function is crucial, although few projects 
conduct the long-term follow up studies necessary to understand the sustainability of 
investments (Taylor, 2013). Approximately one in three handpumps in sub-Saharan 
Africa are non-functional, representing a waste of $US1.2-1.5 billion in infrastructure 
investments over a 20 year period (Narkevic et al., 2009). Despite these losses, 
construction of new infrastructure continues to be prioritised (Smits et al., 2011). 
Sustainability, defined as the continued delivery and uptake of services, is threatened by 
many factors (Carter et al., 1999). The issue is complex, and requires a holistic 
perspective to planning and implementation that goes beyond well-constructed facilities 
(Harvey & Reed, 2004).  
The need for water service sustainability leads to consideration of the people that access 
and manage the operation and maintenance of services (McConville & Mihelcic, 2007). 
Even well-constructed infrastructure needs support from proper institutional 
arrangements to sustain functionality (Sara & Katz, 1997), and a shift is needed away 
from the focus on provision of hardware for water access (Moriarty et al., 2013).  In 
response, sustainability assessments have expanded to include both technical indicators 
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and indicators of how local institutions, such as waterpoint committees, are managing 
services (Chowns, 2014; Foster, 2013; Schweitzer & Mihelcic, 2012), and resources 
such as the WaterAid Sustainability Framework have highlighted how organisations 
working on water supply need to practically consider a broad range of factors 
(WaterAid, 2011).  
Sustainability analysis has expanded to encompass both direct factors such as 
technology and financing, and indirect factors such as governance and regulatory 
structures (Danert & Flowers, 2012; Walters & Chinowsky, 2016). Even actors not 
directly providing services can influence the governance, management, and ultimately 
functionality of water services (Walters & Javernick-Will, 2015). The operation and 
maintenance of facilities involves dynamic interactions (Montgomery et al., 2009) that 
need to be understood and strengthened in order to sustain access to safe water. 
2.3 Safe Water as Service Delivery 
The term ‘service delivery’ frames water access around the experience of users and the 
institutional relationships that make outcomes possible. Viewing water access as service 
delivery highlights the need for both ‘hard’ systems, such as infrastructure, and ‘soft’ 
systems, such as the regulatory environment (Butterworth, 2010; de la Harpe, 2011). 
The 2004 World Development Report focused explicitly on service delivery, arguing 
that weak or unclear institutional arrangements limit the effectiveness of resources 
invested even if the aid sector continues to provides support (World Bank, 2004). From 
this lens, issues including safe water access can be considered through the institutional 
arrangements between people, policymakers, and providers. The exact nature of these 
relationships can differ depending on context, but all of these stakeholders play 
important roles (World Bank, 2004).  
 
 
  
Figure 1 – The institutional arrangement central to service delivery (World Bank, 
2004) 
In the rural water sector, service delivery is defined as an extension of approaches 
beyond capital-intensive infrastructure development to consider the full life-cycle of a 
service, including operations, maintenance, and the learning and adaptive management 
that institutions responsible for these services must perform (Lockwood & Smits, 2011). 
A series of ‘building blocks’ describes specific components necessary for achieving and 
sustaining service delivery (Lockwood & Smits, 2011). These functions need to be 
effectively executed, even if the precise configuration of who does what differs 
depending on the context. 
List 1 – Service Delivery Building Blocks (Lockwood & Smits, 2011) 
1. Professionalisation of community management; 
2. Recognition and promotion of alternative service provider options; 
3. Monitoring service delivery and sustainability; 
4. Harmonisation and coordination; 
5. Support to service providers; 
6. Capacity support to local government; 
7. Learning and adaptive management; 
8. Asset management; 
9. Regulation of rural services and service providers; and 
10. Financing to cover all life-cycle costs 
As described by these building blocks, supporting service delivery involves more than 
the development of infrastructure, and adopting service delivery models at scale has 
implications for stakeholders from users up to local, national, and international 
institutions (Smits et al., 2012). Service delivery concepts are now being used to assess 
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the performance of water facilities by considering user experience, performance of the 
service provider, and performance of the broader institutional authorities that provide 
support for service delivery (Bey et al., 2014). Understanding these broader institutional 
arrangements and how they develop is therefore crucial for improving safe water 
service delivery.  
2.4 Institutions in Service Delivery 
The institutions highlighted by the service delivery building blocks, including 
government departments and community operator committees, are central to improving 
water service delivery. Problematically, however, institutions have received insufficient 
investment compared to infrastructure (Easter & McCann, 2010). Institutional 
weaknesses can exist from local through national levels within a country, affecting 
everything from water quality, to sustainability, to the information management systems 
that are necessary to improve services (Nez & Pérez-Foguet, 2010). These institutions 
need to be strengthened, but this is no easy task.  
Institutions can be difficult to understand and engage because, unlike infrastructure, 
they are not ‘things’. Institutions can instead be understood as norms and policies 
(Willamson, 2000), and in the water sector these institutions have included specific 
stakeholders managing norms and policies such as community waterpoint committees 
and government departments (Cleaver, 2012). Government is important because it plays 
a larger role in shaping the environment in which services are created and accessed 
(OECD, 2010), and some argue that the global water crisis has resulted chiefly from 
failures in water governance (OECD, 2015; UNDP, 2004). Despite consensus on the 
importance of institutions in water supply, understanding what these institutions are, 
what they ‘should’ be, and how to support processes of change remains challenging.  
A growing body of research and tools are attempting to respond to the need. Political 
Economy Analysis (PEA) is one such body of work being adapted to the water sector 
that, broadly speaking, uses interdisciplinary understanding of underlying causes of 
poor governance to inform change management initiatives in institutions. Interest in 
PEA across development organisations has become widespread even if the precise 
definitions and applications differ (Harris, 2013). This group of approaches recognises 
the distribution of power and wealth in political and economic processes, and uses this 
understanding to diagnose opportunities and barriers to change (Collinson, 2003; 
 Edelmann, 2009). Others have also sought to consider how aid might be used to address 
governance constraints that undermine service delivery (Tavakoli et al., 2013).  
Growing interest in PEA suggests its possible value, but the effectiveness of these tools 
depends partly on implicit assumptions about how change in institutions happens. Some 
approaches are designed for use by specific aid organisations intending to design and 
execute programme strategies (ODI, 2009). Assumptions about who is using a tool 
informs which analysis is relevant, but these assumptions may conflict with realities of 
how institutional change happens in practice. Implicit assumptions about how change 
happens might bias the type of analysis used by an organisation (McNicholl & 
Cruickshank, 2015). As the next section will explore, institutional change is a complex 
process that is not easily designed, planned, and implemented as an engineering project 
might be.  
2.5 Theories of Institutional Change 
Managing water is inherently political (Mollinga, 2008), and institutions exist within a 
context of power dynamics and broader institutional dynamics that influences how 
change happens (Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007; Stein et al., 2006). In short, 
international development exists in a complex environment (Ramalingam, 2013). It is 
therefore unlikely that ideal institutional designs can be known (Merrey & Cook, 2012), 
and even rigorously designed strategies are unlikely to be realised as intended 
(Mintzberg, 1987).  
A prevailing belief has been that implementation of blueprint designs can solve 
complex governance problems with a small set of simple models. These simplified 
blueprints for institutional reform have a history of failure (Andrews, 2013; Ostrom et 
al., 2007), and the tendency to apply engineering metaphors and approaches rarely leads 
to institutional change (Merrey et al., 2007). Furthermore, implementation of idealised 
designs can result in institutions adopting superficial outputs without achieving the 
desired outcome in order to appease donor organisations (Andrews et al., 2012). There 
is a need to study and support institutional development from a diagnostic perspective 
rather than a prescriptive one (Ostrom et al., 2007). A non-prescriptive approach might 
identify solutions that are ‘good enough’ for the desired outcome by supporting what is 
working instead of trying to implement an ideal institutional design (Grindle, 2004).  
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Instead, some argue that institutions evolve through complex processes of adoption and 
adaptation of practice that has stronger parallels with an organic creative approach than 
implementation of detailed design (Merrey & Cook, 2012). Cleaver (2012) offers the 
concept of bricolage whereby institutional change is described as a patchwork process 
of innovation, adaptation, and legitimisation. Change might therefore be effectively 
supported by supporting institutions to develop their own rules and ways of working 
through experimentation and learning (Ostrom, 2014).  
Academic theory further supports the view of multiple pathways for institutional 
change, including evolution. Dorado (2005) proposes three profiles of how institutional 
change happens. The different profiles are characterised by different approaches to 
resource mobilisation, the agency of participating stakeholders, and the opportunities 
present in the system. Logically testing combinations of these different aspects 
combines to produce the three profiles: entrepreneurship, partaking, and convening 
(Dorado, 2005).  
Entrepreneurship is perhaps the closest description to the strategic implementation of a 
blueprint design. This profile describes an organisation, acting strategically towards a 
long-term change, taking advantage of an opportunity that others may not see or be able 
to exploit. This strategic behaviour can initiate change, and eventually attract further 
resources for support when other actors in the space observe benefits (Dorado, 2005).  
Contrasted with such strategic behaviour is the partaking profile, which can be 
colloquially described as ‘business as usual’. Non-strategic stakeholders working on 
routine and near-term tasks through minor adjustments eventually and incrementally 
change the status quo over time (Dorado, 2005).   
The conveners change profile offers a third possibility. In this, stakeholders behave 
strategically and collectively, pooling resources to condition the space for collaboration 
prior to targeting a specific reform. The approach retains a long-term vision without 
necessarily knowing the eventual results of the process at the outset (Dorado, 2005). 
These profiles are not judgments on a preferred method; they are simply alternatives. 
Importantly, they challenge the idea that a single actor behaving strategically is the 
primary possibility for creating institutional change. The partaking and conveners 
change profiles in particular support the idea of institutional evolution, and suggest that 
change might be supported by nurturing the environment that supports institutional 
evolution. For example, given that processes of social learning can support 
 improvements in water management (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007), perhaps intentionally 
strengthening relationships around institutions might support the evolutionary process 
of development.  
Uptake of alternative approaches to institutional development will, however, be limited 
by the accessibility of these concepts for practitioners. There is a need to interpret 
complexity through means understood by a variety of stakeholders including policy-
makers, NGOs, donors, and others involved in programmes that influence how services 
are managed (Hall et al., 2013). Analysis that emphasises complexity can be difficult 
for policy-makers to access (Frances Cleaver & De Koning, 2015). New research has 
attempted to expand Political Economy Analysis to understand broader factors 
influencing service delivery (Jones, 2015), but it is unclear how effective such analysis 
is for making complex stakeholder relationships more accessible to non-academic 
audiences. There remains a pressing need for approaches that can rigorously account for 
the complex relationships surrounding institutions while still providing practical insight 
for policy-makers, and presently available methods do not sufficiently address this gap 
(Whaley & Cleaver, 2017). 
2.6 Potential for Social Network Analysis 
Social Network Analysis, with its emphasis on relationships between actors, holds 
potential for providing rigorous yet practical understanding of relationships that support 
institutional development in water sectors. Its potentially unique value is the ability to 
visualise and even quantitatively analyse complex social relationships. Network visuals 
might help make understanding of stakeholder interactions accessible to busy 
practitioners, and the quantitative aspect of networks might provide rich grounds for 
academic inquiry into the otherwise qualitative influences on institutions.  
The study of social networks has an established history of quantitatively studying the 
otherwise qualitative phenomenon of social relationships (Scott, 2013). Studying the 
breadth of relationships that an actor has can sometimes provide surprising insights, 
such as the effect that relatively weak network ties can have on outcomes (Granovetter, 
1973). These applications could logically be extended to understand influences on 
institutional development as well.  
Considering the networked relationships of stakeholders and institutions is itself not 
new.  Development work is embedded in networks of actors (Bebbington & Kothari, 
2006), and networks have been used conceptually to understand influences on 
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organisational development in Africa (Romo & Anheier, 1996). Networks have also 
been used to consider where particular stakeholders participate in broader network 
structures and might be providing valuable horizontal and vertical linkages between 
stakeholders that can influence policy development (Brown, 1991).  
Network analysis has further been considered in natural resources sectors (Bodin et al., 
2006), and emerging research is also beginning to consider the potential of social 
network analysis in a WASH context specifically, although the precise applications 
differ. A study of networks managing water scarcity in Mexico examined how water 
management is socially embedded in networks that are fragmented by local jurisdictions 
(Navarro-Navarro et al., 2017). Network mapping methods have also been used to 
consider linkages across the water-energy-food nexus in Ethiopia, and to study water 
governance in Tanzania (Stein et al., 2011, 2014). These examples suggest that social 
network analysis might have applicability for understanding relationships in water 
sectors, even though existing research has yet to focus specifically on environments that 
support institutional development.  
This research therefore proposes to formally explore the potential of social network 
analysis for identifying influences that can support institutional development in rural 
water supply. The visual and quantitative components in particular might help to 
analyse complexity of stakeholder interactions in a rigorous yet accessible way to 
identify characteristics of environments that support institutional development in a 
diagnostic rather than prescriptive way. Identifying and facilitating the development of 
supportive stakeholder relationship environments might then help to support processes 
of institutional evolution that have pertinent application to challenges currently faced in 
rural water supply.  
 
 3 AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND 
SCOPE 
Identifying environments that support institutional development for water service 
delivery will be a crucial part of achieving the Sustainable Development Goal for water. 
This necessity inspires the research aims, objectives, and scope that are defined in this 
chapter. The intent is to explore how the variety of stakeholders and their interactions in 
a water sector combine to create favourable conditions for institutional development 
through rigorous analysis that can still provide practical insights for practitioners. If 
successful, a stronger understanding of influences supporting institutional development 
has significant potential to help achieve the Sustainable Development Goal for water.   
This chapter expands on this research intent and how it translates into specific questions 
and case studies for investigation. It is meant to equally clarify what is included and 
what is excluded from the research, and the reasons for the chosen scope. This chapter 
also presents the case studies that have been selected for this research. A total of five 
countries are included. Each one is described with some background on its rural water 
sector and justification for its inclusion in this study.  
3.1 Research Aim 
The research aim describes the overall intent of the work as informed by the gap in 
existing research (Section 2.6). The aim of the research is: 
“to characterise stakeholder relationships that support institutions 
managing rural water service delivery to improve performance.” 
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A few clarifications help to define specific terms and the type of findings that are 
expected:  
A stakeholder is any organisation, department, or group of individuals that have a 
vested interest in the rural water service delivery sector. These stakeholders influence or 
are influenced by decisions in the sector (Hemmati et al., 2002). Stakeholders include, 
but are not limited to: non-governmental organisations; government departments; 
private companies; water system operators; bi-lateral or multi-lateral organisations; and 
civil stakeholders such as communities or water users.  
Institutions in this research are government departments or community operator 
committees. This definition is in line with other writing on waterpoint committees and 
government departments as institutions in water sectors (Cleaver, 2012). These 
institutions have permanent and formally recognised roles in the management of rural 
water services, either directly or indirectly.   
Managing rural water service delivery describes involvement with some aspect of 
service delivery – not necessarily direct provision of water. This language is included to 
accommodate governments as well as water system operators. Governments do not 
necessarily operate systems, but nevertheless play important roles in regulating and 
supporting water supply efforts in their jurisdictions (Lockwood & Smits, 2011). 
Studying stakeholder environments that support the development of government 
institutions is relevant to improving water services, and is therefore included in this 
research.  
The term improve performance is a relative one. There is no single criterion that 
applies equally to all institutions in all countries because of their different contexts and 
roles. Performance improvement is therefore directly related to the specific functions of 
an institution in its role to support rural water service delivery. Whatever those roles 
are, a suitable case study institution must show some improvement in these functions in 
the recent past. The common thread between different case studies is therefore not a 
specific type of change in institutional performance in a specific role, but rather the fact 
that improvements relevant to its role have been documented in the 3-5 years prior to 
fieldwork.  
Overall, this research aims to explore the potential utility of social network analysis for 
understanding environments of stakeholder relationships that support institutional 
development in rural water supply. The research is therefore exploratory in nature and 
 does not test specific hypotheses. The intent is instead to understand how adaptations of 
established social science methods and analysis can provide useful insights into 
influences on institutional development by allowing findings to emerge from studying 
cases of institutional development in a variety of contexts.   
3.2 Objectives 
Objectives are the specific research questions that will be answered in the course of the 
study in service of the broader research intent. The research questions are: 
1. What are common characteristics of stakeholder networks around specific 
institutions relevant to rural water supply that are improving performance? 
2. Which network characteristics are perceived by stakeholders in these networks 
as important for supporting institutional development? 
The first question is important because it specifically explores how social network 
analysis can be used to understand stakeholder interactions around cases of institutional 
development in the rural water sector. Identifying common characteristics in cases of 
success might describe network characteristics to look for in future research. The 
second question is important because simply observing differences in network 
structures might not identify significant factors. Social networks are dynamic 
interactions and need qualitative interpretation by those experiencing them in order to 
identify causal factors.  
Asking both research questions is expected to identify characteristics of stakeholder 
relationships that are both observable from a network perspective and perceived as 
important for institutional development by those participating in these networks. The 
perceived importance of network interactions helps to qualify their significance. The 
expected result is a set of stakeholder network characteristics linked to cases of 
institutional development for rural water service delivery in a variety of contexts.  
3.3 Scope 
Appropriate scoping must allow the project to be a manageable doctoral study while 
still answering the research questions. The scope is designed to be ambitious, yet 
achievable in a three-year period undertaken by a single researcher. It is therefore 
important to clarify both what is within the research scope, and what is outside of it.  
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Studying different countries and institution types broadens the potential applicability of 
the research, and it is desirable to answer the research questions as generally as 
possible. Broadening the scope to include case studies in Africa, Asia, and South 
America helps to investigate network characteristics that exist in different contexts to 
identify common properties. Case studies are therefore selected from different 
continents and types of institution to offer diverse perspectives on stakeholder network 
interactions.  
Another scope consideration is the decision to focus on rural water supply specifically 
instead of the broader WASH sector. This scoping decision is purely practical. As a 
sub-set of the WASH sector, the rural water sector is expected to include fewer 
stakeholders. Rural water supply is assumed to be a manageable scope for this project 
that maintains the integrity of investigating questions relevant to the broader WASH 
sector.  
3.3.1 Case Study Selection 
Specific institutions that are improving performance are the focus of this research. Their 
performance improvements indicate that they are growing in capacity, and are therefore 
examples of institutional development. Appropriate case studies are identified through 
existing documentation of performance improvements provided either by these 
institutions directly or by a third party monitor. Accessing existing performance records 
is important because this requires longitudinal evidence that could not be collected by 
the researcher in addition to doing research for this study. These records show where a 
specific institution has been developing in the recent past, and such cases are the focal 
point for research.  
Suitable case studies of developing institutions were identified by soliciting feedback 
from WASH professionals internationally. Contacts were provided with information on 
the research background, aims, and criteria for suitable cases of institutional 
development. Their recommendations were then vetted for alignment with research 
aims and objectives, as well as practical considerations of what could be achieved 
through field work by a single doctoral candidate.  
Two criteria were used to identify case studies. A suitable case study of institutional 
development must: 
1. Have a permanent mandate in rural water supply – Institutions studied must 
have a permanent and formally recognised role in water service delivery. The 
 roles can be either direct or indirect. Community operator committees provide 
direct services because they manage the provision of safe water. Indirect 
relationships describe entities like government authorities that regulate and 
support direct service providers, but do not necessarily manage services 
themselves.  
2. Be improving in its role – Suitable institutions must have demonstrated 
improvement in performance of their respective roles in the past 3-5 years. The 
specific type of performance depends on what is appropriate for that institution. 
What matters is that improvement has been documented, and that it is relevant 
for the types of functions that the institution performs in service of rural water 
supply. Documentation can be provided either directly by the institution or by a 
third-party monitor. The temporal element is also important for identifying 
institutions demonstrating postive change rather than simply consistent high 
performance. Institutions that are improving performance provide an opportunity 
to investigate the relationships that might be supporting this process of change.     
These conditions for suitable case studies were then shared with an international 
network of WASH professionals to get feedback on the research design, and to identify 
suitable case studies. All case studies included in this research were selected through the 
recommendation of knowledgeable practitioners in the sector.  
3.4 Study Limitations 
Limitations identified at the research outset influenced decisions on what is deliberately 
outside the research scope for both practical and theoretical reasons. These limitations 
are presented to clarify expectations of what this research will and will not do, and how 
these limitations have affected the chosen scope. The four main limitations are data 
availability, contextual differences, the timeframe for data collection, and the myriad 
cases of institutional development that exist globally.  
3.4.1 Data Availability 
An important scoping choice was the decision to focus on institutional development 
instead of larger changes in service delivery. This decision was informed by 
consultation with professionals in the WASH sector including the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), which has done extensive ethnographic research to 
determine levels of service delivery, and Aguaconsult and the International Water and 
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Sanitation Centre (IRC). Both of these organisations have played formative roles in the 
development of service delivery concepts in the water sector. Ideally, it would be 
preferred to identify a region that has significantly improved levels of service delivery, 
and to study the overall network characteristics that have supported the improvement. 
This scope, however, is too big.  
Even longitudinal data on performance of institutions in rural water supply can be 
relatively difficult to find. Project activities are commonly documented, however, 
because these are often part of project deliverables for governments, NGOs, and the 
private sector alike. Recognition of the need to collect data indicators of services, 
including institutions, is gaining international attention, but is not standard practice. 
Larger sources of data, such as the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme, 
provide aggregate estimates of water access and do not provide the required data to 
inform case study selection. Documentation on institutional performance exists in some 
cases, however, because it provides middle ground between service delivery indicators 
and infrastructure implementation data. The implication is that cases of institutional 
development can be identified, but these rely on records provided by organisations 
working directly with these institutions. Case studies are therefore primarily informed 
by the availability of data on cases of institutional development that were made 
accessible to the researcher.  
3.4.2 Contextual Differences 
Controlling for contextual variables is difficult when studying institutional 
development. This is particularly true at higher levels of sector hierarchy, such as 
national level, where specific institutions might not have an immediate equivalent 
within the country. For example, a government ministry responsible for rural water 
services cannot readily be compared to an equivalent ministry in another country.  Even 
within the same country, different geographical areas may have sufficiently different 
contexts to necessitate different interactions around otherwise similar institutions. 
Comparative analysis is therefore not emphasised in this research because of the 
challenges of controlling for contextual differences across different case studies.  
These practical limitations contributed to the decision to characterise relationships 
around institutions that are developing without relying on comparative analysis to draw 
conclusions. Data on institutions that are declining in performance were collected where 
possible, but these cases are the minority, and only emerged as potential opportunities 
 during fieldwork. Consequently, only a few instances from India and Bolivia are 
available for comparative analysis in this research, and findings from these cases are 
considered for interest, but are not the basis of final conclusions. Overall, the research 
focuses on understanding characteristics of stakeholder networks around institutions 
that are developing, and the significance of these characteristics is qualified through 
commentary from the stakeholders experiencing these networks.  
3.4.3 Timeframe for Data Collection 
The research design is required to fit within a three-year timeframe, which therefore 
limits the ability to monitor institutional change over time. For this reason, the chosen 
methods rely on ‘snapshots’ of stakeholder networks instead of longitudinal studies. 
This trade-off allows the inclusion of multiple case studies from different contexts at the 
expense of greater depth in fewer locations. The ‘snapshot’ approach is deemed 
acceptable because participating stakeholders can refer to how their networks have 
existed over time, and further qualify how networks are experienced or changing 
through verbal commentary. Future research, however, perhaps with more time and 
resources, might consider formally establishing longitudinal studies to investigate how 
networks change over time.  
3.4.4 Myriad Cases of Institutional Development 
The research scope does not cover all documented cases of institutional development, 
and findings are therefore not intended to be a prescriptive or comprehensive definition 
of how institutional development should work. No reader should interpret findings in 
any of the case studies as presenting one correct way to approach the issue of 
institutional development for water service delivery. This research aspires to broaden 
the applicability of findings by drawing on multiple case studies, but this is not intended 
to produce a fully generalisable recommendation for all cases. Instead, findings from 
the research are intended to characterise what to look for in networks around institutions 
from a diagnostic perspective, and all findings should be critically considered in light of 
each specific context.    
Furthermore, this research does not prefer one model of service delivery over others. 
Many different combinations of technologies, financing, and institutional structures can 
work, depending on the context. Rather than being prescriptive, this research tries to 
understand environments of stakeholder relationships that support processes of 
institutional improvement in different contexts. Understanding enabling environments 
 42 
may be more generalisable than prescriptions for creating specific types of change 
because enabling environments may be more adaptive to handling different types of 
contextually specific problems by using a common process.   
3.5 Specific Case Studies 
This research includes case studies of institutional development in five different 
countries: Ghana, Malawi, India, Tajikistan, and Bolivia. All were identified through 
consultation with WASH professionals who recommended suitable case studies. These 
case study locations are chosen to represent a diversity of contexts, based on available 
data on institutional development, while still being manageable within the scope of a 
three-year research project. Bangladesh was also included as a potential case study 
location, but had to be dropped due to security issues. Bangladesh was still visited 
during the course of research, but the number of interviews conducted was not sufficient 
to construct a full case study. The Bangladeshi interview is instead considered in the 
methods section to discuss the implications of alternative methods for data collection, 
and the impact these might have on potential findings (Section 4.6.2). This section 
presents the rationale for including the other five countries as case study locations.  
The institutions studied are district governments, a national government, and 
community operator committees. Each one has a permanent role in the rural water 
sector that is formally recognised. Unlike international organisations that might play 
temporary roles to develop infrastructure, these institutions play clear roles that are 
critical to the long-term success of safe water access.  
3.5.1 Ghana 
Instances of institutional improvement have been recently documented in certain 
Ghanaian districts. The country was selected as a pilot country for the Sustainable 
Services at Scale (Triple-S) initiative, which ran from 2009 to 2014. This initiative, led 
by IRC and funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, supported improvements 
in rural water supply service delivery through learning and piloting new approaches for 
service delivery (IRC, 2010). Their initiative and associated monitoring provided the 
basis for selecting Ghana as a case study.  
3.5.1.1 Ghana Rural Water Access 
Ghana has made a marked improvement in water access coverage over the past 15 
years, and these gains have propelled access statistics to 84% coverage as measured in 
 the 2008 Demographic Health Survey (IRC & Aguaconsult, 2011). This progress 
includes tangible benefits beyond coverage statistics. In the late 1980s Ghana was 
ranked second globally for cases of guinea worm disease, a waterborne parasite that 
grows inside of humans, and eventually emerges from painful skin sores. International 
efforts responded with efficacy, and the World Health Organisation declared guinea 
worm eradicated from Ghana in 2015 (The Carter Center, 2015). 
Despite a government pledge to deliver universal water access by 2025 (Daily Graphic, 
2014), sustainability challenges with existing infrastructure may undermine progress 
towards this target. Infrastructure does not provide access when broken, and 
functionality figures are not officially measured nationwide. Sustainability is regarded 
as a critical challenge in Ghana, and there is broad interest in improving services.  
The Triple-S initiative responded to this challenge. It has highlighted the need for 
government to play a lead role in coordinating and harmonising efforts towards a strong 
service delivery model because of the importance of the institutional structure behind 
service delivery that can provide and sustain access (IRC & Aguaconsult, 2011).  
3.5.1.2 Selected Districts 
The two districts from the Triple-S initiative selected as case studies represent different 
regions, cultures, and distances from the capital. The districts are briefly described here, 
and henceforth anonymised. Anonymous representation is important for adhering to the 
ethical expectations set with all participants interviewed (Section 4.2), and is further 
important for focusing on networks as social structures that can be characterised more 
generally than relationships between specific stakeholders.    
Monitoring of service delivery authorities in these districts was conducted during the 
Triple-S initiative from 2012-2014, and monitoring data have been generously provided 
by the managing organisation, The International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC). 
These indicators assess the performance of local governments in their roles as 
institutions for managing aspects of rural water service delivery in their jurisdictions. 
Each district was assessed annually on six indicators (IRC, 2011): 
1. There is a well-resourced District Water and Sanitation Team (DWST), 
consisting of 3 well qualified and experienced staff members, receiving the 
needed support by the Regional Government Community Water and Sanitation 
Agency, and District Assemblies; 
2. There are efficient monitoring and data flows; 
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3. District Water and Sanitation Plan (DWSP) is incorporated into medium term 
development plans and budget of the assembly, which is used to guide 
implementation; 
4. DWST monitors Operation & Maintenance of water facilities in terms of 
financial, technical and administrative performance, including periodic audits, 
and provides support where needed; 
5. By-laws for the Water and Sanitation Committees and Water and Sanitation 
Development Boards exist and are enforced effectively; and 
6. NGOs and CSOs providing water facilities do so in coordination with the 
District Assemblies. 
3.5.1.2.1 East Gonja 
East Gonja District, located in Ghana’s Northern Region is home to approximately 
200,000 people (Government of Ghana, 2006). Most of the population are rural, and 
agriculture is the chief economic activity (Adank et al., 2013). Salaga is district capital. 
Table 1 presents the summary of indicators measured by the Triple-S project. Values for 
the different government functions are scored on a binary scale of present (1) or absent 
(0). These indicate a performance improvement in the years leading up to the time of 
research.  
Table 1 - East Gonja service delivery indicators over time 
Indicator 2012 2014 
Presence of service authority  1 1 
DWSP  1 1 
Budget allocation and utilisation  ND 1 
By-laws  0 0 
Coordination of NGOs  0 1 
Monitoring and data flows  1 1 
Total 3 5 
                                                                      (0 = absent; 1 = present; ND = no data) 
 3.5.1.2.2 Akatsi 
Akatsi District, located in Ghana’s Volta Region, technically split into two districts 
midway through the Triple-S initiative. The project continued assessing both. This 
research focused on where the main district office resided previously: now Akatsi 
South. This section of the former district includes the district capital of the same name, 
Akatsi. Table 2 presents the same indicators used to measure district government 
performance under the Triple-S project. These also show an improvement over the 
project period in terms of specific government functions related to rural water service 
delivery.  
Table 2 – Akatsi service delivery indicators over time 
Indicator 2012 2014 
Presence of service authority  1 1 
DWSP  1 1 
Budget allocation and utilisation  1 1 
By-laws  0 1 
Coordination of NGOs  ND 1 
Monitoring and data flows  1 0 
Total 4 5 
                                                                      (0 = absent; 1 = present; ND = no data)    
3.5.2 Malawi 
Institutions studied in Malawi are also district governments. Two districts were 
identified in Malawi where performance improvements have been documented. The two 
districts were identified with the assistance of organisations working with these district 
governments that have generously provided documentation from their evaluations.  
3.5.2.1 Malawi Rural Water Access 
Rural water access is particularly important in Malawi because the majority of the 
population is rural. Figures from the national Sector Performance Report and the 
international Joint Monitoring Programme indicate that Malawi achieved the 
Millennium Development Goal for water access (Government of Malawi, 2014). Rural 
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water access in particular has shown a large increase in access since 1990 
(WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2015a).  
Gains remain uncertain, however, because of sustainability issues. Malawi’s small 
economy and limited government revenue creates incentive for international donors to 
continue financing new infrastructure, but government investment in operational 
expenses and human resources is perceived as disproportionately low when compared to 
other sectors (Ng’ambi, 2013). Sustaining access gains will require tackling 
sustainability issues, and developing the local institutions that manage these services.  
3.5.2.2 Selected Districts 
The two districts represent different geographies, tribes, and networks of stakeholders 
they engage with. Each district is described briefly here, and henceforth referred to 
anonymously.  
3.5.2.2.1 Mangochi 
Mangochi is in Malawi’s Southern Region, and forms the lower end of Lake Malawi. 
The national census from 2008 estimated the population at nearly 800,000 and this 
figure may be approaching 1,000,000 at the time of writing (Mkamanga, 2014). The 
majority of this population is rural. The local economy is largely agricultural, combined 
with fishing in Lake Malawi and other water sources.   
Mangochi District is the sole focus area for the Icelandic International Development 
Agency (ICEIDA). The ICEIDA programme focuses on health, education, and WASH 
sectors through a multi-year programme that began in 2012.  This programme is based 
on a tripartite agreement between ICEIDA, Mangochi District Council, and the Ministry 
of Local Government and Rural Development that prioritises working through 
government systems with minimal direct implementation by ICEIDA (Mkamanga, 
2014).  
The successful management of this programme by Mangochi District Council, 
particularly in the WASH sector, demonstrates a growing level of capability. This is 
evident from the influx of resources and responsibilities being managed since 2012 
(Table 3), and by comparing against parallel programmes in health and education (Table 
4) (Mkamanga, 2014).  
 Table 3 - Mangochi District council WASH output expenditure 
Outputs Budgeted Funds 
up to June 2014 
(USD) 
Expenditure up to 
June 2014 (USD) 
% Funds 
Utilised 
At least 150 new boreholes 
constructed 
$218,039.97 $217,430.93 99.7% 
At least 100 protected shallow 
wells constructed 
$54,551.81 $55,735.35 102.2% 
At least 100 defunct boreholes 
rehabilitated 
$71,663.11 $71,384.95 99.6% 
At least 350 water point 
management committees trained 
in community based management 
in TA Chimwala 
$22,610.84 $22,512.67 99.6% 
At least 80% of households in TA 
Chimwala construct and use 
improved pit latrines and hand 
wash facilities 
$15,360.54 $14,396.98 93.7% 
System strengthening for WASH 
service delivery 
$139,506.53 $137,888.49 98.8% 
Environmental aspects around 
water points and in relation to 
sanitation activities have been 
examined and addressed 
$8,470.20 $8,764.72 103.5% 
Total $530,203.00 $528,114.08 99.6% 
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Table 4 – Mangochi District Council programme expenditure by sector 
Programme Budgeted Funds up 
to June 2014 (USD) 
Expenditure up to 
June 2014 (USD) 
% Funds 
Utilised 
Education $966,100.96 $637,484.95 66.0% 
Health $2,390,191.31 $1,622,249.99 67.9% 
WASH $530,203.00 $528,114.08 99.6% 
Total $3,886,495.27 $2,787,849.01 71.7% 
The successful uptake of the WASH programme provides evidence contrary to the 
widely held belief amongst donors in the Malawi WASH sector that Districts do not 
have capacity. The experience of the ICEIDA programme suggests otherwise; that 
Districts can develop their management capacities when given the opportunity, which in 
this case includes direct both infrastructure development and supporting community 
management committees in WASH service delivery. The programme evaluation report 
finds no major issues with financial reporting, and considers Mangochi District Council 
to be demonstrating a growing level of capacity in its service delivery roles 
(Mkamanga, 2014).  
3.5.2.2.2 Rumphi 
The second case study district was identified by a different organisation. WaterAid 
Malawi (WAMA) has a strong policy and advocacy programme that has focused on 
building local government capacity for WASH service delivery over the past decade. As 
a larger International NGO, WaterAid actively engages approximately one third of 
districts in Malawi through its programmes.  
The results are mixed. One district, however, was highlighted by WAMA as an 
excellent example of a local government strengthening its role as a service authority. 
Unlike ICEIDA, WAMA’s engagement with Rumphi District Council does not focus on 
large financial flows for service implementation, but instead focuses on facilitating 
dialogue and citizens’ engagement to strengthen service delivery arrangements. 
WaterAid Malawi has generously provided their evaluation reports on their work with 
Rumphi District Council, which form the basis of its inclusion as a case study 
institution.  
 
 Situated in Northern Malawi, Rumphi is a geographically diverse district that ranges 
from 400m in elevation along the northern shore of Lake Malawi, to the highlands of 
the Nyika Plateau National Park at 2400m. Rumphi is culturally important, being home 
to the seat of the Paramount Chief of the Tumbuka tribe. In terms of water access, as of 
2010, only 45% of its approximately 175,000 people were estimated to have access to 
improved drinking water sources (Rumphi District Council, 2010).  
The WaterAid Sector Policy and Governance Project ran from 2013 to December 2015, 
and builds on a history of WaterAid as a leader in policy and advocacy work in 
Malawi’s WASH sector. Rumphi is one of their six target districts, and a mid-term 
evaluation from June 2015 showcased Rumphi as a success. Targets relevant to 
Rumphi’s assessment are extracted from this report and summarised in Table 5 
(Papermate Consulting, 2015). 
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Table 5 – Rumphi District Council performance as a service delivery authority 
(Papermate Consulting, 2015) 
Indicator Meeting Target? Details 
Water points mapping database 
updated 
Yes Reported as up to date by Rumphi 
District Council 
District Sector Investment 
Plans (DSIPs) reviewed and 
progress report informing the 
MDG report 
Yes Secured support from an NGO to 
update the DSIP, although 
additional funding will be 
required to print it.  
Allocation of 60% of district 
WASH funds informed by 
DSIPs 
No, but DSIP is 
used to guide 
investments and 
adhere to locally 
developed 
priorities. 
Rumphi District Council rejected 
support from an NGO whose 
activities did not align with 
investment priorities. However, 
there is overall insufficient 
funding to reach the 60% mark.  
District Learning Forums Yes Open days and exchange visits are 
improving interactions between 
the District Council and 
communities.  
Four coordination meetings 
take place annually 
Yes Rumphi District Council holds 
quarterly meetings, bi-annual 
meetings, and additional meetings 
as necessary. 
80% of funds for District 
quarterly meetings raised 
within the Districts 
Yes Only Rumphi District Council 
indicated it can raise funds to 
continue meeting after this project 
ends.  
Project districts allocate funds 
for WASH activities through 
the Local Development Fund  
Yes There is evidence that some LDF 
funds are being used in Rumphi 
for the provision of WASH 
services. 
 These indicators show that Rumphi District Council has increased activity in its role as 
a service authority since the beginning of the measurement period when it was not 
performing these functions. The local government is improving performance, and this 
success has not gone unnoticed by other stakeholders. Rumphi was mentioned to the 
researcher by others in the sector as a good example worth studying, and, as further 
mentioned in the mid-term report, there are indications that the Rumphi’s effectiveness 
influenced the decision for the African Development Bank to plan their next project 
phase to include the district. Other District Councils are now becoming interested in 
learning best practices from Rumphi (Papermate Consulting, 2015). 
3.5.3 West Bengal, India 
Arsenic is a naturally occurring groundwater toxin in West Bengal, India. Community 
operator committees managing arsenic filtration systems are responding to the issue, 
and have been doing so in some cases for over a decade (Sarkar et al., 2010). Some of 
these operators are continuing to improve performance in their operations by increasing 
revenue, upgrading facilities, and increasing their customer base. These community 
operator committees make suitable case studies for understanding networks of service 
operators that directly interact with consumers.  
3.5.3.1 Arsenic in West Bengal 
The state of West Bengal covers a region of the country that is sometimes referred to as 
India’s ‘arsenic belt’. The arsenic naturally occurs in aquifers here, posing an additional 
challenge to providing safe drinking water. The issue became increasingly recognised in 
the late 1990s, and influenced the development of technologies and infrastructure 
development programmes to respond to the arsenic challenge (Sarkar et al., 2010). 
Established technologies are capable of filtering arsenic from water using a cation 
exchange process, but issues of sustainability remain particularly important because 
filter media degrades over time (German et al., 2014). Water quality must be 
consistently tested and the filters replenished periodically for the infrastructure to 
continue functioning. This makes the performance of the operators managing these 
facilities particularly important.  
Figure 2 illustrates the scale of arsenic groundwater contamination in the southern part 
of West Bengal where this research focused. The maximum safe level of arsenic 
concentration in drinking water is set in India at 0.05 mg/L, and the World Health 
Organization standard is 0.01 mg/L. 
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Figure 2 – Presence of naturally occurring aquifer arsenic in the southern part of 
West Bengal (Society for Technology with a Human Face, 2016) 
3.5.3.2 Arsenic Filtration 
All operator committees studied were using one of two technologies for removing 
arsenic from groundwater. The two technologies are the Amal filters and the Drinkwell 
system, both of which use cation exchange to filter arsenic from the water. These filter 
media differ depending on the manufacturer, but a similar process is used to pump raw 
groundwater through resin filter media. Other purification steps can be added to this 
process such as filtration for iron content, removal of particulates, and ultraviolet 
treatment to treat contamination from microorganisms.  
  
Figure 3 – Filtration unit at a case study location in West Bengal. Groundwater is 
pumped from left to right through the three tanks that filter arsenic, iron, and 
other particulates, respectively. The small unit to the right performs ultraviolet 
treatment. (photo: D. McNicholl) 
Groundwater is pumped through these filtration systems and stored in tanks on site. 
Customers then come to collect water in person at specific times, or pay an additional 
fee to have water delivered to them by rickshaw. Payment for these services is typically 
charged monthly. Through this technology and operational structure, these community 
operators are able to provide safe drinking water to local households at an affordable 
price.  
3.5.3.3 Selected Locations 
Operator committees studied were recommended by local non-governmental 
organisations Technology with a Human Face (THF) and SATHEE with additional 
support from the Indian Institute of Engineering, Science, and Technology at Shibpur 
(IIEST). Members of these organisations have extensive experience with arsenic 
removal sites in West Bengal and were able to identify sites most suitable for the 
research. Records that they collect directly from the community operator committees 
provide the basis for identifying performance improvements of these local operators in 
the recent past.  
Furthermore, these partner organisations were able to identify operators within the same 
geographic area that had either failed or were declining in performance. This allows for 
some comparative analysis between successful and less successful instances of these 
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local institutions. Although not the original focus of the research, the opportunity to 
capture some comparative data was considered to be worthwhile during fieldwork. 
Some comparative analysis is possible in West Bengal because these communities 
reside in the same geographical area and are similar in many respects. Such comparison 
was not possible in the same way in Ghana and Malawi because too many differences 
existed between each of the case study locations, but West Bengal offered better 
opportunities for control cases.  
All sites visited were in the 24 North Parganas district near the city of Kolkata. The case 
study institutions are the operators of arsenic removal facilities and the community 
committees that manage these. A total of fifteen operators were selected after 
consultation with the partner organisations supporting the research. The presence of 
some operators that were declining in performance provided the opportunity to capture 
data on operators demonstrating different levels of performance. Eleven community 
operator committees were improving performance by serving more customers, and a 
twelfth had been losing customers until it had recently turned its performance around to 
raise funds, regenerate filter media, and reaffirm community trust in the facility (Table 
6). The other three facilities are either declining in performance, or have ceased 
operations (Table 7). These three declining or failed community operator committees 
are later used to consider how comparative analysis might be done from a network 
perspective (Section 7.1).  
Performance measurements were defined by change in the number of facility users and 
change in facility revenues. These records are kept by the facilities themselves. Data on 
facility operations is later compiled by the organisations working with these 
communities, and it was through them that these data were obtained.  
 
 Table 6 – Performance records of community arsenic filter operators that are 
improving (IIEST, shared records, 3 March 2016; THF, shared records, 2 
February 2016) 
Site Name Start Date Number 
of Users 
Change in 
Number of 
Users in Past 
24 Months 
Change in 
Available Funds 
in Past 24 
Months (INR) 
Date Filter 
Media was 
last 
Regenerated 
Nabayan Sanstha Amal 
Jal Samity 
12/2006 170 from 150-170 +7000 Jan-2012 
Sri Rama Krishna 
School  
06/2005 200 from 170-200 - Oct-2015 
Ichapur Amal Jal 
Samity  
01/2002 50 from 6-50 +19000 Apr-2015 
Laxmipur Hindu 
Milon Mondir Amal 
Jal Samity  
05/2000 80 from 50-80 +5000 Aug-2015 
Binimaypara 2005 250 +25 +1000 Dec-2014 
Shakti Sadhana Club 2009 700 +42 +1680 Feb-2015 
Jaygachi Amal Jal 
Samity 
6/2005 700 from 500-700 spent 322000 INR 
to upgrade facility 
Aug-15 
Dahalthuba Amal Jal 
Samity 
01/2005 275 from 200-275 +50000 Sep-2014 
United Amal Jal 
Samity 
03/2008 203 from 180-203 +10000 Mar-2016 
Kayadanga Amal Jal 
Samity 
01/2012 331 from 290-331 +100000 Feb-2014 
Nabarum Sangha 07/2004 600 from 500-600 +50000 Feb-2015 
Jaygachi Janapriya 04/2014 290 from 360-290 +35000 Jun-2016 
 
 56 
Table 7 - Performance records of community arsenic filter operators that are 
declining in service or have failed (IIEST, shared records, 3 March 2016; THF, 
shared records, 2 February 2016) 
Site Name Start Date Number 
of Users 
Change in 
Number of 
Users in Past 
24 Months 
Change in 
Available Funds 
in Past 24 
Months 
Date Filter 
Media was 
last 
Regenerated 
Narikela Amal 
Jal Samity 
03/2006 closed    
Kachuabagpra 12/2014 closed    
Muktisangha 
Amal Jal 
Samity  
02/2016 56 170-56 +6000 Nov-2011 
Many operators exist in the same district, and differences in their performance provides 
an opportunity for some comparative analysis. Their similar geographies and roles 
minimises contextual differences, but some operators are improving performance 
whereas others are declining have failed (Table 7). These lower performers are also 
studied to consider how differences in network characteristics might relate to 
differences in performance (Section 7.1).  
3.5.4 Tajikistan 
Case studies so far have focused on district governments and local operators. The 
missing level of sector hierarchy is national institutions. These include powerful 
authorities such as ministries, and other national regulatory institutions. They may not 
interact with the operations of water services as directly as local operators, but their role 
as authorities can shape the policy and operations of services throughout a country. 
Tajikistan was included to provide perspective on how change happens in national 
institutions.  
3.5.4.1 Rural Water Access in Tajikistan 
Tajikistan is a small country in central Asia bordered by Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and China. It is a developing country that has the lowest GDP per capita of 
former Soviet states. Its economic development was not helped during period of civil 
war from 1992-1997 (Lynch, 2001), and today it is investing to develop water and 
energy resources for the country.  
 Water resources are an important issue for Tajikistan, both internally and regionally. 
Tajikistan resides upstream of larger populations in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and 
control of these watersheds makes water access an international issue (Stucker et al., 
2012). Water is important for several industries as well as for rural drinking water. 
Cotton is an important export crop, and water demands to irrigate cotton are high. 
Energy and manufacturing are two other sectors that also have high water demands. 
Overall safe drinking water coverage was estimated at 79% in 2015, and the trend has 
been towards growth (WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2015b). This combination of factors creates 
substantial interest both nationally and internationally to see Tajikistan manage its water 
sector effectively, and rural water access is a part of this.  
3.5.4.2 National Institution Leadership in Policy Reform 
Tajikistan provided the opportunity to study change in a national level institution. The 
change is high level, and affects rural water supply along with other parallel sectors 
such as energy and irrigation. The need to manage competing needs in multiple sectors 
necessitated the development of an Integrated Water Resources Management policy that 
could manage resources by watershed instead of political jurisdiction. Such a policy 
change would affect all water sectors, including rural water supply. A proposal to 
change the boundaries and institutional structure of water resource management began 
development in 2006. The idea was there, but challenges negotiating the politics and 
inertia of established institutions suspended progress.  
Progress was reinvigorated in 2013 with the restructuring of national institutions. The 
Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources was abolished, and in its stead the 
Ministry of Energy and Water Resources was created along with the Agency for Land 
Reclamation and Irrigation. This signalled the beginning of intent to reform the water 
sector along the lines of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), but the true 
test would be the capacity of newly formed national institutions to perform their 
functions. These institutions became central to the process of identifying the need for 
reform, negotiating the development of details within it, and eventually seeking official 
approval to formally implement a change in institutional structure for water resource 
management throughout the country. 
Successful development of the reform is a testament to the performance improvement of 
the lead institution managing the reform process. The reform was approved by the 
Presidential office in December 2015 and was set to begin implementation at the time of 
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research. The nature of the reform is defined by official government documentation 
(translated from Tajik): 
The water sector reform aims to lay the foundation for application of 
decentralisation and devolution of part of service delivery in the process of 
division of responsibility between the ministries and agencies, and partially, 
NGOs. The proposed reforms are based on common regulatory principles of 
IWRM and focus on taking into account social, economic and 
environmental interests through sustainable and balanced management and 
development of the water resources (Government of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, 2015). 
The purpose of the case study was to understand the stakeholder network characteristics 
that supported the central government institution to develop the reform and have it 
officially approved. Such a large institutional change is a bold undertaking, and 
studying the conditions that helped to develop and approve the proposed change could 
be insightful. Understanding the Tajik case study could help understanding of 
conditions that support change in national institutions elsewhere.  
It should be clear, however, that full implementation of the reform has yet to happen, 
and it will take time before the full effects can be appreciated. Nevertheless, even 
achieving the political intent to undertake a large reform in a sector as crucial as water 
resources is important to understand. Learning about the implementation of the reform 
to develop the water basin authorities could be grounds for future research that applies 
at regional and local levels of the water sector in Tajikistan.  
3.5.5 Bolivia 
The final case study provides perspective from Latin America. Municipal governments 
in the Department of Cochabamba, Bolivia, are the case study institutions that have 
demonstrated performance improvements. Several have developed management units, 
including hiring specific technical staff, in order to better support community operators 
in their efforts to achieve complete access to safe water and sanitation in their 
municipalities. The INGO Water for People (WfP) recommended the suitability of this 
case study as one of the best examples of institutional development for service delivery 
they have observed in their work across nine countries in Latin America.  
 3.5.5.1 Rural Water Access in Bolivia 
The Bolivian government is committed to improving rural water access. President Evo 
Morales aspired to achieving complete access to safe water across Bolivia by 2020, but 
this commitment was later downgraded to complete coverage across four departments to 
match technical and financial capacities (Cambio, 2016). Nevertheless, the political will 
towards improving water access remains strong in Bolivia.  
In the area of the case study, water supply is managed in rural areas through community 
operator committees called CAPyS (Comité para Agua Potable y Saneamiento). 
Municipal governments liaise with these local operators to provide technical support 
and coordinate new infrastructure investments. The Department offices based in 
regional capitals are the next step of authority above municipalities, followed by 
ministries at the national level. The Departmental office for the case study 
municipalities in Bolivia is Gobernación Cochabamba.  
Not all municipalities in the Cochabamba Department report performance 
improvements, and this difference allows some comparative analysis. Three 
municipalities studied are improving performance, and one reports that it is not 
improving. Although comparative analysis is not the main intent of this research, the 
latter municipality that was not improving performance was identified during fieldwork, 
and data on the network surrounding this institution was captured when the opportunity 
became available. Stakeholder networks interacting with these municipalities are later 
compared to consider how network characteristics might differ between the 
municipalities that are improving performance and the one that is not improving 
(Section 7.2).  
3.5.5.2 Improving Municipalities 
Three municipalities that are improving their capacity for supporting water service 
delivery are studied. These are all in the Department of Cochabamba and contain 
populations of approximately 30,000, and their similar contexts and geographies aids in 
the identification of common network characteristics that support their development. 
The three municipalities are: Villa Rivero, Arani, and Tiraque. All of these case study 
municipalities have developed management units for responding to water supply issues 
in their jurisdictions in the recent past.  
Each municipality has hired new staff to form technical support teams specifically for 
water and sanitation. These teams are called DMSBs: ‘Direcciones Municipales de 
Saneamiento Básico’. This investment in internal capacity represents a clear 
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improvement in each institution’s performance in providing support to local 
communities and operators managing services, and the investment is easily quantified 
by the financial resources committed to the team from each municipality. All 
municipalities show an increasing investment in staff and operational expenses of these 
DMSB teams that directly expand the capacity of the municipalities to perform their 
service delivery functions.  
Table 8 – Summary of municipality investments in DMSB staff and operations by 
year ($USD to nearest dollar) (Agua Para el Pueblo Bolivia, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 
2015) 
Municipality 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Villa Rivero $14,368 $13,362 $13,362 $25,877 
Arani $0 $28,394 $18,103 $46,109 
Tiraque $718 $21,552 $13,362 $26,897 
3.5.5.2.1 Comparative Analysis 
The presence of several municipalities in the same area also allows comparative 
analysis by including one municipality that is not improving performance. Its name is 
anonymised because there is only one underperforming district included in this research 
from Bolivia. It is considered underperforming because they have not formed a DMSB 
nor are displaying improved performance in their role as a municipality. A quote 
captured during an interview with this municipal government illustrates the perceived 
performance of this municipality at the time of research: 
The truth is that there is nothing that is improving… We will need more 
workshops, for the office and to be autonomous and for that we will need a 
big workshop. Community development and what it is, basic relationships. 
We only have the norms, but we cannot do anything with only norms with 
the community. Because they don’t understand almost nothing. So we’re just 
beginning (Municipality staff, primary interview, August 2, 2016).  
This municipality reports no improvements in its performance, and no available 
documentation stated otherwise. This is therefore included as a comparison against the 
three improving municipalities to see whether network characteristics identified in their 
networks are absent from the underperforming municipality’s network.  
 3.6 Chapter Summary 
The aim of this research is to characterise relationships in stakeholder networks that 
support institutional development in rural water sectors. The research asks two specific 
questions to identify the network of stakeholders that interacts with a specific institution 
that is improving performance, and to understand the importance of specific 
relationships within these networks that support the institution to develop. The desired 
result is a richer understanding of the simultaneous influences that can support a process 
of positive change in institutional performance.   
Five case study countries are included in order to identify network characteristics that 
might have relevance in a variety of contexts. The countries are Ghana, Malawi, India, 
Tajikistan, and Bolivia. Each case study focuses on specific institutions that have been 
improving performance in the recent past to understand influences from each one’s 
surrounding stakeholder network that might be supporting the institution to develop. 
Despite contextual differences in each case, all case study institutions have exhibited 
indications of development, and these institutions can be studied to identify influences 
that support a process of positive institutional change from a stakeholder network 
perspective.   
The next chapter on methodology details how existing network research approaches are 
adapted to this study in order to answer the research questions.  
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4 METHODS 
This chapter presents the approach to data collection and analysis used to address the 
research questions. Research methods are drawn from the established fields of social 
network analysis and supplemented with qualitative methods. These methods are 
adapted and combined to investigate how stakeholder relationships support institutional 
development in rural water supply.  
Methods are divided into two parts. The first part describes techniques drawn from 
social network analysis, and the definition of specific ties that are appropriate to 
understanding rural water sectors. This includes the assumptions about network 
boundaries in order to define the scope of data collection (Section 4.3.3). The second 
part explains the qualitative techniques used to analyse the importance of observed 
network characteristics from the perspectives of those experiencing these social 
networks (Section 4.4).  
The final section of this chapter reflects on experiences applying these methods in the 
field (Section 4.6). Case studies from Ghana and Bangladesh are presented to highlight 
how the methods worked during the initial data collection process. Bangladesh, 
although not completed a full case study in this research due to security issues, 
nevertheless provided an opportunity to conduct some interviews to test the possibility 
of alternative means of data collection (Section 4.6.2). These experiences provide 
reflections on the benefits and challenges of these methods, addressed in the latter part 
of this chapter (Section 4.6.3 and 4.6.4).  
 4.1 Theoretical Assumptions 
The main theoretical decision is considering which data are valid for answering the 
research questions. Social network analysis can be conducted on existing data records 
from sources such as emails, contracts, and other archival information, or on data 
captured directly from stakeholder interviews. The choice about which data are 
appropriate is influenced partly by the availability of data, because local institutions 
might not have accurate records documenting their interactions, but the main 
consideration is which data might provide the most useful construction of reality with 
respect to the research questions.  
This research adopts a constructivist epistemological perspective whereby agents may 
perceive and interpret reality differently (Craig & Craig, 1999; Fosnot, 1996). This 
assumption means that primary data collected from network actors about how they 
perceive their relationships will be the basis of analysis. Individual perspectives on their 
relationships with others are assumed to be a valid construction of reality that may 
differ from formally intended institutional structures and relationships. It is not known 
how closely the institutions studied in this research will represent their intended forms, 
functions, and relationships, and a constructivist perspective can accommodate 
discrepancies between the intended and the actual. Using individual perspectives 
therefore allows participants to describe how relationships are actually experienced in 
practice, and to describe how these relationships have existed over time.   
These theoretical assumptions emphasise the importance of directly interacting with 
network actors to capture data. Space needs to be created for them to express their 
perspectives in ways that can be analysed to answer the research questions. Primary 
interviews in person with network stakeholders are therefore selected as the source of 
data in this research, and proposed methods now consider how network data specifically 
can be gathered from these interviews.  
4.2 Ethics 
The main ethical responsibility in involving interview participants is to consider 
potential harm that the study might cause to the participants. Precautions are therefore 
taken to prevent any potential harm. The primary concern is creating a safe environment 
for participants to speak freely without fear of repercussions.  
Anonymity is applied to both the individual interviewed, and the name of the 
stakeholder they represent. Veiling participant identity is important for several reasons. 
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Firstly, individuals commenting on a sector may face repercussions for making 
statements about others, or statements on behalf of their organisations. Keeping 
participants anonymous avoids concerns about consequences of their statements. 
Anonymity of responses presented in research documentation and findings protects 
participants while still allowing investigation of the research questions.  
Anonymity is also important for analysing network characteristics as social structural 
patterns instead of relationships between specific stakeholders. Identifying, for example, 
the most powerful stakeholder in a network may be tactically interesting for those 
working in the network, but the specific names have little value for developing broader 
scientific findings. In this research, stakeholders are therefore classified by their type 
and level of sector hierarchy instead of their unique names. Individuals participating in 
interviews are further protected because even the identification of a stakeholder does 
not identify the individual within it who was interviewed. Classification by stakeholder 
type and level of hierarchy can identify patterns in links between, for example, 
government and the private sector without identifying specific organisations. This 
protects the identities of particular stakeholders, and the individuals within these, while 
still allowing investigation of network characteristics.  
The anonymous nature of the research was discussed with participants during 
interviews, and their consent to participate is confirmed through their signing a release 
form (Appendix B). This allows participants to also indicate whether they would prefer 
to have their verbal responses recorded in writing instead of by audio recording. The 
approach to ethics used in this research is in line with the requirements of the 
Cambridge University Department of Engineering, and was adhered to throughout the 
research process.   
4.3 Egocentric Network Mapping 
Social network analysis is the core method used in this research. This section explains 
how it applies to the research questions, with specific focus on egocentric network 
analysis. It further defines the types of ties that are used to connect network nodes, and 
how the definition of these ties has been adapted from existing definitions of social 
power. Finally, this section describes the data collection methods used to capture 
network data during stakeholder interviews.   
Social Network Analysis has gained attention for mapping characteristics of social 
systems (Borgatti et al., 2013; Scott, 2013). Social network analysis originated from 
 connecting ‘nodes’ using ‘ties’ to identify clusters of social interaction (Scott, 2013), 
and this practice remains the basis for fruitful research in different fields to investigate 
how relationships describe social phenomena (see Bebbington & Kothari, 2006; Frank 
et al., 2014; Romo & Anheier, 1996). Its many applications have been extended to 
include topics ranging from analysis of performance in the private sector where 
organisational effectiveness may be more than the sum of its parts (Cross et al., 2005), 
to characteristics of social support networks amongst friends (Bellotti, 2008).  
Social network analysis was selected for this research because of its potential utility for 
understanding stakeholder relationships that influence institutional development. 
Egocentric network mapping is a specific subset of social network analysis that 
examines a specific node to understand its direct relationships (Crossley et al., 2015). 
Egocentric network analysis, or ego net analysis for short, can identify characteristics of 
an actor’s network that may influence their behaviour. This approach has been used to 
investigate social dynamics including the structure of friend networks (see Bellotti, 
2008), and influences on individual political behaviour (Zhang & Ahmed, 2011). This 
research proposes that egocentric network analysis can be extended to the institutional 
context of this research to understand network characteristics around a specific 
institution that is improving performance. Key decisions about how to study stakeholder 
networks involve deciding what constitutes a tie in the networks of interest (Section 
4.3.1), how data will be collected (Section 4.3.2), and how nodes and network 
boundaries are identified (Section 4.3.3).  
4.3.1 Proposed Network Tie Categories 
Power ties are used to define connections between nodes in rural water sectors studied 
in this research. Power ties are assumed to be the most relevant basis for investigation 
because of the inherent power dynamics in water service delivery (Lockwood and 
Smits, 2011). More nuanced definitions of power are required, however, to understand 
stakeholder relationships in detail. Tie definitions also need to use language that is 
commonly understood by all interview participants to reduce interpretive bias. This 
research therefore proposes four categories of network ties, each weighted and 
directional, as the basis of social network analysis. These are the relationships that 
interview participants are asked to identify, and are adapted from a definition of social 
power to use concepts assumed to be familiar to stakeholders in rural water sectors.  
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Social power, as conceptualised by French and Raven (1959), includes six dimensions 
(List 2), and the proposed network tie types adapt these definitions of power into 
specific tie types and sub-types. Table 9 presents the proposed tie types, sub-types, and 
definitions of the different tie strengths. These sub-types are designed to show relative 
differences in the weight of network connections using standardised definitions that are 
assumed to be commonly understood by research participants. The weighting of ties 
allows interview participants to show relative distinctions in weights between different 
ties in their networks even if they interpret the precise definitions of sub-categories 
slightly differently. Discussion about how these ties and sub-types are derived from the 
‘Bases of Social Power’ (French & Raven, 1959) follows in List 2 after the presentation 
of Table 9.   
 Table 9– Proposed network categorisation of network ties by type and sub-type 
Tie Type Sub-type (weight) Description 
1. Information  1.1 Download Information sent from one to the other 
1.2 Discussion Issues are identified, discussed, and 
clarified 
1.3 Dialogue Exploring assumptions together leads to 
new understanding between stakeholders 
2. Resources  2.1 Low < $100,000 USD per year 
2.2 Mid  $100,000 - $1 million USD per year 
2.3 High > $1 million USD per year 
3. Authority  3.1 Influence  Ability to influence interests of others 
indirectly 
3.2 Authority 
Control; the authority able to enforce 
consequences for non-compliance 
4. Skills 4.1 Consulting Temporary skill provision to complete a 
task 
4.2 Training Providing temporary skill building 
activities 
4.3 Coaching On-going customised interaction to support 
participants’ ability to overcome 
challenges 
4.4 Co-Development Supporting another stakeholder to develop 
their own way of doing things 
These proposed tie types and sub-types can be directly related to the ‘Bases of Social 
Power’ (French & Raven, 1959). Each base of social power in the following list is 
highlighted in bold and each paragraph describes how the tie types used in this research 
relate to the power bases.  
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List 2 – Bases of Social Power (bold) (French & Raven, 1959) and their 
relationships to ego network tie types 
I. Information is looked at directly. This category is broken into further sub-
categories to explore a breadth of information interactions. Respondents are 
anticipated to be able to identify to whom they report, with whom they co-
develop ideas, and so on. This is expected to be a familiar concept to all 
interview participants across different cultures and levels of education.  
II. Expertise is partly shown by skills transfer, which is an aspect of expertise. 
Further combinations with information flows that can exist in parallel help to 
further identify the presence of expertise power. Respondents are assumed to be 
able to identify those providing them with skill and capacity support or 
training. They are also assumed to be able to distinguish between interactions 
that are one time instances of training or consultation versus ongoing 
interactions that support their capacity development.  
III. Coercive and reward power are combined as opposing aspects of the same 
dynamic. These are represented by the authority sub-type ‘influence’ (3.1). 
Respondents are assumed to be able to identify stakeholders that can influence 
or are influenced by the interests of the respondent. These are relationships that 
can change the behaviour of a stakeholder without directly forcing a change 
through a controlling relationship. The stronger version of this tie, authority, 
represents control (3.2), and relates to the definition of legitimacy power that is 
discussed next. Raven and French identify coercive and reward power as being 
similar because they both represent a type of incentive (1958). They can 
therefore be combined into an ‘authority’ tie type that represents either formal 
control or influence between stakeholders.  
IV. Legitimacy is represented by an ‘authority’ tie (3.2). An example of this is a 
directive from a national ministry to a district government that must be obeyed. 
Respondents are expected to be able to identify who has direct control over 
them, or to whom they have a strong obligation, either formally or informally.   
V. Referent power, the desire to be associated with individual or groups, does not 
need to be identified by participants in interviews because relationships can be 
observed directly from network data. Communities of influence can be identified 
later by graphing and aggregating egocentric networks. Respondents may 
struggle to identify this property independently, and therefore are not asked to 
 do so. The network ties they report during interviews instead provide the data to 
eventually explore this type of power.  
Further influences on tie sub-type categorisation are also worth noting. Skill transfer, 
for example, could conceivably be left as a single category representing expertise 
power. Additional detail is included to recognise the impact that different skill transfer 
approaches may have. Action research in the related field of public administration 
identified a distinction between one-time training (4.2) and training followed by 
coaching support (4.3), with the latter showing significantly larger improvements 
(Olivero, Bane, & Kopelman, 1997). A distinction is therefore made where training is 
supplemented with on-going support for practice and feedback. The final skill link, ‘Co-
development’ (4.4), was introduced at the recommendation of study participants in 
Ghana who identified relationships they considered went beyond coaching to actively 
co-generate and implement solutions. 
Finally, information links are differentiated to represent multiple possible collaborative 
relationships. The basic exchange labelled ‘download’ (1.1) represents information 
exchange possible without further relationship, as if the source provides data to a target. 
Writing that distinguishes monologue from dialogue illustrates this point (Busser & 
Wegner, 2012). Relative middle ground is represented by ‘discussion’ (1.2), which 
encourages multiple viewpoints and clarification. Discussion may include debate when 
viewpoints conflict. ‘Dialogue’ (1.3) represents the strongest form of information 
engagement, allowing for collective sense-making through the suspension of judgment 
and re-evaluation of assumptions (Nagda et al., 2008). Definitions of different 
information tie strengths are meant to be illustrative of the relative differences. The 
important implication for interview participants is the ability to differentiate between 
stronger and weaker ties when describing their relationships.  
Through these tie definitions the bases of social power can be represented by the tie 
types and sub-types proposed for this research (Table 9). These tie definitions are 
designed to include a broad definition of social power dimensions using language 
familiar to stakeholders in rural water sectors. Definitions are designed to help 
participants to quickly and easily identify relative differences between relationships in 
their networks even if they do not grasp the complete nuance of sub-type definitions.  
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4.3.2 Network Mapping 
Data capture methods are informed by both data requirements and practical interview 
considerations. Interviews need to reliably capture accurate data from all types of 
potential interview participants. Participants may not have time or interest to participate 
in extended interviews involving unfamiliar concepts with a stranger. Research design 
therefore has to consider how stakeholders of different levels of power, availability, 
experience with research, interest in the subject matter, and education will respond to 
the interview design.  
Individual stakeholder interviews are an important design choice for both practical and 
theoretical reasons. These emphasise the individual perspectives, and recognise that 
practical constraints may hinder group-mapping exercises with the whole network. 
Getting large groups of stakeholders in a room at the same time for an interview can be 
logistically challenging. It also poses risks for influencing participant responses if 
dominant voices crowd out quieter ones, if conflicting opinions are not recognised, or if 
majority consensus produces general sentiments instead of detailed insights. Individual 
interviews are better suited to accommodate these considerations. 
Interviews with individuals are used to represent a stakeholder, which consists of 
multiple individual perspectives. The individual selected therefore has to be 
knowledgeable and capable of speaking on behalf of the group. This is achieved by 
speaking to knowledgeable staff with strong experience of the organisation’s 
relationships, and this individual may or may not be in a leadership position. The 
relevant individual depends on the stakeholder being interviewed, and in practice the 
researcher was commonly referred to specific people and redirected if the recommended 
person could not provide the required information. Interviewing knowledgeable 
individuals was deemed the preferred approach and was standard practice during 
fieldwork.  
Individual interviews are used to identify egocentric networks between the interviewee 
(the ‘ego’) and those they have direct relationships with (‘alters’). Other studies have 
asked egos to comment on ties between alters (Bellotti, 2008), but in this research 
participants are not asked to speculate on links between their alters. This is because 
follow up interviews with the alters themselves can gather these data directly. Data from 
all interviews are later combined to create ego networks around the case study 
institutions for analysis. 
 
 The facilitated interview structure is inspired by the net-map graphing tool. This tool 
allows participants to visualise their network and represent it using post-it notes, flip 
chart paper, and coloured markers to represent different tie types (Schiffer, 2007). In the 
first step, the name of the interview participant is written on a post-it note and placed in 
the centre of the paper. The participant then identifies other stakeholders they have 
direct ties with according to the defined tie types (Table 9) and these stakeholders are 
written on post-it notes and distributed in a circle around the periphery. The participant 
is then asked about each tie type individually and asked to draw ties between them and 
their alters, but participants are not asked to draw ties between alters.   
This process is repeated for each of the four tie types. The drawn ties show arrows to 
indicate direction, colour to indicate tie type, and the number of arrow heads to 
represent tie weight. The participant holds the pens throughout the exercise. The 
researcher can easily convert this drawn network to electronic format for analysis by 
coding the nodes and ties drawn by participants with minimal risk of misinterpreting 
data. The process is intuitive, visual, and can be completed quickly depending on the 
number of stakeholders in a network.  
 
Figure 4 – A completed egocentric network map from an interview (photo: D. 
McNicholl) 
4.3.3 Scope and Sampling Criteria 
The previous chapter described the case study institutions in selected countries that are 
the focus of this research (Section 3.5). Interviews with them are the starting points for 
network investigation. The next step is to define how other stakeholders are identified 
for subsequent interviews. These subsequent interviews are used to verify ties in the ego 
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networks of case study institutions, and to capture data on ties between alters. Selection 
criteria were developed to identify which other stakeholders to interview, given that not 
every stakeholder in every rural water sector can be interviewed. Assumptions about 
network boundaries therefore need to define two things: who to include in interviews; 
and where to draw boundaries in order to answer research questions. 
4.3.3.1 Identifying Network Interviews 
Identification of nodes in an ego network uses a name generator approach (Marsden, 
1987). This means that interview participants are asked to identify stakeholders from 
memory without prompting or selecting from a pre-specified list. This approach is 
appropriate because full lists of network nodes were not available to the researcher prior 
to fieldwork and, even if stakeholder lists were available, the name generator approach 
allows new stakeholders to be identified. The name generator approach identifies the 
most important stakeholders by assuming the most important stakeholders are the 
easiest to recall. This approach can be sensitive to influence by the researcher 
depending on how participants are prompted to identify stakeholders (Marsden, 2003), 
and this challenge was addressed by asking participants to identify whomever they have 
a relationship with in the context of water supply that can be described by any one of 
the four tie types: information, skills, resources, and authority. Asking about these 
relationships specifically is assumed to be more precise than a general prompt such as: 
“who do you interact with?” These names then inform which stakeholders to include in 
subsequent interviews through a ‘snowball’ sampling approach. 
4.3.3.2 Sampling Criteria 
Selection criteria ensure that the interviewing process stops at natural network 
boundaries instead of continuing on indefinitely to potentially include all stakeholders 
in a country. The chief criterion is that a stakeholder needs to be mentioned in more 
than one interview to be eligible for a follow up interview. This allows stakeholders to 
be identified as significant in the networks around case study institutions without prior 
judgment by the researcher, while still ensuring that follow up interviews do not 
continue indefinitely. Stakeholders at higher levels of sector hierarchy needed to be 
mentioned at least three times, and lower hierarchy stakeholders needed to be 
mentioned at least twice. The original design was simply to ensure that any stakeholder 
mentioned more than once received a follow up interview, but an initial pilot of 
fieldwork in Ghana (Section 4.6.1) found that national level stakeholders were too 
numerous, and the threshold for the number of times mentioned was elevated to three. 
 Overall, these criteria mean that if a stakeholder is mentioned only once it will appear in 
overall network data, but a follow up interview to understand that stakeholder’s network 
would not be conducted.  
The sampling method requires some stakeholders to be interviewed initially as starting 
points. The case study institutions are the initial starting point (see Section 3.5), and 
stakeholders connected to them such as government institutions or communities can 
serve as other starting points because they have permanent roles in water supply. If it is 
later found that these secondary stakeholders are only mentioned once, data from their 
interviews can be excluded from network analysis. In this way, case study stakeholders 
and those immediately connected to them can be starting points for snowball networks.  
Figure 5 provides a visual illustration of how these criteria are applied, and shows how 
the snowball network grows with each interview. It begins with one of the case study 
institutions that is improving performance (Section 3.5), and this initial interview 
identifies its direct ties to other stakeholders. Some of these other stakeholders likely 
have permanent roles in rural water supply that will require interviewing, such as 
communities or key government offices. One of these is identified by a small orange dot 
in the first interview in Figure 5, which then becomes the second interview. Other 
stakeholders are identified in this second interview, some new and some that have been 
referenced previously. These stakeholders have now been mentioned twice in 
interviews, and are interviewed subsequently. Note how some stakeholders change from 
yellow nodes to orange ones when they have been identified multiple times. One of 
these becomes the third interview. This process repeats until all stakeholders identified 
have either been interviewed, or do not meet the criteria for a follow up interview. 
Networks are developed through these methods and boundaries emerge naturally.  
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Figure 5 – Visual illustration of snowball network evolution identifying starting 
points, follow up interviews, and stakeholders identified but not yet included for 
subsequent interviews. 
This selection approach naturally identifies network boundaries without requiring 
advance knowledge of network membership. The criteria for inclusion therefore only 
influences the necessity of a follow up interview, which can expand the network to 
include new stakeholders, and verify network links mentioned in other interviews. 
Interviews with only a select subset of stakeholders in a water sector can still therefore 
produce a relevant network for analysis.  
4.3.3.3 Identifying Stakeholder Groups 
Another boundary challenge is the presence of many instances of the same stakeholder 
type. Communities are a good example of this; a single district in Malawi may have 
several hundred communities. Other stakeholders may report that they connect with 
 these communities, but follow up interviews with each community is infeasible in the 
scope of this research. A grouping approach is therefore applied to capture perspectives 
from communities without having to interview each one.  
In this research, multiple stakeholders of an identical type (e.g. communities) are 
grouped together as a single node, and then one or more of these is separated to provide 
a specific instance for interviewing. This means that perspectives can be captured from 
this stakeholder group without interviewing each stakeholder. For communities and 
water users, two instances were typically interviewed from within a larger group. Figure 
6 illustrates how this works.  
 
Figure 6 – Illustration of how similar stakeholders are grouped and at least one of 
their members is interviewed to produce network data for analysis 
Assume that node A describes a tie with communities in a district during its interview. 
This type of statement is general and may not apply equally to all communities in the 
district. Follow up interviews are necessary to verify the network relationship. 
Following up with each community in the district is impractical, however, so 
community node is split into a ‘Group’ node and a ‘Specific’ node. A follow up 
interview with the specific node, an individual community, happens next. It identifies a 
tie with other communities, the general node, but not one with node A. The final 
network therefore shows a tie between the B nodes, and a tie from node A to the group 
B node, but not the specific B node because the interview with the B node did not 
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mention a tie between itself and A. The approach means that if a stakeholder makes a 
general claim, such as ‘we have relationships with all communities in a district’, this 
can be captured as data, and follow up interviews with specific communities can clarify 
the nature of the relationship in specific instances.  
The grouping approach allows interview participants to reference larger groups of 
stakeholders and to verify these ties with a follow up interview. This also provides some 
indication of ties within a group of like stakeholders. This approach creates a network 
boundary to capture perspective from large groups of similar stakeholders without 
requiring follow up interviews with each instance within a group.  
4.3.4 Aggregating Egocentric Networks 
Network data from all interviews are combined to produce snowball networks. These 
snowball networks are then filtered to show the ego networks of the institutions being 
studied. Combining interview data therefore includes both direct ties between an ego 
and its alters, and ties between alters.  
Combining data from multiple interviews means that conflicts occasionally arise. A 
conflict occurs when two interviewed stakeholders perceive a tie between them 
differently. The first possibility is where the two stakeholders both identify a tie, but 
perceive different strengths. In these cases, the tie weight is averaged. Taking the 
average gives both interview participants equal ability to perceive their relationship 
without preferring one perspective over the other. A second type of conflict arises 
through omissions. These are where an interview participant identifies ties to another 
stakeholder, but these same tie types are not mentioned in the subsequent interview with 
the other stakeholder. In these cases, all reported ties are included in final network data. 
This means that if one side remembers ties and the other side forgets them, the ties are 
still included in the final network. Including all ties identified during interviews and 
taking the average of conflicting perceptions of tie weights allows data from multiple 
interviews to be combined in a final network for analysis.  
Figure 7 presents a visual illustration of how data from multiple interviews are 
combined to produce final networks for analysis. Example one shows how two different 
stakeholders identify the same type of tie between them in separate interviews. The 
difference is that they perceive the weight of the tie differently. The final result takes 
the average of the two. In example two, one of the stakeholders reports a tie while the 
other does not. This is treated as an omission where the stakeholder in interview B may 
 have simply forgotten to identify this tie. The final result therefore takes the tie that was 
reported and ignores the fact that this was omitted in another interview.  
 
Figure 7 – Illustration of the process for averaging conflicts in network data from 
interviews 
These design choices combine multiple individual interviews to produce snowball 
networks for analysis from individual stakeholder perspectives. Perspectives are 
aggregated from a series of interviews that eventually identify the network nodes and 
ties necessary for egocentric network analysis around the case study institutions. 
Analysing ego networks provides the starting point for answering the research 
questions, and is next supplemented by qualitative stakeholder interpretations of the 
importance of network characteristics.  
4.4 Participant Perspective Coding 
Characteristics of networks are not inherently good or bad. The concept of brokerage, 
for example, was previously assumed to be a desirable role in a network, but further 
research has demonstrated that this is not always the case (Crossley, 2010). Stakeholder 
perspectives therefore help to inform the value and significance of observed network 
characteristics. Network characteristics are qualified by capturing and collating 
stakeholder perceptions of network characteristics during interviews.  
After drawing their ego networks, interview participants are asked about their 
perceptions of the network to further understand how the network supports institutional 
development. These perspectives are recorded and later coded to identify network 
characteristics that are independently identified by multiple stakeholders referring to a 
specific set of network relationships. Individual perspectives can also provide unique 
insights if one stakeholder sees something that others do not. Whether they agree with 
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others or not, stakeholder commentary provides insight into how the networks are 
experienced by the stakeholders that participate in these relationships.   
All interview participants are asked the same question immediately after drawing their 
ego network. These responses are audio recorded for later transcription and analysis. 
The exact language sometimes requires adaptation depending on the vernacular, level of 
education, and familiarity with considering abstract concepts such as institutional 
development, but the intent of the question remains constant. Referring to the ego 
network the participant has just drawn, the question is: 
“What about this network is helping the management of rural water 
services to improve?” 
Follow up questions from the interviewer are limited, except for clarifications and 
encouragement to elaborate on the full breadth of network interactions that the 
participant perceives as important. This questioning structure allows participants, 
instead of the researcher, to guide the direction of conversation towards what they 
perceive as most important. The question is designed to identify network characteristics 
that support institutional development, while being broad enough to allow participants 
to share whatever they feel is important. The theme of the question is clear, but its open-
ended nature allows participants to lead the identification of what they perceive as most 
important with minimal influence from the preconceived ideas from the researcher.  
Transcriptions from audio recordings are later coded by the researcher. Commentaries 
are sorted by the network characteristics they describe, and how these relate to 
institutional development. These commentaries can then be grouped to identify where 
multiple stakeholders describe a similar network characteristic as an important influence 
supporting institutional development. This coding method is inspired by Grounded 
Theory methodology (see Charmaz, 2006) and draws on established coding processes to 
identify themes in data (Flick, 2006) and approaches to synthesising qualitative 
interviews with network data (Herz et al., 2014), but differs slightly because not all 
comments are equally included in the final findings. Coding first identifies where 
commentaries describe network characteristics related to institutional development, and 
participant commentary can sometimes deviate from the intended research focus. 
Coding also screens commentaries to make sure that the respondent directly observes 
the part of the network that they describe. This guards against stakeholders making 
general comments that may not apply equally to all parts of a network. The coding 
 method therefore provides a set of described network characteristics that are used to 
qualify the importance of numerical network data (McNicholl et al., 2017).   
Combining the quantitative and qualitative methods strengthens the overall research to 
identify network characteristics and to qualify which characteristics have positive 
influences on institutional development. Network investigation is able to lend 
quantitative weight to the qualitative nature of stakeholder interactions, but it is not 
enough on its own. Understanding the significance of particular network interactions 
needs to be complemented by qualifying statements, and coding stakeholder perceptions 
to identify commonly observed themes achieves this.   
4.5 Combined Analysis 
To summarise the overall analysis, perspectives from participant responses about 
network characteristics augment quantitative network analysis to identify which 
characteristics are positive. The process is two step. The first part applies standard 
quantitative ego network numerical analysis to characterise the ego networks of interest. 
The second step uses interview verbal responses to describe the importance of network 
characteristics. The result is a set of both quantitative and qualitative network 
characteristics that describe stakeholders improving performance from a network 
perspective. The combined methods determine the presence of network characteristics 
numerically, then qualify their importance with narratives from interviews.  
4.6 Field Testing Methods 
Advantages and disadvantages of data collection methods were identified from an initial 
test in Ghana, expanded through research in the other four case study countries. An 
alternate data collection method was also tested in Bangladesh where a single interview 
with a knowledgeable stakeholder attempted to develop a complete ego network that 
included all ties between stakeholders identified in the interview. This section outlines 
experiences from fieldwork, and concludes with benefits and limitations of the data 
collection methods.  
4.6.1 Piloting Methods in Ghana 
Ghana, the first country case study, provided an opportunity to pilot data collection 
methods. Ghana was selected because the researcher had some experience in the 
country but did not know the water sector there intimately. Piloting fieldwork methods 
allowed adaptation of methods where necessary, and the opportunity to return to Ghana 
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at a later date if methods had to be adapted significantly enough to disqualify the data 
collected during the pilot fieldwork. Fortunately, the pilot study was successful, and 
data collected from the trip were deemed suitable for analysis.  
Fieldwork in Ghana was conducted from April to May 2015, and a total of 43 
stakeholders participated in interviews. The starting point of investigation were the two 
district governments that are improving performance (Section 3.5.1.2), and further 
stakeholder interviews explored network relationships connecting to local, regional, and 
national levels. Network and narrative data collected during these interviews became 
the basis for the Ghana case study.   
Interviews typically took less than 60 minutes, and could be completed in as little as 20 
minutes when time constraints demanded efficiency and the number of stakeholders in 
an ego network was small. Interview participants found intuitive the process of 
identifying stakeholders and describing their relationships through drawing arrows. 
They would commonly ask clarifying questions, or describe a particular relationship to 
understand how it could best be represented using the tie type framework used in this 
research. Characterising other relationships typically progressed smoothly once a few 
initial examples were completed.  
All interviews followed a simple three-step format: 
1. Writing stakeholder names on the flip chart that the participating stakeholder 
(the ego) has any information, skill, resource, or authority ties with; 
2. Drawing ties between the stakeholder being interviewed (the ego) and the other 
stakeholders identified (the alters) for each tie type on the flip chart; and  
3. Commentary on network characteristics (recorded verbal response). 
 
  
Figure 8 – An interview participant identifies the egocentric network of his 
organisation (photo: D. McNicholl) 
The majority of these interviews were conducted in English in the offices or residences 
of the participants. The few interviews that were conducted in local languages 
benefitted from the assistance of local government staff that were kind enough to 
translate. Concepts in the exercise were typically grasped quickly by participants, and 
the visual nature of the exercise helped to make it intuitive regardless of participant 
literacy.  
Participants typically felt comfortable having their verbal responses recorded, although 
several first clarified that their responses would be anonymous. The depth to which each 
respondent explored particular issues differed, but all were willing to qualify the 
importance of network characteristics to some extent. Capturing multiple perspectives 
from independent interviews then allowed the triangulation of important issues.  
The length and depth of these commentaries could be unpredictable. Some participants 
would insist on having only a brief period for an interview, and then spend 90 minutes 
explaining their views. These commentaries could be surprisingly candid, even about 
potentially sensitive issues. It is possible that the confidentiality of the interview and the 
perception of the researcher as a neutral party without a direct agenda in the Ghanaian 
water sector are two factors that supported an open interview environment.  
The methods used in Ghana collected the desired data, and no methodological changes 
were necessary in subsequent case studies. Data collection became more efficient in 
different contexts as the researcher became more experienced, but the structure 
remained the same. The data collection methods were able to capture the required data 
in all case study countries.  
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4.6.2 Testing Alternative Data Collection in Bangladesh 
One methodological experiment was conducted in Bangladesh to test the ability of a 
single knowledgeable stakeholder to describe an entire ego network, including ties 
between alters. The network mapping interviews used in this research did not ask the 
participant to describe ties between other stakeholders in its ego network based on the 
assumption that an ego might struggle to define ties between alters because it does not 
experience these relationships directly. A brief visit to Bangladesh provided an 
appropriate opportunity to test this assumption because follow up interviews with alters 
was not possible.  
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) has been lauded as one of the 
most successful NGOs in the world (Smillie, 2009). From their beginnings as a small 
local NGO in 1972, BRAC has grown to become the largest NGO in Bangladesh, and 
has extended its presence to 12 other countries. Its most recent water and sanitation 
programme, with support from the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, targeted an 
estimated 8.9 million households (Jacimovic et al., 2014). Their work would have made 
them an interesting case study for this research, but this possibility was abandoned due 
to security issues in Bangladesh at the time of fieldwork.  
One interview was conducted with a senior representative of the BRAC WASH 
department. The interview applied the same approach used in previous country case 
studies with one important difference: the participant was asked to draw alter-to-alter 
ties in his ego network. This means that the ego network drawn in the interview showed 
all connections between all stakeholders as perceived by the individual interviewed. His 
extensive experience makes him knowledgeable of the sector, but the extent to which he 
can accurately characterise connections between other stakeholders was unknown.  
Attempting this modified interview approach found that the alter-to-alter ties lacked 
detail and the participant was not confident in his responses. Although he had some 
sense of interactions between alters in his ego network, he was not able to confidently 
report on the details of these ties. The number of ties also made the drawn network 
difficult to interpret after completion of the interview (Figure 9).  
  
Figure 9 – Section of the network drawn by the interview participant (photo: D. 
McNicholl) 
Preliminary findings were developed after the interview and presented to BRAC for 
feedback. This allowed the opportunity to identify any omissions from the network in 
the original interview. Their feedback highlighted both a strength of the research 
methods, and the limitation of attempting to understand a whole network from the 
perspective of only one stakeholder.  
According to staff at BRAC, the methods had “drawn up the stakeholder dynamics quite 
nicely – especially considering the short amount of time and the volume of information” 
(N. Khan, email correspondence, Feb 9, 2016). This positive feedback suggests that the 
ego network mapping exercise has some value as a stand-alone exercise in its ability to 
quickly interpret direct ego-alter ties and possibly some of the alter-to-alter ties, but 
drawing alter-to-alter ties may require supplemental data from interviews with those 
alters. Consequently, data on alter-to-alter ties were not captured in interviews outside 
of this one experiment.  
4.6.3 Benefits of Methods 
The research methods were used to collect required data in the five case study countries 
between April 2015 and August 2016. A total of 162 interviews were conducted in six 
countries over a sixteen-month period. The methods met the demands of this ambitious 
project, and this section considers several reasons why these methods worked.  
Firstly, participants generously made time for the interviews. Participation was likely 
helped by the fact that the interviews needed to be conducted in person and therefore 
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required specific scheduling. Remotely conducted surveys can be easier to ignore. 
Although many have busy schedules, participants often followed up when unavailable 
and offered alternatives for meeting times. One local government official suggested 
meeting on a Sunday evening because it was most convenient for him. Flexibility of the 
researcher was an important part of responding to stakeholder availability, and helped to 
ensure that the exercise could be completed efficiently if busy schedules required it.  
The majority of participants were not concerned about sharing their perspectives during 
interviews. An exception was in Tajikistan where anonymity was particularly important 
because of the sensitive political environment. Almost all participants in Tajikistan 
declined to be audio recorded, but permitted handwritten notes and collection of 
network data. A release form helped clarify how data would be managed and confirmed 
willingness to participate (Appendix B). This was important for stakeholders facing 
restrictions about how they are allowed to represent an organisation, and for managing 
fear of potential repercussions when discussing politically sensitive material. All 
stakeholders approached were at least willing to draw their egocentric networks even if 
they declined to have their verbal responses audio recorded. 
The visual nature of network mapping was an asset. The network drawing exercise was 
engaging, and held participant attention throughout the interview. All participants were 
able to complete the exercise. Being able to draw the network also allowed the 
participants to visually sense how long the exercise would take, which appealed to busy 
stakeholders.  
The visual process had further benefits. Participants sometimes double-checked their 
responses for completeness, which they may have struggled to do in an exclusively oral 
interview. Being focused on drawing one connection in the network at a time also made 
it more difficult for participants to be aware of the overall picture they were creating. 
For example, if one were asked to describe a network generally, he or she might talk in 
imprecise generalisations. Describing each relationship individually identifies where 
relationships between similar types of stakeholders are in fact different, and provides 
detail that might be lost in a summary description. 
Multiple participants also saw value in the exercise itself because of the detail used to 
describe networks. This was particularly true for stakeholders actively considering their 
own role within the network and how they might participate more strategically. This 
seems to be partly because connecting stakeholders one at a time allows detailed 
network characteristics to emerge, which might not be evident from generalised 
 assumptions that individuals have about the networks in which they participate. A few 
participants took photos of the egocentric network after the exercise because they found 
it interesting; others asked about when the method will be published and potentially 
available for use.  
The verification provided by interviewing stakeholders separately was also deemed to 
be useful. Although participants may omit or misremember certain stakeholders or ties, 
interviewing stakeholders individually helps to verify data. The detailed structure of 
network graphing during interviews also makes it difficult for participants to wilfully 
collude to provide misleading data. Experiences collecting these data suggest that the 
networks are accurate representations of the stakeholders and relationships in the rural 
water sectors studied.  
In summary, the research methods were deemed to be effective for collecting the 
required data, and were found to have several advantages. The necessity of one-on-one 
interviews helped participants to create time for the exercise, and to openly share their 
views once they understood the conversation was anonymous. Participants often 
became engaged in the visual nature of the network mapping exercise once it began, 
clarifying how they could best represent their experiences, and double checking their 
responses. Some were interested in the insights that came from visualising their 
networks. Subsequent interviews with other stakeholders independently then helped to 
verify data and gather different views on issues. Further research might build on these 
methods to consider how they can be used again and adapted to different contexts.  
4.6.4 Challenges with Methods 
There were also challenges with applying the research methods. These relate to both the 
experience of conducting interviews, and limitations of trying to understand complex 
realities through a particular type of approach. Multiple challenges were identified that 
had to be managed in the context of this research.   
Firstly, participant oral responses sometimes deviate from the intended topic. Maximum 
space was given for participants to speak as they saw fit, sometimes involving lengthy 
digressions. Clarification was only requested during points of confusion, and summaries 
were occasionally ventured to help wrap up a topic and proceed to a new one. Future 
case studies may consider encouraging further oral responses more closely related to the 
topic of interest after participants have fully expressed their views on what is important.  
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Some challenges arose from trying to approximate dynamic relationships with a drawn 
snapshot. The exercise did not capture the frequency of interaction between 
stakeholders. One participant in Ghana, while giving feedback on the exercise, 
tentatively suggested including some way of measuring interaction frequency. On 
further consideration, however, he then backtracked in favour of simplicity because he 
believed that the levels of intensity within link types give some indication of interaction 
frequency. Intensity of a relationship is, however, not the same as frequency of 
interaction, and future iterations of these methods might consider finding an efficient 
way of incorporating frequency of interaction into the mapping exercise.  
Drawn networks also do not show how things change over time, meaning that 
interviews provide a snapshot that is an approximation of relationships over a period 
spanning several years. This is accepted as a limitation of the methods, since capturing 
multiple snapshots over several years was not feasible in this research. The relatively 
stable nature of institutional relationships, particularly involving government and civil 
society, and allowing interview participants to verbally describe the nature network 
interactions can justify accepting this limitation.  
Limitations with interviewing knowledgeable individuals on behalf of an organisation 
or stakeholder group was also identified as a trade-off earlier in this chapter. Overall, 
the experience of interviewing knowledgeable individuals seemed to provide the 
appropriate data. It might be possible to interview more people from an organisation, 
but would probably require collation of separate interviews. Multiple people from the 
same organisation were present in a small number of interviews, but it was unclear 
whether this benefitted the research or instead sacrificed detail for consensus. In these 
cases, one of the members drew the network while the others offered their views on 
how ties should be represented. A perceived desire to reach consensus may have 
lessened the respondent’s candidness and may have contributed to groupthink, but it is 
difficult to know the exact effect without formally studying these differences. 
Introducing a framework for graphing network tie types occasionally introduced 
interpretive challenges. There is potential for tie types and their sub-types to be 
interpreted differently. All participants, however, appeared able to grasp the framework 
quickly. Clarification was offered when requested using standardised descriptions, and 
assistance categorising tie types was further offered when participants were confused 
about what to draw. Loss of detail is unavoidable when categorising a complex reality 
into a standardised framework, although strong pushback against the framework design 
 was not encountered. This suggests that the tie types and their sub-types are reasonable 
classifications, even if they are imperfect. 
An interesting challenge emerged at the community level where participants 
interviewed could belong to multiple stakeholder groups simultaneously. For example, a 
community member can simultaneously be a chief and a representative on several 
committees. These groups were linked closely enough that these stakeholders were able 
to describe the relationships between multiple nodes at the community level, although 
future fieldwork may benefit from further detail by interviewing community sub-groups 
separately.  
A final, practical challenge was logistical. Participants were consistently supportive of 
the research, and willing to make time for interviews provided that the researcher could 
adapt to their schedules. This was sometimes challenging, requiring traveling to a new 
town on short notice, spending an unexpected night somewhere, or sometimes being 
unable to make plans for more than a few hours at a time. Chasing down interviews 
could be unpredictable and tiring, especially in foreign and occasionally sweltering 
climates.   
4.7 Methods Summary 
The methods presented in this section were applied to case studies in Ghana, Malawi, 
India, Tajikistan, and Bolivia to capture network data on how stakeholders in rural 
water service delivery sectors interact.  The methods combine egocentric network 
mapping to capture quantitative data, and verbal descriptions of networks are used to 
capture qualitative data. These two types of data are then used to identify stakeholder 
networks and their characteristics that are perceived as supporting institutional 
development for rural water supply.  
The next chapter presents quantitative analysis of network data. This is the first 
analytical step that investigates quantitative properties of ego networks for specific 
cases of institutions that are improving performance. The chapter will show how ego 
networks are analysed to present findings. This analytical step is then followed by the 
chapter on Qualitative Analysis (Chapter 6), which presents analysis of stakeholder 
commentary on important network characteristics. 
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5 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Network data collected during stakeholder interviews are analysed quantitatively using 
established methods. This chapter explains the analytical process and presents 
quantitative findings. Analysis proceeds from four angles: network size; homophily; 
multiplexity; and reciprocity. Each is defined in its respective section of this chapter, 
and some definitions of network terminology and analytical methods are presented first 
as the basis for investigation in this chapter. 
5.1.1 Visualising Snowball Networks 
Snowball networks are composed of all stakeholders and the ties between them that 
were identified in each country case study through primary data collection. These are 
the larger networks around the specific case study institutions that are the core interest 
of this research (see Section 3.5). All nodes and ties in these snowball networks can be 
visualised using Gephi network graphing software (Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 
2009), as shown in the examples of the Ghana network in Figure 10 and the Indian 
network in Figure 11. Nodes are depicted as grey dots, black arrows are ties, 
arrowheads indicate tie direction, and arrow thickness is proportional to tie weight. 
 
 
  
Figure 10 – Snowball network of all data captured in Ghana. 
 
Figure 11 – Snowball network of all data captured in India. 
Each case study focused on specific institutions that are improving performance in their 
roles related to rural water service delivery, as described earlier (Section 3.5). These 
will be referred to throughout this chapter as case study institutions, and they include 
local government, national government, or local water service operators, depending on 
the country. Case study institutions in India are community operator committees 
managing arsenic removal facilities. Case study institutions in Ghana, Malawi, and 
Bolivia are district and municipal governments. Research in Tajikistan focuses on a 
national government institution that sets policy and regulates the water sector. Each case 
study institution exists within the larger snowball network that contains all nodes and 
ties identified through primary data collection in each country.  
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5.1.2 Identifying Ego Networks within Snowball Networks 
Ego networks exist within the larger snowball network that is created by combining all 
node and tie data collected in each country. An ego network shows only nodes directly 
connected to a particular node of interest. The node of interest around which the 
network is created is called the ego, and nodes that are directly connected to the ego are 
called alters (Crossley et al., 2015).  
Snowball networks can be filtered to show the ego network of any node, as shown in 
Figure 12 and Figure 13. Ego nodes are presented as larger than others in the filtered 
ego networks (right frames) in Figure 12 and Figure 13, but their original positions in 
the network visuals are maintained. This shows how ego networks fit into the larger 
snowball networks in Ghana and India respectively.  
 
Figure 12 – Ghana snowball network (left) filtered for a specific ego network 
(right) 
 
Figure 13 – India snowball network (left) filtered for a specific ego network (right) 
Each ego network consists of the ego stakeholder and the other stakeholders it directly 
connects with – its alters. Ties are either between the ego and alters or between alters. 
Data on alter to alter ties were captured during follow up interviews with at least one of 
the two alters in the relationship. Figure 14 illustrates how these terms apply to an ego 
network.  
  
Figure 14 – Ego network example with terms defined (McNicholl et al., 2017) 
5.1.3 Identifying Egos to Analyse 
The institutions that are improving performance, referred to as case study institutions, 
were pre-determined before field work began (Section 3.5), and the ego networks of 
these case study institutions are the principal unit of analysis. The ego networks of other 
stakeholders interviewed can also be analysed to provide some comparison. Analysing 
these other ego networks can provide perspective on typical values for ego network 
properties for other stakeholders in each country. Two sets of ego networks – those of 
case study institutions, and those of others interviewed – allows some comparison of 
how case study institution network characteristics differ from those of other 
stakeholders in their respective countries.  
There are therefore three categories of stakeholders in the snowball network of each 
country studied. The first category includes the case study institutions that are 
improving performance. Analysis of their ego networks is the basis of this chapter. The 
second category includes other stakeholders that were interviewed whose performance 
is unknown. Comparing ego network properties of others interviewed to the case study 
institutions provides perspective on how case study institution ego network properties 
differ from others in the same sector. The third category includes stakeholders that were 
identified during fieldwork but not interviewed. They are not analysed because their full 
ego networks are not known. Table 10 quantifies the number of case study institutions 
and the number of other stakeholder ego networks included in each country.  
One other category of ego networks is also used for comparison in the India and Bolivia 
case studies. Capturing cases for comparison was not originally planned during 
fieldwork, but these were included when the opportunities presented themselves. These 
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institutions are the same as the other case study institutions in terms of level of 
hierarchy and role, but these institutions are declining in performance or have failed. 
These instances provide a more direct comparison in these two countries to see how 
network characteristics identified in case study institution ego networks are represented 
in the ego networks of institutions that are not developing. Data on underperforming 
institutions were only available in two case study countries because data on other 
institutions were either unavailable or, in the case of Tajikistan, because there is no 
other equivalent institution in the country. Differences in performance and comparison 
against case study institutions is explored in the chapter on Comparative Analysis 
(Chapter 7). 
Table 10 – Number of ego networks by country included in quantitative analysis 
 Ghana Malawi India Tajikistan Bolivia 
Case study 
institutions 
2 2 12 1 3 
Others 
interviewed 
41 38 25 14 19 
Others identified 
but not 
interviewed 
90 107 64 49 65 
Underperforming 
institutions 
0 0 3 0 1 
Total egos for 
analysis 
43 40 40 15 23 
Total in snowball 
network 
133 147 104 64 88 
The purpose of quantitatively analysing these different ego networks is to provide 
perspective on how case study institution ego networks differ from other stakeholders in 
their sector; the purpose is not to test for statistical significance. Comparison can help to 
understand whether or not, for example, the number of alters in case study institution 
ego networks are relatively high compared to others in the sector. The purpose is not to 
draw conclusions about influences on institutional development from this comparative 
 analysis, but rather to provide some perspective on typical values for different ego 
network properties in the respective countries.  
5.1.4 Case Study Ego Networks 
Ego networks for case study institutions can be visually represented to show two 
properties of the alters they interact with: type and level of sector hierarchy. These 
properties are used for ego network analysis in this chapter and in subsequent ones. 
Each property is described in turn.   
Levels of hierarchy are defined by the institutional structures in these countries, and 
stakeholder level of hierarchy is defined by where a stakeholder is based (Table 11). In 
Bolivia, for example, analysis considers the tendency of case study municipal 
governments to connect to others within that municipality versus to stakeholders at 
department or national levels. In India, the consideration is the tendency of local 
operators to connect to others within their communities versus those outside of it. 
Levels of hierarchy differ slightly depending on the institutional structures of case study 
countries, but all reflect similar ideas of decentralised jurisdictions spanning from local 
to national levels.  
Table 11 – Definition of levels of sector hierarchy by country used in analysis 
Level of 
Sector 
Hierarchy 
Ghana Malawi Bolivia India Tajikistan 
High National National National State National* 
Middle Regional Regional Department District Regional 
Local District* District* Municipal* Community* District 
                                                          * denotes case study institution level of sector hierarchy 
Stakeholder type is the property used to define network nodes by the role of the 
stakeholder (Table 12). Definitions are consistent across all case studies. Stakeholder 
types are defined for this research with the intent to understand how case study 
institutions connect to similar versus different stakeholder types. These definitions draw 
on common terms in rural water sectors to simplify identification of stakeholder types 
during interviews.   
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Table 12 – Definitions of stakeholder types used in network analysis 
Type Definition 
Government Official government agencies or departments. 
Private For profit stakeholders that provide goods or services. 
Operator Dedicated manager of a water system. These are distinguished from 
Private because these perform a specific function in providing water 
services that may not be profit-driven.  
DP Development Partners, or donor organisations, that includes bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral organisations such as the UK Department for 
International Development (DfID) and the World Bank Group (WB). 
INGO International Non-Government Organisations that run projects or 
provide services with international scope and resources such as 
WaterAid or Water for People.  
NGO Non-Government Organisations that operate with scope and resources 
within the country only. 
Academic Academic institutions including universities. 
Civil Other local stakeholders from civil society including citizens, 
communities, religious leaders, and traditional leaders. 
Colour coding and spatial orientation of nodes can be used to visualise ego networks 
that identify node types and levels of hierarchy. Examples of these ego networks from 
each country are presented next.  
5.1.4.1 Ghana 
The case study institutions in Ghana are two district governments that are improving 
performance with respect to their roles in rural water service delivery (Section 3.5.1.2). 
One of them is shown in this section; the other is included in Appendix A. The case 
study district government in Figure 15 is the ‘ego’ and is represented as the largest node 
in the network. Levels of sector hierarchy are defined by the y-axis and the red dotted 
boxes; x-axis locations are distributed randomly for visual clarity. Stakeholder types are 
defined by node colour and the legend to the right of the figure. Arrows indicate the 
direction of a tie, and the thickness of the line represents the ‘weight’ of the combined 
information, skill, resource, and authority ties. Ties to and from the ego combine data 
 from both the interview with the ego, and data from interviews with altars that described 
ties with the ego. Ties between alters are included where one or both of the alters 
provided data on these ties during follow-up interviews.  
 
Figure 15 – Ego network of a case study district government in Ghana for all tie 
types visualised to show levels of sector hierarchy and stakeholder types 
(McNicholl et al., 2017) 
Figure 15 includes all network ties and tie types: information, skills, resources, and 
authority. The number of alters in the ego network change, however, depending on the 
tie types included. This is demonstrated by filtering each tie type and showing the 
resulting ego networks in Figure 16. 
 96 
 
Figure 16 – Ego networks for different tie types of a Ghanaian district government 
For the ego network of each tie type, node positions are kept the same, but network 
membership changes. For example, some alters are part of the information network, but 
are not present in the resource ego network. Information ties are the most common, and 
analysis of multiplex ties explores how multiple tie types exist in parallel (Section 5.4).   
5.1.4.2 Malawi 
The case study institutions in Malawi are also two district governments. The ego 
network for one of them is presented here (Figure 17), and the other is included in 
Appendix A. Government hierarchy in Malawi is similar to the structure in Ghana, but 
with fewer districts. District Authorities are the local units of formal government, 
followed by regional, then national levels. Malawi has 28 districts in three regions. The 
result is that the total number of stakeholders in the ego networks can differ depending 
on country, and even within a country, depending on the context.  
 
  
Figure 17 - Ego network of a case study district government in Malawi for all tie 
types visualised to show levels of sector hierarchy and stakeholder types 
This network can also be separated to show the ego network for each tie type (Figure 
18). 
 
Figure 18 - Ego networks for different tie types of a Malawian district government 
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5.1.4.3 India 
Case study institutions in India are operators of community arsenic filter units. There 
are three levels of hierarchy in this case study: community, district, and state. The 
highest level of hierarchy that directly connects to case study stakeholder are based in 
the state capital of West Bengal, Kolkata, and the state is therefore the highest level of 
hierarchy. Within West Bengal, all case study stakeholders are in the district of 24 
North Parganas. 
This definition of hierarchy considers the case study institutions, in this case community 
arsenic filter operators, as being members of their immediate community, and 
connections beyond this are considered links to other levels of hierarchy. Other levels of 
hierarchy include other stakeholders in the district, or stakeholders based in the state 
capital. The important distinction when considering hierarchy is investigating links to 
the immediate community as distinct from links to stakeholders beyond this. The ego 
network of a case study operators is presented in Figure 19, and Figure 20 shows the 
separate ego networks for each tie type.  
 
Figure 19 - Ego network of a case study arsenic filter operator in India for all tie 
types visualised to show levels of sector hierarchy and stakeholder types 
  
Figure 20 - Ego networks for different tie types of a Indian local arsenic filter 
operator 
5.1.4.4 Bolivia 
Case study institutions in Bolivia are municipal governments. Four were studied, and 
one is presented in this section. The institutional structure is similar to that in Ghana and 
Malawi but with different names. The equivalent of a district is a municipality, and the 
equivalent of a region is a department. Figure 21 and Figure 22 present one example of 
a case study municipality overall ego network and ego networks by tie type, 
respectively.  
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Figure 21 - Ego network of a case study municipal government in Bolivia for all tie 
types visualised to show levels of sector hierarchy and stakeholder types 
 
Figure 22 - Ego networks for different tie types of a Bolivian municipal 
government 
 5.1.4.5 Tajikistan 
The case study institution in Tajikistan is a national government institution. This 
national institution is interesting because of its relatively few connections to lower 
levels of sector hierarchy compared to its national ties. As with other countries, the 
national, regional, and district institutional hierarchy is present, but these other levels of 
hierarchy have little direct relevance to the ego network of the case study institution.  
 
Figure 23 - Ego network of the case study institution in Tajikistan for all tie types 
visualised to show levels of sector hierarchy and stakeholder types 
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Figure 24 - Ego networks for different tie types of the Tajikistan case study 
institution  
Investigating ego networks by individual tie type shows considerable differences. 
Despite the presence of numerous information and skill ties, no resource ties were 
reported either to or from the case study ego in any of the interviews. This signals that 
the primary functions of this institution relate to information, skills, and authority, and 
that resources are handled by different government entities or organisations, but do not 
directly pass through the case study institution.  
5.1.5 Analysing Ego Networks 
Four types of ego network numerical analysis are conducted in this chapter: size, 
homophily, multiplexity, and reciprocity. Each is a specific network measure that will 
be defined in the subsequent sections. These measures include common ego network 
characterisations of ego to alter ties and alter attributes (Crossley et al., 2015). UCINET 
software is used to analyse quantitative properties of all ego networks in this chapter 
(Borgatti et al., 2002), and visualisations are produced using Gephi (Bastian et al., 
2009).  
 5.2 Network Size 
Network size quantifies the number of alters in an ego network. Network sizes are first 
calculated for the case study institutions, and these values are then compared to the ego 
networks of other stakeholders interviewed in each country. The process is repeated for 
each of the four tie types.  
5.2.1 Network Size Example 
An example illustrates how network size is calculated. The ego in this network of skill 
ties is a case study district government from Ghana. There are thirteen alters in the 
network, therefore the size of the network is thirteen.  
 
Figure 25 – Skill ego network for a municipal government in Ghana with a 
network size of thirteen  
5.2.2 Information Network Size 
The type of analysis presented in the example (Figure 25) is repeated for each case 
study institution to show how information network sizes compare to each other across 
countries. The information network size of each case study institution in each country is 
quantified and plotted in Figure 26.  
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Figure 26 – Information network sizes for case study institutions by country 
Figure 26 plots the size of each information ego network for each case study institution 
by country. The plot shows that Indian case study institutions have information network 
sizes between four and ten, meaning that four to ten alters are in each information ego 
network. Information ego network sizes for all other countries show ten or more alters 
in their respective ego networks.  
Adding analysis of ego networks for other stakeholders interviewed allows comparison. 
The distribution of these values is added in box plots that represent how case study 
institutions compare to median, minimum, and maximum values. Figure 27 illustrates 
how box plots are used in this chapter to compare the values of case study institutions to 
other stakeholders interviewed in their respective countries. Figure 28 then presents the 
comparison for information network sizes.  
 
 
Figure 27 – Legend for box plots presented in this chapter 
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Figure 28 – Information network sizes of case study institutions compared to other 
stakeholders interviewed in the same country 
Information network sizes for almost all case study institutions are above the median in 
all countries when compared to ego networks of other stakeholders interviewed. This 
indicates that the number of alters in these information ego networks is relatively large 
compared to their peers. This, however, assumes that all stakeholders in the network are 
equal and can be compared. Analysis is therefore potentially improved by controlling 
for level of sector hierarchy. Controlling for hierarchy ensures that, for example, district 
governments are compared to other stakeholders at the district level instead of 
comparing them to large authorities such as a national ministry.  
 
The performance of these other stakeholders is not known, however. All that is known 
is that these stakeholders are based at the same level of network hierarchy as the case 
study institutions. The size of their ego networks can therefore provide perspective on 
what is typical for stakeholders at this level of network hierarchy, but should not be 
misinterpreted as a comparison between higher and lower performing stakeholders.  
Controlling for level of sector hierarchy further highlights the relatively large 
information network sizes of the case study institutions. Figure 29 presents the findings. 
All case study institutions are either at or near the top of the box plot distributions. This 
means that they have relatively large numbers of stakeholders in their information 
networks when compared to peer stakeholders at the same level of sector hierarchy.  
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Figure 29 – Information network size comparison controlled for same level of 
sector hierarchy 
5.2.3 Skill and Authority Network Sizes 
Analysis of network size is applied to the other tie types, and similar findings are 
observed for skill and authority ego networks. Skill and authority network size 
distributions show relatively high values for case study institutions compared to others 
in the sector (Figure 30 and Figure 31).   
 
Figure 30 – Skill network sizes by country 
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Figure 31 – Authority network sizes by country 
These findings are similar to results of information network sizes, but with slightly 
lower values for some countries. Indian case study institutions have between three and 
nine ties. Case study institutions in other countries have nine or more alters in their 
authority ego networks.  
The same results become clearer when controlling for level of sector hierarchy, as 
shown in Figure 32 and Figure 33. Controlling for level of sector hierarchy reduces the 
number of stakeholders in the analysis, and median and quartile values consequently 
overlap in some cases. This is the case for the skill network size in Ghana and the 
authority network size in Malawi that creates narrow or overlapping parts of box plots. 
 
Figure 32 - Skill network sizes controlled by level of stakeholder hierarchy 
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Figure 33 – Authority network sizes controlled by level of stakeholder hierarchy 
Controlling for level of sector hierarchy shows that all case study institutions are in the 
upper quartile, with the exception of some Indian case study institutions that are above 
the median but not in the top quartile. This shows that, as with information networks, 
skill and authority networks are relatively large for the case study institutions that are 
improving performance.  
5.2.4 Resource Network Sizes 
Resource ties are the least common of the four tie types, and some stakeholders 
interviewed did not describe any resource ties at all. Not every stakeholder participating 
in the rural water sector is actively handling financial resource flows. The relative rarity 
of resource ties is easily seen by quantifying the number of directional ties observed in 
each country snowball network for each tie type (Figure 34). Directional ties mean that 
a two-way tie is counted as two ties.  
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Figure 34 – Number of ties in snowball networks by country and tie type 
One possible reason for resource ties being relatively uncommon is their definition in 
this research as the physical transfer of financial or otherwise fungible resources from 
one stakeholder to another. This practice was described by interviewees as less common 
than assets being purchased on behalf of another stakeholder, or being investing directly 
in infrastructure development. The flow of resources throughout a sector is therefore not 
a complete representation of resources related to service delivery because infrastructure 
itself is not included as a node in the ego networks. For example, an international donor 
might invest in a project in coordination with local government but without channelling 
the funds directly through the government itself. The government might provide in-kind 
contributions to the project that would not appear as financial resource transfers 
between stakeholders. This example is particularly relevant for the case study institution 
in Tajikistan that identifies no resource ties in its ego network.  
Resource ties remain important, however, even if they do not provide a complete picture 
of infrastructure investments. A single large financial resource transfer between 
stakeholders would change the nature of their relationship. Analysis of resource ego 
networks is therefore important to conduct, even if the resource networks contain fewer 
ties. Analysis of resource network sizes proceeds exactly as with previous tie types. 
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Figure 35 and Figure 36 illustrate the distributions of resource network sizes overall and 
when controlling for level of hierarchy, respectively.   
 
Figure 35 – Resource network sizes 
 
Figure 36 – Resource network sizes controlled for level of stakeholder hierarchy 
Findings for resource network sizes are not consistent across different countries. India 
shows a relatively broad range of resource network sizes while the case study institution 
in Tajikistan has a resource network size of zero. This means there are no resource ties 
in this institution’s ego network. Controlling for level shows that case study institutions 
in Bolivia, Ghana, and Malawi have relatively large resource network sizes, but it is 
important to note that overall analysis is limited by the relative infrequency of resource 
ties in the ego networks.  
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 5.2.5 Network Size Summary 
Analysis of network sizes finds that all institutions improving performance are 
connected to numerous alters through relationships of information, skills, and authority, 
while resource network sizes are smaller. Information, skill, and authority ego networks 
sizes of case study institutions are also relatively large when compared to other 
stakeholder ego networks in their respective countries.  
The overall finding is straightforward: institutions that are improving performance are 
well connected in both an absolute and relative sense. The nature and importance of 
these connections cannot be inferred from network data alone, however, and requires 
qualification from the perspectives of those actively experiencing these networks. As 
with the subsequent sections in numerical analysis, qualification of the network 
characteristics is presented in the next chapter on Qualitative Analysis (Chapter 6).  
5.3 Homophily 
Homophily characterises the properties of alters in an ego network. It quantifies the 
proportion of ties that an ego has to alters with similar versus dissimilar attributes. 
Whereas size looked at number of alters, homophily looks at the diversity of alter 
properties from the perspective of those that are similar to versus different than the ego.  
Homophily can be characterised in two dimensions because data are available on 
stakeholder type and stakeholder level of sector hierarchy. From one perspective, 
stakeholder type allows investigation of the tendency for, say, governments to connect 
to other government agencies versus other stakeholder types such as private sector, civil 
society, or multi-lateral organisations. The second perspective explores the tendency to 
connect with stakeholders of the same level versus other levels of sector hierarchy. For 
example, this could be the tendency of a national level stakeholder, such as a ministry, 
to connect with other stakeholders operating at regional and local levels of sector 
hierarchy. Investigation of both homophily by type and homophily by level of sector 
hierarchy are conducted in this section.  
5.3.1 Homophily Example 
An example from Tajikistan illustrates the concept of homophily from the two 
perspectives of type and level of sector hierarchy. The example in Figure 37 illustrates 
how these two perspectives can produce different findings using information ties for the 
case study institution in Tajikistan. The abundance of ties with national level 
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stakeholders and relative rarity of ties to non-national level stakeholders is easily 
observed, as is the approximately even number of ties to both other government 
stakeholders as well as different stakeholder types.  
 
 
Figure 37 – Tajikistan information ego network by stakeholder type and level of 
sector hierarchy 
Homophily is calculated using an EI index (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). ‘E’ stands for 
the number of ties to external (i.e. different) nodes; ‘I’ stands for the number of ties to 
internal (i.e. similar) nodes. The EI index is found by subtracting the number of 
stakeholders similar to the ego from the number of stakeholders that are different, and 
dividing the result by the total number (Equation 1).  
   
   
   
 
Equation 1 – Calculation of the EI index as a measure of network homophily 
The calculation provides a normalised value between one and negative one that 
represents the tendency of the ego to engage with alters that are different versus similar 
to itself. An EI index of one indicates exclusive engagement with different alters; an EI 
 index of negative one indicates exclusive engagement with like alters; and a value of 
zero represents an equal number of alters with similar and different properties than the 
ego in the network (Crossley et al., 2015).  
An EI index is used to characterise the ego network in Figure 37. Homophily by type 
has an EI index of -0.071 and homophily by level has an EI index of -0.929. Depending 
on the lens through which stakeholder categories are viewed, this ego is either 
marginally homophilic, or extremely homophilic. This same analysis is then applied to 
all case study institutions to identify characteristics of homophily for both type and 
level.  
5.3.2 Homophily by Type 
Homophily by type is considered for each tie type separately, except for resources. 
Resource ego networks are not considered for homophily calculations because EI values 
are more sensitive to changes when the total number of alters in an ego network is 
small, and the relatively rarity of resource ties skews results.  Values for homophily by 
type are computed for each case study institution and plotted to show the distributions. 
5.3.2.1 Information Homophily by Type 
Information homophily by type is explored first. Values for case study institutions in all 
countries are presented first (Figure 38) on their own to show the degree to which their 
tendencies are towards connecting with like stakeholders, different stakeholders, or a 
mix between the two.  
 
Figure 38 – Information homophily by type for each case study institution by 
country 
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Plotting homophily values for each case finds that most case study institutions have a 
positive EI Index, indicating a greater number of connections with stakeholders of 
different type than the ego. Tajikistan is a slight exception, having almost even numbers 
of ties to similar and different stakeholder types. Indian institutions studied show a 
strong heterophilic tendency, which indicates multiple connections to stakeholders such 
as community members and few connections to other water service operators.  
Next, analysis of other egos is done for the purpose of comparison. Box plots illustrate 
the relative position of case study egos to other stakeholders in the network that were 
interviewed (Figure 39).  
 
Figure 39 – Information homophily by type relative to other stakeholders 
Comparison to other egos shows that other stakeholders interviewed are also typically 
heterophilic. Controlling for level of hierarchy does not distinguish case study 
institutions in any consistent way (Figure 40). Connections to different stakeholders 
may be important in specific cases, but information homophily by type does not 
numerically distinguish case study institutions from their peers in a consistent way 
across country case studies.  
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Figure 40 – Information homophily by type controlled for level of sector hierarchy 
5.3.2.2 Skill and Authority Homophily by Type 
Homophily by type for skill and authority ties yields similar findings to analysis of 
information ties. Box plots, both overall and controlling for level of sector hierarchy, 
show heterophilic tendencies that are not consistently distinct from other stakeholders 
(Figure 41, Figure 42, Figure 43, and Figure 44). India shows a higher tendency to 
connect with different stakeholder types because the case study institutions are 
operators. This indicates that they connect with other stakeholders but typically not with 
other community operator committees.  
 
Figure 41 – Skill homophily by type 
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Figure 42 - Authority homophily by type 
 
Figure 43 - Skill homophily by type controlled for level of sector hierarchy 
 
Figure 44 – Authority homophily by type controlled for level of sector hierarchy 
India (N=38) Bolivia (N=23) Ghana (N=43) Malawi (N=38) Tajikistan 
(N=15) 
<
 H
o
m
o
p
h
il
ic
   
 |
   
H
et
er
o
p
h
il
ic
 >
 
-1
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  0
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 1
 
Authority Homophily by Type 
India (Local 
N=28) 
Bolivia 
(Municipal 
N=15) 
Ghana (District 
N=6) 
Malawi 
(District N=10) 
Tajikistan 
(National 
N=11) 
<
 H
o
m
o
p
h
il
ic
   
 |
   
H
et
er
o
p
h
il
ic
 >
 
-1
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  0
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 1
 
Skill Homophily by Type Controlled for 
Stakeholder Level 
India (Local 
N=31) 
Bolivia 
(Municipal 
N=15) 
Ghana (District 
N=10) 
Malawi 
(District N=11) 
Tajikistan 
(National 
N=11) 
<
 H
o
m
o
p
h
il
ic
   
 |
 H
et
er
o
p
h
il
ic
 >
 
-1
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  0
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  1
 
Authority Homophily by Type Controlled for 
Stakeholder Level 
 5.3.2.3 Homophily by Type Summary 
EI indices for case study institutions show a tendency towards connecting with 
stakeholders of different types. This is true for information, skill, and authority ties. 
Although this characteristic does not consistently distinguish case study institutions 
from others in their sectors, the defining characteristic is from an absolute sense. Case 
study institutions tend to engage more stakeholders of different types than stakeholders 
of similar types to themselves.  
5.3.3 Homophily by Level 
Analysis of homophily by level follows the same process as analysis of homophily by 
type. Homophily by level is the investigation of tendency to connect with different 
levels versus similar levels of sector hierarchy. This provides representation of how well 
a stakeholder is connected across different levels of a sector hierarchy. Again, the 
analysis of resource ego networks is excluded because of the sensitivity of EI index 
values when few alters are present in an ego network.  
5.3.3.1 Information Homophily by Level 
As with previous analysis, values are calculated for each case study institution in each 
country. Presenting values first without box plots for comparison to others allows easy 
identification of case study institutions as either heterophilic or homophilic (Figure 45).  
 
Figure 45 – Information homophily by level 
Plotting information homophily by level does not reveal obvious characteristics across 
all case study institutions. Instead, three descriptions are apparent in the different 
countries studied. Case study institutions in India typically have homophilic tendencies, 
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suggesting they have more connections to local stakeholders than to higher levels of 
hierarchy. This makes sense for local operators who predominantly serve others in the 
community. All district governments but one have a slightly heterophilic tendency. This 
describes a mixture of connections to both local stakeholders, such as communities, and 
to higher levels stakeholders such as regional and national governments, large private 
sector stakeholders, and international organisations.  
The case study institution in Tajikistan, on the other hand, is almost completely 
homophilic. This shows nearly exclusive connections to stakeholders that are also at the 
national level. Comparing EI indices of case study institutions to other stakeholders 
interviewed shows that, with the exception of Tajikistan, case study institutions tend to 
be slightly more heterophilic. Figure 46 shows the values of case study districts relative 
to the distribution of other stakeholders in their respective countries. Institutions with 
the exception of Tajikistan appear to be even more comparatively heterophilic by level 
when controlling for hierarchy (Figure 47). 
 
Figure 46 – Information homophily by level 
India (N=40) Bolivia (N=23) Ghana (N=43) Malawi (N=40) Tajikistan 
(N=15) 
<
 H
o
m
o
p
h
il
ic
   
| 
H
et
er
o
p
h
il
ic
 >
 
-1
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 0
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  1
 
Country 
Information Homophily by Level 
  
Figure 47 – Information homophily by level controlled for level of sector hierarchy 
5.3.3.2 Skill and Authority Homophily by Level 
Homophily analysis of skill and authority homophily by level does not produce 
consistent groupings of characteristics across case study countries. Figure 48 and Figure 
49 present the results for skill and authority ties respectively.  
 
Figure 48 – Skill homophily by level 
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Figure 49 – Authority homophily by level 
Findings show similar results for skills and authority networks, again with three 
apparent groupings related to stakeholder types across the different countries studied. 
The Indian institutions studied show a mixture of homophilic and heterophilic ego 
network properties, with an overall homophilic tendency. Most district governments 
show a heterophilic tendency, but not in all cases. Tajikistan remains strongly 
homophilic.  
Findings remain consistent when controlling for stakeholder level of sector hierarchy in 
box plot distribution analysis (Figure 50 and Figure 51). As was the case with 
information ties, comparison by level shows stronger heterophilic tendency than other 
stakeholders.  
 
Figure 50 – Skill homophily by level controlled for level of sector hierarchy 
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Figure 51 – Authority homophily by level controlled for level of sector hierarchy 
5.3.4 Homophily Summary 
Homophily analysis finds that case study institutions are connected to multiple 
stakeholder types at multiple levels of sector hierarchy with information, skill, and 
authority ties. The case study institution in Tajikistan is the only exception to this; 
homophily by level analysis finds that it almost exclusively connects to other 
stakeholders at the national level of sector hierarchy. It is possible that this 
characteristic is related to the nature of the policy reform that this institution is 
managing, possibly requiring strong engagement with national level stakeholders, but 
this explanation is speculative. Overall, the principal finding from homophily analysis is 
that case study institutions are connected to stakeholders of different types and levels of 
sector hierarchy, and further explanation of the significance of this characteristic 
requires qualification from stakeholder narratives in the next chapter on Narrative 
Analysis (Chapter 6).  
5.4 Multiplexity 
Analysis thus far has considered ties individually, but many of these ties exist in 
parallel. Multiplexity studies the overlap of different exchanges in a relationship 
(Verbrugge, 1979). Combinations of multiple tie types can be quantified to identify the 
most common sets of parallel ties both inbound to and outbound from the ego networks 
of the case study institutions that are improving performance. Analysis in this section 
counts the number of different outbound and inbound tie combinations for each case 
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study institution in each country, and the section concludes with a summary of the total 
number of tie combinations observed in the snowball networks of each country studied.  
To recap, the four tie types are: information, skills, resources, and authority. Each type 
can exist on its own, or in combination with other tie types in parallel. A total of fifteen 
combinations are possible. All figures in this section use the same nomenclature to note 
tie combinations. Information is ‘I’; skills are ‘S’; resources are ‘R’; and authority is 
‘A’. For example, a combination of information, skills and authority would be labelled 
‘ISA’. The order of the letters is not important because the multiplex ties represent 
combinations, not permutations. The frequency of different tie type combinations is 
plotted for each case study institution in each country.  
5.4.1 Ghana 
Information ties, either on their own or combined with skills and authority, are the most 
common tie combinations observed in the ego networks of case study district 
governments improving performance in Ghana. Figure 52 shows the distribution of 
different tie combinations observed in the case study district government ego networks. 
Both ego networks also report at least one incoming tie combination of all four tie 
types. Tie combinations that exclude information ties are absent, however. This 
indicates that all alters in these two ego networks can be identified from graphing 
information ties alone.  
   
Figure 52 – Number of outgoing (left) and incoming (right) tie combinations by 
type for each case study district ego network in Ghana 
5.4.2 Malawi 
Both case study district governments in Malawi also show information ties as the most 
common type, and these ties are sometimes combined with skill and authority ties. 
Figure 53 shows the distribution of different tie combinations observed the case study 
district government ego networks. Resource ties are less common, but both ego 
networks report multiple incoming ties that combine all four tie types. Both egos also 
exhibit some ties that exist in the absence of information ties, but these are a minority; 
the majority of alters in the ego network can be identified using only information ties.  
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Figure 53 - Number of outgoing (left) and incoming (right) tie combinations by 
type for each case study district ego network in Malawi 
5.4.3 India 
Case study community operator committees in India show mostly multiplex ties in their 
ego networks. Figure 54 shows the distribution of different tie combinations observed 
the case study community operator ego networks. Few tie combinations exhibit only a 
single tie type. As with other case study countries, most combinations include an 
information tie, and this most commonly combines with a skill tie, an authority tie, or 
both. Again, ties in the absence of an information tie are few in number, suggesting that 
the majority of alters in ego networks might be identified by only graphing information 
ties.  
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Figure 54 – Number of outgoing (left) and incoming (right) tie combinations by 
type for each case study operator ego network in India 
5.4.4 Bolivia 
Information is the only tie type that exists on its own in the ego networks of Bolivian 
case study institutions. Figure 55 shows the distribution of different tie combinations 
observed the case study municipality ego networks. All other tie types have at least one 
other tie in parallel, that usually includes an information tie. The most common 
outgoing multiplex tie for all municipalities combines information, skill, and authority 
ties, whereas the most common incoming tie combinations differ by municipality. All, 
however, show multiple tie combinations that include all four tie types of information, 
skills, resources, and authority.  
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Figure 55 – Number of outgoing (left) and incoming (right) tie combinations by 
type for each case study municipality ego network in Bolivia 
5.4.5 Tajikistan 
The national government institution studied in Tajikistan shows remarkably little 
diversity in the tie combinations identified in its ego network. Figure 56 shows the 
distribution of different tie combinations observed the case study authority ego network. 
Information and skill ties existing in parallel are the basis of all combinations. Some 
incoming ties, however, also include an authority tie in addition to the information and 
skill ties. This indicates that the relationships of this authority are defined by two-way 
information and skill ties in parallel, and that the alters present in this ego network 
could be identified by through information or skill ties only.  
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Figure 56 – Number of outgoing (left) and incoming (right) tie combinations by 
type for the case study institution ego network in Tajikistan 
5.4.6 Multiplexity Summary 
All tie combinations identified in the snowball networks of each country can be 
quantified to further explore two emerging findings (Figure 57). Firstly, the majority of 
relationships are multiplex, meaning that multiple tie types exist in parallel. Secondly, 
information ties are the most common tie type present. As such, by identifying 
information ties, one might identify the majority of stakeholders in a network.  
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Figure 57 – Prevalence of all  tie combinations by type each country studied 
Aggregate data of all tie combinations observed in country snowball networks indicate 
that most relationships consist of multiple tie types (62.7%), or only contain an 
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 information tie (34.2%). Most multiplex ties also contain at least an information tie 
(97.0%). Because information ties exist in the majority of relationships observed 
(95.0%), it is possible that future research might identify almost all stakeholders in by 
graphing only information ties. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that studying 
information ties should be a leading line of inquiry for identifying alters in an 
institution’s ego network.   
5.5 Reciprocity 
A final type of quantitative analysis considers the percentage of ties that are 
reciprocated. This quantifies the proportion of ties that are two-way versus one-way. 
This analysis was performed on the ego networks of all case study institutions. It uses 
both data from interviews with the respective egos and data from interviews with alters 
that described direct ties to the case study institutions. Whereas multiplex analysis 
separated inbound ties from outbound ties, reciprocity looks at both directions 
simultaneously.  
Percent reciprocity is calculated by dividing the number of two-way ties by the number 
of alters in an ego network for each tie type. For example, if the information size is 10 – 
that is, ten alters having direct information ties with an ego – and the number of two-
way ties is 5, then 50 percent of the information ties are reciprocal. These calculations 
were performed for each case study institution that is improving performance in each 
country, and for each tie type (Table 13). 
 130 
Table 13 – Prevalence of reciprocal ties in the ego networks of each case study 
institution by tie type.  
Country Ego 
                                                        Tie Type 
Info Skills Resources Authority 
Ties 
% 
Reciprocal 
Ties 
% 
Reciprocal 
Ties 
% 
Reciprocal 
Ties 
% 
Reciprocal 
Ghana 
District 1 20 90% 13 15% 9 11% 17 35% 
District 2 16 100% 9 0% 8 0% 15 27% 
Malawi 
District 1 24 75% 16 25% 6 0% 20 55% 
District 2 24 96% 19 21% 5 0% 22 55% 
India 
Operator 1 6 100% 6 50% 3 33% 4 0% 
Operator 2 5 100% 5 100% 5 0% 5 0% 
Operator 3 6 83% 4 25% 4 0% 4 0% 
Operator 4 5 100% 5 20% 4 0% 5 0% 
Operator 5 6 50% 6 33% 2 0% 6 0% 
Operator 6 5 60% 5 80% 4 0% 5 0% 
Operator 7 4 100% 4 25% 1 0% 4 0% 
Operator 8 5 100% 5 60% 5 0% 4 0% 
Operator 9 7 100% 7 57% 6 0% 6 17% 
Operator 10 4 75% 2 50% 3 0% 4 0% 
Operator 11 10 60% 3 33% 9 0% 9 0% 
Operator 12 8 50% 6 33% 7 14% 5 0% 
Bolivia 
Municipality 1 13 69% 11 18% 10 10% 13 85% 
Municipality 2 13 100% 11 9% 2 0% 12 83% 
Municipality 3 10 90% 9 89% 3 0% 9 67% 
Tajikistan National 
Authority 
28 100% 28 100% 0 n/a 28 18% 
Values are coloured on a scale from red (0%) to green (100%) for visual clarity 
Each tie type presents different findings. Information ties are the most commonly 
reciprocated. Analysis finds that all case study institutions improving performance in all 
countries studied have reciprocal information ties of at least 50%, and often a great deal 
higher. This degree of reciprocity stands in contrast to the three other tie types. Skill tie 
reciprocation differs by both country and case studies within countries. Resource ties 
were even less commonly reciprocated; fifteen case study ego networks show no two-
 way resource ties at all. Authority ties do not present a clear pattern across all case study 
countries. Although there appears to be some grouping within countries, broad 
descriptions about authority reciprocity are not as easily made as they are for the other 
three tie types. In summary, information is commonly reciprocated, reciprocity of skill 
and resource ties are less common, and authority reciprocity depends on the country.  
Reciprocated information ties suggest that case study institutions in all countries are 
commonly engaged in two-way information exchanges with the majority of their alters. 
These ties likely indicate the presence of feedback loops, and discussions that may be 
important for collaborative problem solving. The true nature and value of these ties is 
further explored through analysis of stakeholder narratives in the next chapter (Chapter 
6).  
Skills are less commonly reciprocated. The prevalence of lower reciprocity suggests 
that skill ties are commonly, but not always, one-way relationships. This relationship 
suggests an interaction of providing support through trainings or technical assistance 
where a skilled stakeholder might support a less skilled one. Tajikistan, and one 
operator in India are notable exceptions because these institutions exhibit reciprocal 
skill relationships for all skill ties. In most cases, however, reciprocity analysis shows 
that skill ties are commonly one-way relationships.  
Resource ties are rarely reciprocated. This finding is not surprising; it is reasonable that 
financial resources would flow from one stakeholder to another instead of being passed 
back and forth. An exception to this might be something like a loan arrangement, where 
funds are received and repaid, but data indicate that resources flows are most commonly 
one-way.  
Reciprocity of authority ties were the least consistent across country case studies, which 
suggests that power dynamics can differ depending on context. The findings also 
suggest that authority may be perceived differently depending on the context, and that 
ties reported by stakeholders during interviews might be less consistently identified than 
ties of information, skills, or resources. Overall statements about authority reciprocity 
may depend on the country context, and broad themes across case study locations are 
not easily summarised.  
5.6 Chapter Summary 
Four types of numerical analysis were produced from egocentric network analysis of 
case study institutions. The first two numerical properties are network size and 
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homophily. All case study institutions exhibit multiple information, skill, and authority 
ties in their ego networks, and these are often relatively large network sizes when 
compared to other stakeholders in their respective sectors. Properties of homophily 
show tendencies to connect to different stakeholder types, and to include at least some 
connections across levels of sector hierarchy for information, skill, and authority ties. 
Analysis of resource ties, however, did not produce consistent findings across case 
study countries. These findings are general properties that require further qualification 
from stakeholder interview narratives.  
Multiplexity analysis then followed to quantify the prevalence of different combinations 
in which multiple tie types exist in parallel. Analysis of all case studies finds that most 
relationships in case study institution ego networks contain multiple tie types 
simultaneously, and information ties are the most common tie type. In all cases, it is 
rare for other ties to exist in the absence of information. Of the 848 relationships 
observed across all country snowball networks, only 5.0% of relationships did not 
contain an information tie. These findings suggest that that majority of alters and 
interactions might be identified in future studies by graphing only information ties.  
Reciprocity quantified the prevalence of two-way versus one-way ties for each tie type 
in case study institutions ego networks. Findings indicate that reciprocity depends on tie 
type, and information ties are the most commonly reciprocated. Skill and resource ties 
were less commonly reciprocated, suggesting a difference in ability between the 
provider and the receiver, and the reciprocity of authority ties showed no broad pattern 
across all case study institutions. These findings suggest that reciprocal information ties 
are the basis of networks surrounding institutions that are improving performance, and 
that skill and resource ties highlight the providers of technical and financial support, 
respectively.  
Numerical analysis characterises these ego networks, but is insufficient on its own for 
understanding the importance of specific network characteristics. Properties such as 
large information network sizes might be positive, negative, or neutral influences on the 
performance of an institution. Perspective on the value of these observed network 
characteristics is required.  
Qualifying the importance of observed network characteristics is therefore an important 
next step that is conducted in the following chapter. Stakeholder perspectives are 
verified and compared against one another to highlight network characteristics that are 
both observable in the ego networks and perceived as important by those experiencing 
 these networks. These qualifications help to understand the relevance of observed 
network characteristics because simply observing these characteristics does not confirm 
their importance in supporting institutions to improve performance.  
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6 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Commentary from interview participants is needed to qualify the importance of 
quantitative network characteristics. These narratives attribute significance to ego 
network characteristics identified in the previous chapter, and identify other network 
characteristics that stakeholders participating in these networks perceive as important, 
but that might not be immediately apparent from standard numerical analysis of ego 
networks. Newly identified network characteristics can then inform further analysis of 
numerical network data to qualify characteristics that are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively recognisable in the case institution ego networks.  
Narratives are compared with each other to identify where different stakeholders 
independently describe the importance of a similar characteristic in the same part of a 
network. This occurs in a three-step manual coding process. The first step breaks 
interviews into fragments that are coded according to perceived value 
(positive/negative/neutral) and the part of the network the comment applies to, if 
relevant. Macro-economic factors such as currency inflation are an example of a 
commentary that might not relate to network characteristics specifically. The second 
step confirms that the stakeholder describing a characteristic is able to directly observe 
this part of the network. This step helps to ensure the validity of the statement by 
requiring the respondent to have first-hand experience on the subject. The third step 
groups together positive commentary about similar parts of the network to identify 
where multiple stakeholders directly observing a common part of the network perceive 
similar positive network characteristics. When completed, this analysis excludes 
characteristics that are mentioned only once, and focuses on characteristics described as 
 supporting institutional development – as is the intent of this research. The result is a 
list of verified network characteristics described as supporting institutional development 
for each case study (McNicholl et al., 2017). 
The coding approach described above is favoured over aggregate coding of themes 
identified from all interviews because it focuses on network characteristics that support 
institutional development and it considers the vantage point of the stakeholder 
providing commentary. Aggregate coding of themes from all interviews was 
experimented with using Atlas.ti software, and this approach was rejected because it did 
not easily consider the importance of which stakeholders provided which perspectives. 
For example, national stakeholders may describe their perception of coordination at 
local levels that they, personally, cannot verify directly, and the experienced reality in 
the respective part of the network could be quite different. It is therefore important to 
ensure that stakeholders commenting on positive network characteristics are actively 
interacting with these parts of the network, and this was achieved by manually coding 
and then sorting conversation fragments from interviews.  
6.1 Narrative Analysis Example 
An example from Ghana illustrates how multiple narratives combine to qualify a 
network characteristic perceived as supporting institutional development. Multiple 
stakeholders commented on the importance of information and skill ties between district 
government and stakeholders at higher levels of the sector hierarchy. Figure 58 
illustrates what this looks like in an ego network. It shows how commentary provided 
by different stakeholders within the ego network can reference the same type of 
characteristic. In this case, both the institution and an alter in its ego network comment 
on a relationship between regional and district government that they perceive as 
beneficial. Their independent identification of this characteristic helps to verify it, as 
does their ability to directly observe this characteristic in the ego network. Speech 
bubbles in Figure 58 illustrate possible examples of commentary, and the red arrow 
highlights the relationship that these stakeholders describe. 
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Figure 58 – Illustration of stakeholders independently commenting on a similar 
network characteristic in the same part of the ego network.  
Figure 58 is only an illustration; actual comments from these stakeholders describe the 
characteristic in detail. For all comments, stakeholder names are anonymised, but their 
type and level of sector hierarchy is reported at the beginning of each quote using the 
following nomenclature: 
 [Stakeholder Type]/[Level of Sector Hierarchy]: […quote…] 
A full description of levels of hierarchy for each country and stakeholder types can be 
found in the Quantitative Analysis chapter (Section 5.1.4).  
The following comment is from one of the case study local governments in Ghana. It 
describes an interaction with a stakeholder at a higher level of sector hierarchy 
providing support to the district. The language clearly describes this relationship as a 
positive benefit, and has been lightly edited for grammatical clarity.  
Government/District: So, for me, when it comes to rural water, the [support 
agency] has the bigger strength. They have the technical know-how, they 
have the people, they have the institutional structure to be able to deliver 
water at the rural level. And that kind of understanding is there. And for us, 
it’s working perfectly. And we are doing even better than our colleagues in 
urban water supply. 
 Identifying the specific part of the network in question is easy because the stakeholder 
is named directly and only anonymised in accordance with the ethical commitments of 
this research. The quote is an example of one stakeholder describing a positive network 
characteristic related to a specific part of the network that this stakeholder experiences 
directly. Commentary from the other stakeholder confirms this characteristic: 
Government/Regional: With [this district], because of the intent of the 
relationship is to pilot a scaling up programme, get all the information, see 
all the areas to improve to be able to scale up coverage. It has been a very 
strong relationship and we are hoping to scale up in all the other districts to 
be able to do the same. 
This commentary adds further understanding to the nuance of this specific relationship. 
These stakeholders are working together to test approaches for managing rural water 
service delivery. It is described as a strong programme, and this description directly 
relates to the improved performance of the district government in question.  
Other stakeholders are directly observing this relationship as well, and provide further 
commentary. For brevity, not all quotes are presented. These aggregated perspectives 
help to verify the importance of specific relationships for supporting institutional 
development. The described relationships can then be related to network properties, 
such as information and skill ties, to understand how the interactions can be observed 
through stakeholder networks.  
The chapter is presented in three groups of findings. The first group includes common 
network characteristics that are both described as important for supporting institutional 
development and are observable in stakeholder networks in multiple case study 
countries. The second group includes uncommon network characteristics that only apply 
to a few case study institutions, and contain some perspectives that are not as strongly 
corroborated by multiple interviews. The final category is unconfirmed characteristics. 
These are factors that multiple stakeholders commented on, but cannot be investigated 
from the network perspective used in this research. They are presented for interest, and 
for consideration in future research, but are not findings that can be observed from a 
network perspective. The findings that will be emphasised as the output from this 
chapter are the common network characteristics that are identified in networks and 
perceived as important in the majority of case study locations.  
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6.2 Common Network Characteristics 
Three network characteristics were identified as supporting institutional development in 
multiple case study countries. These characteristics are identified from interviews with 
case study institutions, and alters in their ego networks. The fact that similar 
characteristics are identified in multiple country contexts suggests that these are 
important influences that are easily perceived by stakeholders, and these influences can 
also be understood from a social network analysis perspective. Other characteristics 
described as important only appeared in some instances, and others still were described 
but could not be observed from a network perspective. These latter categories will be 
explored in subsequent sections, while this section focuses on the three commonly 
identified network characteristics.  
6.2.1 Characteristic #1 – Information and skill ties with lower levels of 
hierarchy 
This network characteristic describes information and skill ties between an ego and 
other stakeholders at the same or at lower levels of sector hierarchy. For a district 
government, this part of the ego network describes other stakeholders in the district, 
such as communities, private sector, and operators, but not stakeholders from regional 
and national levels such as government authorities or international organisations. For a 
local operator, this part of the ego network refers to other local stakeholders such as 
users and possibly local artisans. The characteristic therefore describes the local part of 
the network, and the importance of skill and information connections within this 
context.  
Analysis in the previous chapter (Chapter 5) has already quantified properties of 
information and skill ties in ego networks. Numerous information and skill ties were 
found in the ego networks of case study institutions, and these network sizes are 
relatively large when compared to other ego networks in their respective countries. 
Homophily by level also provides an indication of the tendency to connect with 
stakeholders of similar versus different levels of sector hierarchy. These numerical 
properties are general, and the findings they suggest can be strengthened by analysing 
commentary from interviews that explicitly describes connections in the ego networks.  
6.2.1.1 Ghana 
The relationship of information and skill ties between case study institutions and local 
stakeholders appeared during the first case study on local governments in Ghana. The 
 importance of these local ties was referenced by multiple stakeholders of different types 
and levels of hierarchy. For brevity, a selection of quotes is presented to illustrate the 
concept in the words of stakeholders interviewed. Quotes are anonymised throughout 
this work in accordance with the ethical commitments of this research, and names are 
replaced with labels of stakeholder type and level of sector hierarchy.  
Each quote describes an aspect of an information and skill relationship between district 
government and local stakeholders such as communities and local operators. Quotes 
describe the information connection from local stakeholders to the district governments 
for coordination and requests for support. These interactions are followed up by visits 
from district government to provide support, coordination to develop new projects, and 
technical audits of local capacity.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 7 (4 shown) 
Civil/District: In fact, this thing, the water system, we got to know a lot, so 
many things from the rural water and sanitation. The engineer at the 
district, …and the woman in charge… they help us a lot to have access of 
water. When any time we had any faults, we report to them. So they quickly 
come for the assistance. 
Civil/District: So with district assembly the relation is they invite me, and 
then just like as you have come, maybe if they want to do any expansion, 
expansion work, or maybe they needed to find out maybe how they… how 
the system is operating. The operation of the system. So they invite me, and 
then I give them the information. 
Government/District: In the sense that, for instance, when it comes to the 
[community management committees], and the assembly, we do annual 
auditing for them. We don’t just do financial auditing, but we do technical 
auditing of the system. So that helps us to put them on their toes for them to 
make sure they operate the system very well. So in so doing we realise that 
always there is safe water being delivered to the communities.  
Government/District: And what we also do is that there is that constant 
monitoring or technical support to the [community water and sanitation 
management teams]. So when we go there and we realise maybe the system 
is not working this time…. also the same applies to the system operators. 
Because normally they are doing this you know as I said earlier on, the 
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system is for the assembly, but we have vested it in their care, for them to 
take care of it. So we do comprehensive monitoring and auditing of the 
system as well. When we realise the system is not being operated well, we 
do away with such operators, and bring in a new operator who can operate 
it very well.  
This commentary describes both a relationship of local government providing support 
to local stakeholders, and in the process learning about what needs to be done. These 
relationships would logically inform local governments about which activities to 
prioritise, and which capacities to develop. The descriptions also suggest that 
information and skill ties would provide the clearest indication of these relationships in 
network data.  
Numerical analysis of Ghana ego networks identified several characteristics that 
describe these interactions quantitatively. Analysis found multiple information and skill 
ties, and homophily by level analysis finds a mixture of connections between local 
stakeholders and those at higher levels of sector hierarchy. These numerical values are 
consistent with the narratives described by interview participants, and these 
relationships can be investigated in the ego network by looking specifically at the 
information relationships in the ego network that are within the districts. Figure 59 and 
Figure 60 depict the network graphs of these local relationships.  
 
Figure 59 – Information ties to local stakeholders in ego networks of Ghana case 
study district governments (McNicholl et al., 2017) 
  
Figure 60 - Skill ties to local stakeholders in ego networks of Ghana case study 
district governments  
Investigation of ego networks related to local stakeholders confirms the presence of 
information and skill relationships that are described as important by the stakeholders 
involved in these networks. This indicates that connections between district government 
and stakeholders that rely on it for support is an important influence in Ghana for 
district government improving its role in supporting rural water service delivery.  
6.2.1.2 Malawi 
The importance of network characteristics related to skill and information ties were also 
described by multiple stakeholders in Malawi. Eight stakeholders provided commentary 
on this topic. They represent a diverse set of stakeholder types and levels of hierarchy, 
ranging from local to national, and stakeholder types including civil, government, and 
international organisations. A selection of some of their interview transcripts are 
provided here to illustrate the most salient points.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 8 (4 shown) 
Government/District: So all these communities are being trained and we 
also train the [community governance committees], how they can identify 
the gaps from these areas…. Because the information we get, it’s what we 
use from the communities. So we have got the systems which have put in 
place to get this information. As you have seen, we get information from the 
[community governance committees], and that is our entry point to know 
where exactly there is need for water supply.  
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Operator/District: There is a change because we do coordinate in working 
with the stakeholders. One. Two, if there is information we also exchange 
information…. In short I can say through the network we have, we work 
together, and our association improves. In all corners, because we work in 
a network with the stakeholders. 
INGO/National: Yeah, it’s strengthening the citizens’ voice and also 
strengthening the systems in which planning, implementation, and 
monitoring is taking place. And that’s the other side, which is the district 
council level. Because you have to prepare – if you are creating demand at 
community level, it means you also have to prepare the supply side to be 
responsive. So it’s working at both ends rather than just creating trouble on 
the ground, or strengthening the system that is not accountable to anyone. 
You know, it doesn’t work; it has to be both ways. 
NGO/National: Because the network is much more in terms of sharing of 
information to ensure that the water supply and other services that are 
effectively delivered to the end user in this particular case, the people. Also, 
the network is to promote issues of transparency and accountability through 
engagement. So it’s much more of engagement to ensure that agreed 
frameworks for ensuring that water, clean water is available, to ensure that 
waterpoints are being managed well in terms of clean water. And so forth. 
These quotes describe a two-way relationship between district government and local 
stakeholders to share information and strengthen systems for water management. One of 
the stakeholders makes specific reference to community governance structures that help 
to discuss issues and coordinate efforts within the district.  
These perspectives add substance to some of the findings from numerical analysis. 
Network size analysis found multiple information and skill connections for district 
government stakeholders in Malawi; homophily by level analysis found a mixture of 
connections to different levels of sector hierarchy, including local connections; and 
homophily by type found connections between district governments and other 
stakeholder types such as communities and operators. Numerical analysis is therefore 
broadly consistent with the descriptions provided by stakeholders during interviews. 
Analysis of the ego networks becomes more specific by visualising the local 
interactions in each district government ego network (Figure 61 and Figure 62). 
 Information and skill connections to other local stakeholders become apparent when 
filtering the ego network for this property.  
 
Figure 61 - Information ties to local stakeholders in ego networks of Malawi case 
study district governments (McNicholl et al., 2017)  
   
Figure 62 - Skill ties to local stakeholders in ego networks of Malawi case study 
district governments  
6.2.1.3 India 
Community operators managing community arsenic removal facilities were the centre of 
network analysis in India. These operator ego networks differ from district government ego 
networks studied in other countries, but still exhibit the common theme of local information 
and skill connections. Commentary from stakeholders involved in these networks describe 
the importance of these connections in the context of communities in West Bengal. The 
majority of this commentary comes from either community members or facility operators. 
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The two quotes selected to illustrate this network characteristic are translated from Bengali to 
English by an interpreter, and are collected from the same ego network around a specific 
operator.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 6 (2 shown) 
Operator/Community: What he is saying is that he arranges a meeting every 
month, so like, at that meeting he calls upon everybody at the meeting and he 
listens to the solutions and problems they are facing. Like what are the… how 
they can do better in the future. So he listens to the problem and if there is a 
solution so he can do the solution either by spending money or by spending 
people in the system. So this is how it works. 
Civil/Community: So he is telling that he gives the water to the consumers and 
then if the consumers give the feedback to him, then he reports it back to the 
operator. 
These quotes describe a feedback relationship from consumers to the facility managers. This 
characteristic was further supported by reference to a related but slightly different concept of 
‘good local relationships’. Eight stakeholders mentioned this characteristic. An interview 
quote from one of them illustrates the idea that is also exhibited through information and skill 
tie types.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the network characteristic: 8 (1 shown) 
Civil/Community: See basically you can see our relationship, he is the person 
who is giving the water to the family, to the local families, and he is our very 
close neighbour. So we are maintaining a very healthy relationship with our 
consumers. Because you can say everyone is our club member. So in that case we 
are very close to each other. 
These quotes represent a relationship that is different than district government ties to 
communities, yet bears similarities from a network tie perspective. Quantitative analysis of 
Indian case study operator ego networks indicated that multiple information and skill network 
ties are present, as is to be expected from the stakeholder quotes. Analysis also found these 
ego networks to be more homophilic by level than the case study institutions in other 
countries, which indicates multiple ties between the Indian case study operators and other 
local stakeholders. This quantitative property is again consistent with the quotes about 
network characteristics that support institutional development.  
 Filtering ego networks for case study institutions in India to show local ties helps to visualise 
these characteristics further. Operators are depicted as the largest nodes in Figure 63.  
 
 
Figure 63 – Information ego networks of case study operators in India showing ties to 
other community stakeholders  
All ego networks for community operator committees improving their performance in India 
show numerous information and skill ties to local stakeholders. Each network contains at 
least one general community node that represents users in the network that were not 
interviewed. The ego networks are appropriate for comparative representation, but actually 
represent a larger number of local stakeholders. Information ties are commonly two way 
relationships that would correspond to the feedback relationships between customer and 
operator described in some of the quotes. It seems logical that a property of an effective water 
service operator would be to have active relationships with its customers.  
6.2.1.4 Bolivia 
The importance of connections to local stakeholders also emerged from interviews in Bolivia. 
These perspectives describe such connections as supporting performance improvements in 
the respective municipalities. Quotes below are selected to illustrate the concept, and are 
sometimes described in the same breath as commentary about the broader network of 
information and skill ties. Four of eleven stakeholder perspectives are presented to highlight 
key points that are echoed by others. All quotes are translated from Spanish.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 11 (4 shown) 
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Government/Municipality: And the system it is related with everything. Before 
there was nothing with the economic resources but since then we have been given 
tools and capacity that [an NGO] are giving us. We give them to the [community 
operators]. So with the capacity, we give this capacity to the community. So 
everything is related, and connected. 
Civil/Municipality: And we also have to build more capacity to socialise. For me, 
the workshops are to know what they are bringing to us. We need to see the 
situation, if there is water or if there is not. Some things, according to that to 
improve and to learn. So we know where to go. 
Operator/Municipality: They are helping [community operators] with the 
information and tools and capacities…I think everything is okay. There is nothing 
else to help improve the system because everything is being implemented for 
now… By this time we are going very well. If there is something that happens, we 
will solve it. 
Operator/Municipality: The technical assistance, we will need that constantly. 
Workshops, vigilance, from [multiple stakeholders]. 
Commentary from multiple interviews describes the importance of interactions between 
municipalities and local stakeholders. Numerical analysis indicates the presence of multiple 
information and skill ties around municipalities in Bolivia. Like other countries with case 
study institutions at the district level, homophily by level analysis shows engagement of 
stakeholders at different levels of sector hierarchy, including those at the local level. 
Numerical analysis is therefore broadly consistent with the narrative provided by 
stakeholders, and ties specific to local stakeholders in the ego network visualises these 
relationships further detail (Figure 64 and Figure 65).  
     
Figure 64 - Information ties to other municipal stakeholders in ego networks of Bolivia 
case study municipalities (McNicholl et al., 2017) 
 
Figure 65 - Skill ties to other municipal stakeholders in ego networks of Bolivia case 
study municipalities 
These ego networks are filtered to show only local stakeholder information and skill ties, and 
these local ties illustrate how the characteristics described during interviews are observable 
from a network perspective. Multiple ties of each type are visible for each case study 
municipality. From the network graphs alone the content of skill and information ties is 
unknown, but it is logical that these connections help the municipalities to understand local 
needs and respond appropriately.  
6.2.1.5 Tajikistan 
Tajikistan is a notable exception compared to the other four case study locations. While the 
others exhibit numerous ties to stakeholders at lower levels of hierarchy, the case study 
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institution in Tajikistan does not. The case study institution in Tajikistan has many ties to 
peer stakeholders, but has almost no connections to lower levels (Figure 66). This is 
quantified in analysis of its homophily by level that finds that the ego relates almost 
exclusively to other stakeholders at the national level.  
 
Figure 66 – Information ties by level of hierarchy for the Tajikistan case study 
institution 
Reference to network characteristics describing the importance of ties to lower levels of the 
sector hierarchy were not mentioned. This is not likely due to issues with methodology; 
fieldwork in Tajikistan included multiple interviews with local stakeholders in two districts. 
Ties between the case study institution and other stakeholders at the national level were 
mentioned as important, however, and these are explored in detail in analysis of ties to higher 
level stakeholders in sector hierarchies (Section 6.2.2.5).  
6.2.1.6 Summary of Information and Skill Ties with Lower Levels of Hierarchy 
Commentary from interview participants in four out of five countries described connections 
to stakeholders at lower levels of sector hierarchy as important for supporting institutional 
development. No two countries are identical, but their themes bear similarities. The key 
characteristic is that case study institutions are engaging stakeholders at lower levels of sector 
hierarchy in order to provide information and technical support to those who need it, as well 
as receive feedback on how services are operating and what can improve. These relationships 
can help institutions to both play their role effectively and develop understanding of how they 
can improve performance.  
 Investigation of ego network properties around case study institutions confirmed the presence 
of information and skill ties mentioned during interviews. All case study institutions, with the 
exception of the case study institution in Tajikistan, exhibit multiple information and skill 
connections to lower levels of sector hierarchy. This characteristic is also apparent from 
quantitative analysis of network size and homophily by level, and confirmed by visualisation 
of the specific parts of ego networks that connect to stakeholders at lower levels of hierarchy.  
Overall, it is a logical that skill and information ties with local stakeholders could help an 
operator or government authority to understand issues and improve performance. This 
characteristic can be observed from network properties in part by investigating the presence 
of information and skill ties between a key stakeholder and local stakeholders who depend on 
it. The presence of these ties does not, however, necessarily guarantee that institutional 
development is happening. Qualitative understanding of how the relationships are 
experienced in practice remains important for assessing how relationships are supporting 
desired outcomes.  
6.2.2 Characteristic #2 – Information and skill ties with higher levels of 
hierarchy 
This characteristic describes the other half of ego networks: connections to stakeholders at 
higher levels of sector hierarchy. The characteristic also relates to information and skill ties, 
and it was present in every case study country to varying extents. Some differences exist 
because of the nature of different case study institutions types, levels of sector hierarchy, and 
the number of other stakeholders that happen to be active in those areas. The number of alters 
at higher levels of hierarchy can therefore differ depending on the context, and this section 
explores the nature of the relationships with these stakeholders instead of focusing on the 
number of relationships.  
6.2.2.1 Ghana 
In Ghana, five different stakeholders described the importance of the technical support, and 
the importance of information provided by regional and national sector levels to the district 
governments. The nature of the relationship is straightforward, and can be investigated by 
describing the information and skill relationships inbound to the case study districts from this 
higher level of sector hierarchy.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 5 (4 shown) 
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Government/Regional: We are rather assisting. Yeah, we are assisting them. Yes. 
It’s only few districts that they are able to drill boreholes on their own. Without 
us coming in. 
Government/National: The fourth point is that the good working relationship 
with the assemblies. [The District Governments] have a very good working 
relationship with the assemblies. You remember that they don’t have structures 
here [at the district], but they provide facilitation role for the assemblies to 
deliver the system. 
Private/National: And then the whole structure, by that I’m talking about the 
[regional authority] structure, they’ve been there as coordinators and facilitators 
and then they have their regional offices who also give support, technical 
support, to the districts. 
Government/Regional: Between [a regional authority] and the districts we have 
come a long way, so there’s a lot of coaching, a lot of co-development we are 
giving the districts and it’s helping them to be the implementers of these facilities. 
These narratives demonstrate information and skill ties linking to higher levels of sector 
hierarchy, which in this case is national and regional levels. These relationships make up the 
other part of the ego networks explored in the previous section (Section 6.2.1). Quotes 
describe a relationship of support to local governments that is helping them to develop new 
approaches and to play their roles effectively.  
Network size values for information and skills partially described these relationships 
quantitatively. Homophily by level indicated that case study districts are connected to higher 
levels of sector hierarchy, and homophily by type indicated the presence of ties to other 
stakeholders beyond government. Ego networks filtered for ties to stakeholders at higher 
levels of sector hierarchy allows more detailed investigation of the described network 
characteristics.  
  
Figure 67 – Information ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy for case study 
district government ego networks in Ghana (McNicholl et al., 2017) 
 
Figure 68 - Skill ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy for case study district 
government ego networks in Ghana 
Multiple information and skill ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy are apparent for 
each case study district. Alters in these ego networks are at both regional and national 
levels, and also represent a range of stakeholder types. In both cases, the ego is the 
recipient of relatively strong information and skill ties from government and non-
government alters.  
6.2.2.2 Malawi 
Multiple stakeholders in Malawi also described the importance of information and skill 
connections between case study district governments and higher levels of sector 
hierarchy. Some of these comments also distinguished between support from permanent 
institutions, such as government, and impermanent stakeholders such as international 
development organisations that are not mandated to remain in the network indefinitely. 
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Commentary on this characteristic was provided in thirteen different interviews, and a 
selection of their quotes highlights the common themes perceived by different 
stakeholder types and from different levels of sector hierarchy.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 13 (4 shown) 
INGO/National: So if we do capacity building of the district teams, we 
know we are going to actually deliver more if we partner with them as 
compared to us working alone. 
Government/District: …and even the trainings in capacitating the human 
resource at our district level. Right from the [district government] up to the 
structures lower or below, below the [district government]. Trainings, 
coaching, whatever. It’s there. Sure. I think all of them are helping us to 
improve our service delivery in water supply, and it’s both at governance 
level, financial material level, and even at, what, governance level, financial 
material level, and the, yeah, I think mostly at these two levels. 
INGO/National: And what is also very important from that case is, the 
leadership that the district council takes in ensuring that there is a plan in 
place, and also ensuring that everything else that is happening in the 
district is also responding to the plan. And even for the leaders to actually 
say: “We don’t need this support. And this is the kind of support that we 
need at this point in time.” Which is something very unique; I'm not sure 
how many districts in Malawi are actually operating the way [this district] 
has been operating. 
Government/National: In each and every district that we go, we also try to 
improve the institutional capacity by giving them office blocks, and actually 
even development of the water users associations, giving them the capacity 
at district level and so forth. So yes, there’s institutional capacity… 
Capacity building, both accommodation as well as the training to the staff 
members, maybe water monitoring assistants and so forth. 
Multiple stakeholders from both district government and higher sector hierarchy levels 
talk about deliberate engagement to strengthen local government capacity. Another 
quote also describes a process of local government providing feedback to influence 
what type of support it receives. Information and skill ties would be the logical 
expressions of these relationships in network data, and from the descriptions it is 
 reasonable that these relationships could support local government performance 
improvements.  These described characteristics are consistent with the quantitative 
analysis that found numerous information and skill ties, as well as connections to 
stakeholders across different levels of hierarchy. Information and skill ties to higher 
levels of hierarchy can also be observed in the ego networks of these case study local 
governments (Figure 69 and Figure 70).  
 
Figure 69 - Information ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy for case study 
district government ego networks in Malawi (McNicholl et al., 2017) 
 
Figure 70 – Skill ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy for case study district 
government ego networks in Malawi  
Multiple information and skill ties to higher levels of hierarchy are apparent in the ego 
network of each case study local government in Malawi. The difference between the 
described characteristics and the network graphs is that many information connections 
can look similar from a network perspective, and even be of similar weight, but the 
nuance of each particular relationship can differ. For example, the concept of a district 
government being able to provide feedback to influence the kind of support it receives 
describes an important characteristic that is not fully characterised by network data 
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alone. For this reason, it remains important to supplement quantitative network data 
with qualitative descriptions to interpret the significance of particular relationships.  
6.2.2.3 India 
Information and skill ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy were described as 
important in India, although less frequently than in other case study countries. An 
important distinguishing characteristic of case study institutions in India is that these are 
local operators with no formal obligation to be connected to other stakeholders at higher 
levels of hierarchy. This mandate stands in contrast to district governments who, at least 
on paper, should be connected to both those who depend on their support and the 
national institutions that govern them.  
The fact that connections to higher level stakeholders are described as important 
amongst local operators in India is therefore interesting. These relationships are 
qualified by a few examples from the eight different operator ego networks where 
stakeholders commented on aspects of this characteristic.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 8 (3 shown) 
Operator/Community: And also he reports back to [the support 
organisation] if any technical error or technical assistance is required then 
he report back to [them]. 
Private/Community: Then the club members will give information to us 
[from the support organisation] if anything faulty happens. It helps to take 
action. 
NGO/State: And yes I also have the relationship of the plant owners with 
the existing plant… So that we can engage, we can maintain the system, we 
can get proper reports from those plants. Like how the plant is running. If 
something wrong happens, then I concern, I discuss with my other members 
or other persons of [my organisation]. So, like if any requirements or any 
system enhancement is required, then we provide consulting and also to the 
plant owners. 
These stakeholders describe a relationship of technical support from a stakeholder at 
higher level of sector hierarchy that helps operators to overcome technical challenges. 
Maintenance of the filters is important because the media that removes arsenic degrades 
over time. Water quality monitoring is necessary to ensure that water remains safe to 
 drink, and both monitoring and maintenance can be supported by stakeholders at higher 
levels of hierarchy as required.  
Quantitative analysis of Indian case study operators provides an initial understanding of 
the described characteristics. Network size values for information and skill ties showed 
the presence of numerous relationships.  Homophily by type numerical analysis showed 
connections to other stakeholder types, and homophily by level showed that operators 
do not exclusively connect to local stakeholders, even if these ties constitute the 
majority in the ego networks. Ties to higher levels of hierarchy are visualised in Figure 
71 where both information and skill ties are shown simultaneously. 
 
Figure 71 – Combined information and skill ego networks of case study operators 
in India showing ties to stakeholders at higher levels of hierarchy 
Reviewing ego networks for these local operators finds connections that are few in 
number, but nevertheless present. This characteristic suggests that support from other 
stakeholders at higher levels of sector hierarchy provides value to these operators.  
6.2.2.4 Bolivia 
Nine interview participants in Bolivia referenced the importance of skill and 
information ties between case study municipalities and higher levels of the sector 
hierarchy. These quotes describe activities such as workshops to build capacity, and ties 
that provide information on approaches for managing service delivery. A selection of 
quotes describing these characteristics is presented here: 
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 9 (5 shown) 
Government/Municipal: Of these institutions that are supporting us, most 
of all will be [an INGO]. Talking about investment and workshops and 
trainings to solve the water systems and sanitation. 
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Operator/Municipal: Just the way they are doing now. Some consultants 
that come here to the community to help us to prepare the annual 
programme of operations. 
Operator/Municipal: All that we work with these NGOs and with the 
institutions and the institutions from the government is to improve the 
quality of life. To improve the systems and to build the systems. 
Academic/Department: So we do this through advice to the users, to the 
technicians who work here and also work with the authorities. Those are the 
levels. 
NGO/Department: So it can be an NGO like [ours], it can also be the 
government the municipality it can be another institution, but there should 
be someone who gives them technical assistance permanently. To develop 
capacities in this network that we mentioned. 
These quotes describe how ties between upper levels of sector hierarchy and the 
municipalities are supporting local improvements. Network characteristics that 
specifically relate to improvements in municipal performance are often mixed with 
reference to infrastructure investments, and infrastructure is discussed later in this 
chapter (Section 6.3.4).  
A particularly nuanced network characteristic finds one stakeholder encouraging 
municipalities to develop a stronger internal organisational structure for managing 
service delivery as a precursor to partnership. The idea is that these municipalities can 
qualify for technical support and investments in infrastructure if they, in turn, invest in 
developing their internal capacity for managing services. The approach appears to be 
influencing the behaviour of the case study municipalities.  
INGO/Department: At the meeting last Tuesday there were the six 
[municipalities]. And there were three more municipalities. We are 
enforcing them in order that they build and create [district management 
units for water and sanitation]. Once they have a [district management 
unit] we will start working with them. It is a previous condition. 
This characteristic describes using infrastructure investment as leverage to influence the 
development of management structures within municipalities. These management units 
are then the same entities referred to in the characteristic describing connections to local 
stakeholders that provide information and skill support to local operators and 
 communities. This is perceived as a valuable arrangement that is having tangible effects 
on the capacity of the case study municipalities in Bolivia.  
More broadly, these described characteristics are consistent with the numerical findings 
of skill and information network sizes, and homophily by level. These properties 
indicate multiple connections that span levels of sector hierarchy. As with ego networks 
in other case study countries, these ties are expected to be visible in network 
visualisations of these municipalities. Filtering municipality ego networks to show 
connections to higher levels of sector hierarchy confirms the presence of these network 
characteristics (Figure 72 and Figure 73). 
 
Figure 72 – Information ties to stakeholders of higher level of sector hierarchy for 
case study municipalities in Bolivia (McNicholl et al., 2017) 
 
Figure 73 – Skills ties to stakeholders of higher level of sector hierarchy for case 
study municipalities in Bolivia 
Investigation of these ego networks finds that support is coming from multiple 
stakeholders at higher levels of sector hierarchy in each ego network. Narrative analysis 
of stakeholder commentary finds that there are different strategies for providing support 
to municipalities, but many of these stakeholders have specific intentions to build 
municipal capacity. Development of municipal management structures is then likely 
important for passing on support to the operators and communities identified in the 
other half of these ego networks (Section 6.2.1.4). 
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6.2.2.5 Tajikistan 
The case study institution in Tajikistan is at the top level of sector hierarchy in the 
country, and therefore has no higher level to engage with. Ties between national level 
stakeholders were reported as important, however. The characteristic of ties to upper 
levels of hierarchy can instead be explored by looking at relationships across the 
national level between the institution and other stakeholders at the national level.  
Influences from international organisations were identified in particular. Perspectives 
from multiple stakeholders indicate that international donor organisations are actively 
supporting the reform, and that dialogue platforms improve the interface between 
government and international organisations. These international organisations are 
comprised mainly of bi-lateral and multi-lateral organisations that work in Tajikistan. 
Five stakeholders described how international organisations interact with the institution 
studied, and their quotes are paraphrased from handwritten notes.   
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 5 (3 shown) 
DP/National: Since January this year [several Development Partners] are 
helping to implement the reform… Period of convincing was crucial leading 
up to now. At present, the reform has yet to get under way… but the process 
of getting everyone on board has been formalised and is moving forward. 
Government/National: [A Development Partner] hired a consultant to 
identify who is doing what in ministries in terms of authority and 
influence… First reform project began in 2006 with all stakeholders 
creating a working group… Another platform was also created, the national 
policy dialogue. This second platform then gathered all stakeholders. 
DP/National: A coordination unit was proposed, similar to what had 
existed previously. They would look at monthly progress and how donors 
are responding. They would implement programmes such as to support 
reforms. Different donors would support different basins and sub-basins. 
The coordination meetings are now ongoing. They’ve had three of them so 
far in 2016. Trying to reaffirm reform priorities and donor contributions to 
these. [He is] surprised it is working this time. 
Homophily by type analysis found that the case study government institution engages 
an approximately equal number of organisations that are similar and dissimilar to itself. 
This initial characterisation, combined with the identification of large information and 
 skill network sizes, suggests active engagement with the international organisations 
described in the quotations. The international organisations engaging the ego are easily 
identified by colour coding stakeholders by type (Figure 74).  
 
Figure 74 – Information ties with stakeholders at national level of sector hierarchy 
in Tajikistan in the case study institution ego network 
Numerous information ties between international organisations and the case study 
institution ego are easy to identify in the network graph. These findings confirm the 
presence of engagement amongst stakeholders at the national level, and qualify some of 
the importance of these network characteristics. This coordinated effort to engage the 
central authority on policy reform is perceived as beneficial in Tajikistan.  
6.2.2.6 Summary of Information and Skill Ties with Higher Levels of Hierarchy 
Examples in every country described information and skill connections with higher 
levels of hierarchy that are supporting the case study institutions to improve 
performance. In the case of district governments, these can be connections with regional 
or national level stakeholders. In Tajikistan, the institution is already at the highest level 
of the sector and therefore engages with other stakeholders also at the national level.  
The network characteristic is not particularly surprising. It seems logical that higher 
level stakeholders would support more local ones to develop their roles in service 
delivery. The advantage from a network perspective is the ease with which this 
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characteristic can be visualised to understand if this type of support exists, and where it 
is coming from. Even if the network characteristic seems obviously beneficial, it is 
possible that support from higher levels of hierarchy could be weak or absent, without 
being recognised as such by stakeholders in the network. Investigation of the full 
breadth of ego network characteristics provides potentially useful information on the 
types of engagement from higher levels and where these are coming from.  
6.2.3 Characteristic #3 – Coordination between higher-level hierarchy 
stakeholders providing strong information and skill support 
This third and final network characteristic commonly identified across several country 
case studies explores coordination between stakeholders strongly supporting an ego 
from higher levels of sector hierarchy. Coordination was a theme referenced by 
stakeholders in each country. What coordination means from a network perspective, 
however, is unclear because not every stakeholder equally engages everyone else. 
Interview quotes on this characteristic are combined with quantitative findings to 
understand how coordination between stakeholders is observed in the ego networks of 
the case study institutions in the five countries.  
The analytical methods used in this section combine information and skill ties to 
investigate coordination because these tie types were identified as significant in the first 
two common network characteristics. Ties presented in analysis in this section will 
therefore refer to instances where both information and skill ties exist in parallel. These 
combined ties will be used to identify the stakeholders that are most strongly engaging 
the ego, and to quantify the strength of ties between these alters.  
Specifically, the two alters most strongly engaging the ego with combined information 
and skill ties are investigated because of the unit of analysis produced by looking at 
three nodes, and because follow up interviews with these alters were conducted in all 
cases. These interviews therefore captured data on alter-to-alter ties between the two 
alters most strongly engaging each case study institution. Including the ego and the two 
alters most strongly engaging it creates a basic unit of network analysis called a triad. 
This is considered to be the smallest coalition possible in a network, and analysis of 
triads has been the basis of extensive sociological research and the development of 
network theory (Caplow, 1968; Simmel, 1964; Stryke & Psathas, 1960). Analysis in this 
section will therefore consider the two alters most strongly engaging the ego to see if 
the two alters are also linked by information and skill ties to form a coordination unit.  
 Analysis first identifies the two alters most strongly engaging the ego with both 
information and skill ties. Information ties are weighted from 1 to 3 and skill ties are 
weighted from 1 to 4 (Section 4.3.1). Alters identified for analysis are defined as 
strongly engaging the ego if their combined information and skill tie weights are each 
greater than the minimum value of 1, meaning that alters with the weakest possible ties 
are excluded. Incoming tie strength is taken from the perspective of the ego because, 
logically, the ego can distinguish relative tie weight differences from the same 
perspective. The second step then quantifies the average strength of information and 
skill ties between these two alters as reported by them during follow up interviews. 
These alters were directly interviewed in all cases.  
Applying these two steps produces a triad between the ego and two alters for analysis 
(Figure 75). Specifically, this process identifies whether there are at least two alters 
strongly engaging an ego with both information and skill ties, and identifies whether 
strong information and skill ties also exist between these alters. Identifying and 
quantifying the strength of these alter to alter ties is expected to help interpret 
coordination between stakeholders engaging the ego from a network perspective.  
 
Figure 75 – Example triad showing the ego and the two alters with the strongest 
combined information and skill ties to the ego 
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6.2.3.1 Ghana 
Coordination amongst stakeholders at higher levels of hierarchy was described as 
important in Ghana. These descriptions of coordination relate specifically to the ego 
networks of the case study districts, where both local governments are receiving support 
from stakeholders at higher levels of sector hierarchy, as was explored earlier in this 
chapter (Section 6.2.2.1). The next step explores from a network perspective how these 
stakeholders engaging a case study district engage each other. Four stakeholders in 
Ghana described the triad of information and skill ties between district government, a 
regional authority, and an International NGO.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 4 (3 shown) 
Government/District: And then I think for the [work we have done] has 
empowered the assembly in a way. We now know the water situation in the 
district, so if the church organisations, or their [inaudible] comes to the 
districts they want to assist you in borehole maintenance or borehole we 
know functionality that was done by the project has been able to tell us how 
many facilities are functioning. 
INGO/National: Okay, so all the three figures from the three points. And 
what we realised from the three points was that sometimes the key challenge 
is actually that the management teams that are supposed to monitor the 
systems are defunct. So, once the management teams are not in place then 
you cannot guarantee the service levels. Depending on how we’ve worked 
with our partners, depending on what kind of problems we have found 
together, then we work out solutions together. 
Government/District: Now we understand we use this life cycle cost 
approach, where we comprehensively budget for water and sanitation 
activities. Yes. So, everything is really budgeted for. And for instance we 
have this composite budget. So once it’s been in there, we have a reason to 
spend on such activities. So those are some of the things helping us to really 
work as it is. 
These comments describe how certain relationships between an ego and its alters are 
stronger than others, and that working together as a triad has produced solutions. The 
quotes refer to specific stakeholders that were evident from the context of the interview, 
even if these are not named explicitly in the quotes. Analysis of the case study district 
 government ego networks can clarify what these characteristics look like from a 
network perspective.  
The following analysis of each district government ego network quantitatively identifies 
the properties of ties between stakeholders engaging districts from higher levels of 
sector hierarchy. Identical analysis of triads is repeated throughout this section to 
investigate coordination between alters in ego networks of case study institutions. The 
first step identifies the two alters in the ego network that are the source of the strongest 
combined inbound information and skill ties from the perspective of the ego. The ego 
perspective is important because it can define what it perceives as strongest relative to 
all types of engagement it experiences. For this analysis, strong ties are defined as 
stronger than the most basic possible tie strengths for information and skills. The next 
step investigates ties between these two alters. The result quantifies coordination 
between the stakeholders most strongly engaging a case study institution.  
The two alters with the strongest combined information and skill ties to the ego are 
shown for each case study district government ego network in Figure 76. Also shown 
are the weights of the information and skill ties between these two alters. These ties 
show a triad of strong information and skill ties between all three stakeholders in each 
case. 
 
Figure 76 – Visualisation of the network triads in Ghana between case study local 
governments and the alters with the strongest information and skill ties to the ego. 
Analysis finds strong information and skill ties between these alters in each ego 
network. (McNicholl et al., 2017) 
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First, the ego network is filtered to show the two alters at higher levels of hierarchy 
most strongly engaging the ego with information and skill ties. Information and skill 
ties between these two alters can then be identified. The filtered ego network shows that 
the two alters most strongly engaging a case study district are also strongly engaging 
each other.  
The importance of coordination as a network characteristic is logical. Stakeholders 
strongly engaging a district government will likely influence it. Multiple stakeholders 
need to be working towards common outcomes if they are successfully going to 
influence district performance improvements, and these supporting stakeholders 
therefore strongly need to engage each other. This engagement could help to align 
efforts and complement each other’s work.  
6.2.3.2 Malawi 
Commentary on coordination between stakeholders at higher levels of sector hierarchy 
also emerged in Malawi. These comments sometimes referred to specific stakeholders 
and interactions, and sometimes offered a more general perception of everyone working 
together.  
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 6 (3 shown) 
Academic/Regional: I think one of the things that’s helping improve 
services for water supply is that we have several partners, both government 
stakeholders such as [a regional authority], but also large and small NGOs, 
and they’re all working with us in some capacity. So they may not be 
working with us on a specific project, but because they interact with us, 
there’s always tea break conversations on other topics, and I think that’s a 
big change from when the centre first started… I mean they may not all do 
the same approach, but it’s important that everyone knows kind of what 
everyone’s doing in the area. Because as we discussed there are some 
smaller NGOs here that are not necessarily working in the proper way, but 
by working through us we can encourage them to work through the districts 
or to do their training in a different way for example. 
NGO/National: So basically the network is enhanced through the forums, 
what we call the citizens’ forums. Which brings in the people themselves as 
end users of water, and then various service providers. It could be NGOs, 
[INGOs], and through it could be the local councils who are supplying 
 water in those areas. And in those local areas there also committees, like 
water and sanitation committees, which oversee that water is being supplied 
that is clean. 
INGO/National: And of course also these other organisations like […], just 
to mention a few. They are also able to understand that water is important 
for the communities that we are serving and they are able to provide that 
particular water. Based on the findings that we have, sometimes there could 
be an organisation that has got resources to provide that water service, but 
they might not be aware of where exactly they would bring that water to. So 
when we are coming in, engaged in dialogue with these colleagues, they 
have been able to understand that there is a need here and let’s provide. 
These quotes touch on themes of collaboration between the stakeholders, sharing 
information, awareness of their respective intentions and achievements, and support for 
each other’s work. Analysis of these stakeholder interactions follows the same process 
as investigation of coordination in Ghanaian ego networks. The two alters most strongly 
engaging the case study district governments with combined information and skill ties 
from the perspective of the ego are identified first. The strength of information and skill 
interactions between these alters is then quantified. This process characterises 
coordination between the alters most strongly engaging the ego. Ego networks for the 
first and second case study district governments are presented in Figure 77 and Figure 
78 respectively.  
 
Figure 77 – Visualisation of the network triad in Malawi between District 1 and 
the alters with the strongest information and skill ties to the ego. Analysis shows a 
weak information tie between these two alters.  
 166 
 
Figure 78 - Visualisation of the network triad in Malawi between District 2 and the 
alters with the strongest information and skill ties to the ego. Analysis shows three 
alters because two have equal strength ties to the ego. These alters are not all 
directly connected.   
Coordination is incomplete between alters strongly engaging case study institutions in 
Malawi. The first case study district government (Figure 77) shows a weak information 
tie between the two alters most strongly engaging that district government. The second 
case study district government (Figure 78) has three alters included because two of 
these engage the ego with information and skill ties of equal weight. One of the ties is 
missing between the INGO alter and the DP alter. The second case study district 
government ego network does show some strong engagement between these alters with 
information and skill ties to the district government, but not all alters are directly 
connected. It is reasonable that some stakeholders would mention alignment and 
coordination as important aspects of network interaction, but analysis of the specific ego 
networks around case study district governments does not find strong ties between alters 
in all cases.  
6.2.3.3 India 
Case study institutions in India are community operator committees that have relatively 
few connections to higher levels of sector hierarchy. The relatively small number of 
stakeholders at higher levels of hierarchy in operator ego networks corresponds to less 
commentary about relationships between these higher level alters. Only one stakeholder 
commented on the importance of this network characteristic, but the detail of the 
 description suggests that the coordination tie is important, and analysis is conducted in 
this section to be consistent with analysis of other case study countries. 
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 1 (1 shown) 
Academic/State: [Our] present role for the units that have been installed is 
not direct because [the NGO] is now technically competent and so they can 
provide service. Administration also can provide the service for all kind of 
stakeholder needs…. So that way we thought this kind of a system where an 
NGO is there is technically capable and specialised in this kind of filter 
operations is in place, and the committees, and the school administration 
are eager to see their filter serving their respective communities for years. 
This quote describes a relationship between an academic institution and an NGO both 
playing roles in supporting the case study community operator committees. The 
academic institution played a leading role in developing arsenic filtration technology, 
and their coordination with a local NGO allows technical support to continue being 
extended to community operator committees. This relationship is important because the 
academic institution does not have the mandate or capacity to directly provide all types 
of support to the community operators. This arrangement therefore creates a mutually 
supportive set of relationships that benefits all three stakeholders in the triad: the 
academic institution, the NGO, and a case study operator.  
Analysis of operator ego networks illustrates how coordination is observed in the India 
case study. In ten of the twelve operators studied, the same pair of stakeholders – the 
academic institution and an NGO – are the only alters engaging the operators from 
higher levels of sector hierarchy with both strong information and skill ties. The other 
two operators identify only one alter. Because analysis of alter-to-alter ties is the same 
for many of these egos, two figures can be used to visualise the ego networks of all case 
study operators in India that are improving performance (Figure 79 and Figure 80). Ten 
of the twelve case study operators that are improving performance exhibit coordination 
between strongly engaged alters in their respective ego networks. 
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Figure 79 – Visualisation of the network triad for ten case study operators showing 
the alters with the strongest information and skill ties to the ego. Analysis shows 
strong information and skill ties between these two alters.  
 
Figure 80 - Visualisation of the network triad for two case study operators showing 
the alters with the strongest information and skill ties to the ego. Only one alter is 
identified as strongly engaging these two operators with both information and skill 
ties from higher levels of hierarchy.  
 6.2.3.4 Bolivia 
Coordination was mentioned as important by only two stakeholders interviewed in 
Bolivia. These comments refer to ego networks around local governments, but relatively 
few stakeholders are engaged in these ego networks from higher levels of sector 
hierarchy as compared to other local governments studied in Ghana and Malawi. This 
may be a reason why this characteristic was mentioned less frequently in Bolivia. Two 
quotes describe coordination amongst stakeholders at a higher level of sector hierarchy 
who are strongly engaging municipalities.   
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 2 (2 shown) 
Government/Department: All of the relationships are to set relationships of 
coordination in specific objectives to help us to visualise, to solve, to get 
clear to discuss, and others. So we decided to identify first of all, to all the 
actors public and private, and the other entities too to identify them to see 
how many of them work, in the water topics…And in order to be more 
effective in the interventions and not to waste our efforts. And not to make 
the investments useless. So all of these actions and all of these entities we 
have the same objectives: to improve the systems and to give the people 
adequate service in water and sanitation. 
INGO/Department: There is good coordination between these institutions. 
The sector has a good structure and there are many different levels. 
Municipal, national, international cooperation, NGOs, society in general, 
department. There is good participation between them. 
Both commentaries cite coordination as important, but details of these interactions are 
vague. Analysis of case study municipality ego networks investigates coordination 
between stakeholders at higher levels of hierarchy in these ego networks to explore this 
characteristic from a network perspective. In Bolivia, however, only one alter at higher 
levels of hierarchy is identified as engaging each case study local government with both 
information and skill ties stronger than the minimum possible weight (Figure 81). The 
coordination network characteristic is therefore not identified in the Bolivian case 
studies.  
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Figure 81 – Bolivian case study municipalities information and skill network ties to 
higher levels of sector hierarchy filtered for the strongest tie weights from the 
perspective of the ego 
6.2.3.5 Tajikistan 
In Tajikistan, interview commentary highlights the importance of coordination amongst 
stakeholders supporting the case study institution that is leading the policy reform. 
Some commentary refers to a particular stakeholder that is playing a coordination role 
amongst development partners. This is something more specific than just coordination: 
it is a characterisation of a specific stakeholder taking a lead role in assisting the reform 
process on behalf of other international organisations. Comments from stakeholders in 
interviews illustrate this concept in greater detail. 
Total number of interviewed stakeholders describing the characteristic: 5 (3 shown) 
INGO/National: Both donors manage to have the same line in front of the 
government. That really helped. And that’s thanks to the two of them who 
really pushed to have a common view… the donors getting together, and it 
took a while to get the same position. But the eventually to put everything 
together, to delegate to [specific stakeholders], to represent them in front of 
the government, and that really helped. 
Government/National: [The facilitator] is paid by [a donor] but hired to 
lead the reform process from the donor side. 
DP/National: [Donors] requested [a facilitator] … to help approve and 
implement the water reform…in December 2015 the government approved 
the reform. [The government] appointed… a coordinating unit in the 
ministry… [the facilitator] wanted to be based in the [government] instead 
 of at the head office…. Overall, it’s time, patience, and resources. These are 
needed to convince of the benefits through a consultation process. Need to 
understand, for everyone, what’s in it for them?... Tajikistan needs heavy 
mediation between donors and government. [The facilitator] plays a role as 
a mediator between them to understand needs and identify solutions. 
Dialogue is a process to achieve consensus on both sides. 
The stakeholder described as the ‘facilitator’ can be identified from analysis of the 
strong incoming information and skill ties perceived by the ego. The facilitator is 
evident as one of the alters engaging the ego with the strongest weights of skill and 
information ties. Only one other stakeholder across the entire ego network does 
likewise, and analysis of the ties between these two alters find strong information and 
skill ties (Figure 82).  
 
Figure 82 – Visualisation of the network triad in Tajikistan between the case study 
institution and the alters with the strongest information and skill ties to the ego. 
Analysis finds strong information and skill ties between these alters.  
These properties provide a more detailed picture of the facilitator, its relationship to the 
case study institution, and its relationship to the other alter most strongly engaging the 
institution. These indicators, as described from a network perspective, might help 
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identify the presence – or absence – of facilitators in other such networks, or help to 
strengthen the roles of facilitators trying to play similar roles.  
6.2.3.6 Summary of Coordination between Higher-level Hierarchy Stakeholders 
Providing Strong Information and Skill Support 
Coordination amongst stakeholders was referenced as important by stakeholders in each 
country. The word ‘coordination’ is imprecise, however, because not every stakeholder 
has equally strong ties with every other stakeholder in an ego network. Triad analysis 
can therefore be used to identify where engagement is strongest, and how these 
stakeholders relate to each other. This analytical approach offers a specific description 
from a network perspective of how coordination happens in practice between a few key 
stakeholders who strongly engage a case study institution. 
This network characteristic of coordination can be identified in two steps. The first step 
is to identify, from the perspective of the ego, the strongest information and skill ties 
coming from higher levels of hierarchy. The second step is to quantify the strength of 
the information and skill ties between these alters. In the cases where this network 
characteristic was observed, these alter-to-alter relationships were described as 
important for coordinating efforts when engaging an institution.  
The coordination network characteristic is less present in Bolivia and Malawi. In these 
cases, there are either few alters strongly engaging case study institutions with both 
information and skill ties, or relationships between these alters are weak or missing. 
These findings suggest that the absence of this network characteristic does not 
necessarily halt institutional development, but a lack of relationships between alters 
strongly engaging an ego might be a missed opportunity for strengthening support for 
institutional development. It seems logical that weak ties between stakeholders strongly 
engaging an institution could lead to redundant or even conflicting efforts, and it is 
therefore reasonable that the importance of coordination between stakeholders 
supporting an institution was identified as a supportive influence on institutional 
development in multiple case studies.  
6.3 Uncommon Network Characteristics 
Some network characteristics that reportedly support institutional development were 
described in a small number of instances. Some of these influences may only apply to 
specific types of stakeholders, may be contextually dependent, or may not perceived as 
important elsewhere. These network characteristics were described as positive 
 influences on institutional development in specific cases, but these characteristics are 
less ubiquitous than the common characteristics described previously.  
6.3.1 Water Tariffs 
A tariff is what users pay for water services, and at least some mention of the 
importance of appropriate water tariffs was made in every case study country. Tariffs do 
no emerge as a common characteristic, however, because only the Indian case study 
institutions were operators who have a direct relationship to water tariffs. Operators 
directly interact with tariffs when users pay for water, but tariffs do not apply to other 
institutions such as local governments that are not directly providing water services to 
users.  
Commentary related to the local operators in India provides the clearest quotes about 
the importance of water tariffs. A selection of these perspectives is presented here. All 
of these quotes refer to a specific local operator that is improving its performance.   
Private/State: Other than this I told you for sustenance, for sustainability, 
they collect a small amount of money from every household family and with 
that fund they manage to run their plant. Manage to pay the electricity bill. 
Manage to pay for chemicals. And also operator’s salary. So with these 
ideas basically, and with these kind of implementation, I guess it has been 
successful. 
Civil/Community: [From translator] So what she is saying is that the price 
of the water is very less, so it is for everybody. Like she can afford it, and 
also her servant, her maid servant, she can also afford it because just a 
nominal amount of 40 rupees for the whole month of regular delivery of 
water. 
Operator/Community: [From translator] So this is how the community is 
getting developed and also getting help by the money the consumers is 
paying for that water. 
These quotes describe a resource tie that helps to sustain services while still being 
affordable for users. From a network perspective, this relationship is expected to be 
visible in the form of a resource tie between consumers and operators. The investigation 
is straightforward because it simply notes whether a tie exists or not. Tie weight is 
expected to be small and therefore unimportant in analysis because the forty-rupee 
monthly tariff was less than 50p equivalent at the time of research. 
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Resource ties are easy to identify in ego networks. Visualising a few of these Indian 
operator resource ego nets illustrates the concept. Figure 83 shows the local resource 
network for one of the case study operators. These resource ties show consumers paying 
directly for water, as well as consumers paying through a water delivery agent who acts 
as a middleman.  
 
Figure 83 – Local resource network for one of the case study operators in India 
These networks show payment of tariffs from consumers to either the operator or 
management committee, or alternatively to a delivery agent who then passes the 
payment onto the operator. Replicated analysis for all networks of successful operators 
in India finds this characteristic present in all cases but one.  
It is unsurprising that an affordable tariff structure is linked to almost all operators in 
India that are improving performance. The exception is an ashram that provides its 
services as a public good and maintains operations through charitable revenue streams 
instead of tariffs, and resource ties therefore appear differently in its network. Revenue 
logically helps to sustain and potentially improve operations. Conversely, the absence of 
income could eventually bankrupt facilities and force them to close. Even though the 
tariffs are relatively small, the network perspective identifies these relationships and 
identifies who is being paid by whom.  
6.3.2 Dedicated Operator 
Having a dedicated system operator was another network characteristic that most clearly 
emerged from the Indian case study. These operators were typically paid for their 
 services. Dedicated operators were mentioned as important in other countries such as 
Bolivia and Tajikistan, but performance data on these operators was not captured 
because these were not the focus of the case studies.  
This characteristic is described by multiple stakeholders in India, some in greater detail 
than others.  
Operator/Community: Everything we have to pay it. And paying to our 
caretaker. Our backwasher, then their bonus. Everything we have to pay. 
Academic/State: And also what happened in many of the locations or most 
of the locations where filters are installed, the committees appointed a 
caretaker. Caretaker may be a local unemployed youth, or in some cases 
there is. So it helped those families of the caretaker. Because it is kind of 
source of income for them. So we have seen in many of the locations the 
caretakers themselves are very interested to maintain the units properly so 
that more and more people come, and they are whatever income is coming, 
that is also staying for many years. Because they are interested for their 
families…And the appointed caretaker in most cases they pay an honorary 
amount to the caretaker from the committee fund. 
The network perspective of this characteristic offers little insight because the 
characteristic is an intrinsic node property. This means that the operator is one of the 
members of the management committee, which in this research is represented as a 
single node. The key point is that, regardless of how the network is represented, a 
specific individual within the institution is playing a dedicated role in managing the 
services. All case study operators that are improving performance in India have a paid 
person managing the arsenic removal facility as a member of the community operator 
committees.  
6.3.3 Cost-Recovery Support  
One characteristic identified in India suggests a particular type of relationship for 
sustaining engagement between an institution and stakeholders at higher levels of 
hierarchy. Information and skill ties to higher levels of hierarchy were described as 
important in all countries (Section 6.2.2), including local arsenic filter operators in 
India. For the case of the operators that were improving performance, all were receiving 
some information and skill support from a stakeholder at a higher level of sector 
hierarchy that these local operators compensated financially. Network ties show a 
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resource tie from operators to these support organisations in return for information and 
skill engagement.  
This arrangement was identified in descriptions of network characteristics during 
interviews. Some stakeholders directly commented on the importance of this 
arrangement for sustaining the interaction, which is then important for supporting 
operators to sustain community water supply services.  
Operator/Community: And during these ten years I think five or six times I 
paid. Yes. I think six years. I think six times I paid to [the supporting 
organisation]. Not only this. For maintenance of this water pump. 
Academic/State: But many of them prefer [the supporting organisation], so 
they contact [the supporting organisation]. They collect the sample, and 
they pay the charge for that…You know perhaps about that. Regeneration 
also being charged…. So that way we thought this kind of a system where 
an NGO is there is technically capable and specialised in this kind of filter 
operations is in place, and the committees, and the school administration 
are eager to see their filter serving their respective communities for years. 
So now a synergistic system is coming up. So they need [the supporting 
organisation] support, [the supporting organisation] goes to meet their 
order so they can sustain themselves. 
This relationship is observed in ego networks by noting the presence of a resource tie 
that runs parallel to the information and skill ties received from the supporting 
organisation to the local operators. The resource ties show operators paying for a 
service. As described in an interview quote, this creates a ‘synergistic’ relationship that 
helps both stakeholders to sustain their activities. Compensation for support providers is 
a characteristic that exists for all local operators studied that are improving 
performance.  
 
  
Figure 84 – Relationship drawn in an operator’s ego network during an interview. 
Skill (black), information (blue), and authority (red) ties from a support 
organisation (left) to a local operator (right) reciprocated by a resource tie (green) 
from the operator to the support organisation. 
6.3.4 Channelling Investments Through Local Governments 
Channelling financial resources for infrastructure construction through local 
government is happening in Bolivia, Ghana, and Malawi to different extents. Some 
stakeholders see this as important, but both the goal and the effect of this approach are 
difficult to fully understand from the network perspective that this research provides.  
Quotes from Malawi and Bolivia describe how channelling investments through district 
governments are perceived by different stakeholders, and how these relationships relate 
to the development of long-term capacity for supporting service delivery. These quotes 
draw on different countries, and the country name has been added to beginning of the 
quote labels.  
Malawi/DP/National: We provide funding for quite a lot of staff – water 
monitoring assistants. And they’re not just for our programme, but for 
district use as a whole. So that I think, plus we provide them with mobility, 
through motorcycles and fuel. So that allows them to visit more of… they’re 
much more out there than they were before. So the numbers and the mobility 
is meaning that they get much better reports from the district and can 
actually follow up on complaints. 
Malawi/INGO/National: Well I think the way we work with the local 
government now, especially we give them more than $100,000 US dollars a 
year, what that is doing is that we are trying to mimic their [monthly 
discretionary funds], their operational costs, because they don’t get as 
much money. So that particular relationship in terms of giving them 
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resources, trying to offer the skills transfer and support and coaching, to 
enable them to actually do their work – it’s giving them the wings to fly; to 
actually do the stuff they’ve not been able to do because they lack the 
money. 
Malawi/Government/District: And on the financial and material level then 
we have the donors who are there... Giving us the financial resources and 
even the trainings in capacitating the human resource at the district level. 
Bolivia/Government/Municipal: We administer the direct admission. We 
have a budget for example of this year from […] of 387,000 Bolivianos. And 
from the municipality 332,000 Bolivianos. We decide where the money goes. 
We administrate the money in projects. And then we execute the projects. So 
everyone has a part. [The NGO], the municipality, and the [community 
management committees]. 
Bolivia/INGO/Department: …it is a unity that secures the success of all 
this network. I think the financial part, the investment, the norms, the 
trainings and the workshops, the relationships. Because these relationships 
go to the community, these go to the people. If this doesn´t exist, it doesn’t 
go to the people. A lot of financial help, a lot of norms, a lot of 
coordination, a lot of platforms, very good. But how do we get here [to the 
people]. If it doesn’t exist, it’s really hard. 
Resource ties are easy to identify in ego networks, and these ties commonly exist in 
parallel with information and skill ties, as shown in multiplexity analysis (Section 
5.4.6). The presence of information ties existing in parallel with resource ties is 
unsurprising since giving money to someone logically necessitates at least an 
information connection. The characteristic can be explained as supporting institution 
development either by supposing that handling resources builds internal capacity, or by 
handling resources necessitating information and skill engagement in parallel that helps 
to improve institutional performance. The reality is perhaps somewhere between these 
two explanations, and perhaps manifests differently depending on the context and 
specific institutions involved.  
6.4 Influences Unconfirmed by Network Data 
Network analysis is only one way to understand influences on institutional performance, 
and commentary from some stakeholders made clear that other factors are at play. 
 These factors are not readily observable from the network approach of this research. 
These additional influences are highlighted in this section because they are described as 
important even if they are beyond the observational capability of social network 
methods used in this research.  
6.4.1 A Champion Leading the Reform 
Some interview participants in Tajikistan described the importance of a specific 
institution, and an individual within it, taking responsibility for the reform process. This 
factor is specific to Tajikistan, but could reasonably apply elsewhere.  
DP/National: No more foreign techs writing reforms. [He] read the 
documents and became the champion of them…. Took about 1.5 years to 
read, tweak, and take on board what was being proposed in the reform. 
Now, he owns it…. Needed lots of signatures from other institutions. 
Involved lots of tweaking and redrafting. 
DP/National: The beauty with [a central individual within the authority] is 
that [he] really understands the issues and implications. He might not have 
all the details of implementation, but he can seek that support from donors 
or technical assistants…. There is a group of institutions including [the 
authority and others] that then liaise with the other relevant ministries.   
What is not captured by network perspectives is the commitment and motivation of key 
individuals. Important offices could be well connected but unmotivated. It is not a given 
that the presence of connections will automatically lead to the level of commitment 
described in the interview quotes, even if network ties can provide some indication of 
who is being engaged.  
6.4.2 Convening Organisation 
Some stakeholders aspire to influence the shape of the overall sector network by 
working as a broker or convenor. The concept is straightforward: introducing specific 
connections can reduce the degrees of separation between stakeholders, thereby 
potentially improving coordination and knowledge sharing.  
The Tajikistan Water Supply and Sanitation (TajWSS) programme, initiated by Oxfam, 
aims to provide such a knowledge sharing platform in Tajikistan. The programme 
appears to be successful. Stakeholder commentary indicated perceived utility of the 
platform, and the meetings are well attended by a diversity of stakeholders in the sector. 
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It has explicit networking goals of connecting stakeholders in the Tajikistan WASH 
sector, and therefore should be investigable from a network perspective.  
DP/National: This network is a powerful instrument. Now the network is for 
ongoing discussion on policy. Then this can lead to policy change. Then 
international coordination grows. 
Government/National: The network helps to get information across the 
sector. What is happening, and so on. 
INGO/National: Overall the network is very good. We learn from other 
organisations. Good to exchange from different experiences. Gathers 
information about other organisations and what they are doing. 
The challenge with investigating the properties of this network is related to the type of 
network data collected. Interviews used a name generator approach whereby 
participants listed stakeholders they work with without being prompted. This method 
was appropriate because a complete list of sector stakeholders was not available at the 
outset of data collection. It is adequate for the specific goals of this research, but makes 
investigation of the effect of the TajWSS network more difficult. Performing whole 
network analysis on the TajWSS network would require asking each network member 
about every other member to ensure that no one is omitted.   
The inability of participants to choose from a specified stakeholder lists disqualifies the 
use of network data for whole network analysis because recollection errors could 
possibly omit ties that change the overall structure of the network. This effect is not 
important for ego networks, however, because they are not investigated using whole 
network properties such as network diameter. The snowball data collected from 
sequential stakeholder interviews provides some indication of the overall network, but 
these data are insufficient for rigorous whole network analysis.  
The importance of sector platforms for information sharing and coordination is 
therefore presented as an unconfirmed network characteristic. From analysis of 
available network data, the platform appears to reach a large number of stakeholders, 
and quotes from stakeholders in the network add further credibility to its value. The full 
network effect of this platform is unconfirmed, however, even if stakeholder 
commentary suggests that the practice provides value for the sector overall.  
 6.4.3 Water Quality 
Perception of water quality in India was identified as important, particularly because the 
case study institutions were local water service operators. This issue surfaced in other 
countries, such as Bolivia, but was not directly connected to the institutions that were 
improving performance. In India this factor was described as important by both users 
and operator committees.  
Consumers naturally want good water. Their demand for clean water directly affected 
their relationship with local providers in India, and their perception of water quality 
could directly influence consumer willingness to pay for water services. Several 
consumers interviewed identified affordable clean water as the only thing that mattered 
from their perspective.  
Civil/Community: That is very healthy and tasty. It is cheaper. 
Civil/Community: And he also told that this quality is very good. This water 
is very precious in this area. 
Operator/Community: First time the media is very good, and last one to 
two years firstly this is good activated. But then he regenerated the media 
and this quality is very low. And for this reason user numbers are 
decreased. 
The final quote provides perspective on what happens when water quality declines. 
Other positive network characteristics might exist, but the quote suggests that a decline 
in quality corresponds to a decline in customers. This is an example of a non-network 
factor that might override even supportive network characteristics.  
6.4.4 Executive Power 
Stakeholders in each case study country would occasionally reference the importance of 
executive power. The presidential office was a common example: a directive from the 
top office carries power that can override the effects of other network characteristics. 
This poses a challenge from a network perspective because executive offices rarely 
appeared in ego networks, but have the potential to influence them significantly.  
Specific quotes about this influence were not provided during interviews. Executive 
power was often discussed indirectly or at a time outside of the formal interview where 
quotes were recorded. This makes the influence harder to characterise because, even if it 
is recognised by multiple stakeholders, its manifestation can be subtle and inconsistent.  
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This suggests a conditionality for interpreting network data. Interactions in ego 
networks could represent how these interactions typically function, while still being 
vulnerable to external influences that may not be immediately visible from the 
perspective of the immediate network around an institution. External influences include 
macro-economic factors such as currency devaluation, or political directives from high 
up that might be out of sync with how technocratic services typically function. Here, 
executive power presents a challenge for understanding how networks function because 
it can have little presence until it manifests suddenly with significant implications for all 
stakeholders involved.  
The implication is that networks can potentially be interpreted on different frequencies 
of interaction. Presidential directives may be infrequent – perhaps once per year or even 
less. In the meantime, ongoing local interactions dominate in the day-to-day. Such 
modelling of these networks would allow the incorporation of strong but infrequent 
influences alongside weaker but more consistent ones. Future research could 
characterise stakeholder interactions that exist at different frequencies such as yearly, 
monthly, and weekly to understand when different network characteristics are 
experienced.  
6.5 Qualitative Analysis Summary 
This chapter has introduced qualitative analysis to interpret the significance of 
quantitatively observed network properties in cases of institutional development. Three 
common network characteristics were identified in multiple countries that are both 
visible in network data and described as important by stakeholders active in these 
networks. The three network characteristics are: information and skill ties to lower 
hierarchy stakeholders; information and skill ties to higher hierarchy stakeholders; and 
strong information and skill ties between higher hierarchy stakeholders that have strong 
information and skill ties with an institution. Not every network characteristic is present 
in each country, but these characteristics appear in multiple cases despite the different 
contexts and types of institutions studied. Table 14 summarises these observations by 
network characteristic and country.  
 Table 14 – Summary of common network characteristics and where they were 
observed.  
Country                                    Network Characteristic 
#1 – Information 
and skill ties with 
lower levels of 
hierarchy 
#2 – Information and 
skill ties with higher 
levels of hierarchy 
#3 – Coordination 
between higher-level 
hierarchy stakeholders 
providing strong 
information and skill 
support 
Ghana    
Malawi    
India    
Bolivia    
Tajikistan    
Qualitative analysis also identified other influences on institutional development that 
are either less common or difficult to confirm from available network data. These 
factors may be important as well, although their ubiquity and manifestations in network 
data are difficult to confirm. Uncommon network characteristics related specifically to 
institutions who are operating services include the importance of a water tariff and the 
importance of a dedicated system operator. One characteristic related specifically to 
stakeholders from higher levels of sector hierarchy that are providing information and 
skill support to lower levels. This characteristic described a cost recovery mechanism 
where recipients of information and skill support pay for services that help the 
stakeholder at higher level of sector hierarchy to sustain operations. A final 
characteristic considered the role of infrastructure investment being channelled through 
institutions as a means of building their capacity. All of these characteristics were 
identified as positive influences on institutional development in some instances, and 
network ties related to these characteristics can be identified, even if these 
characteristics were not equally identified in all cases.  
Four characteristics unconfirmed by network data were also presented because of their 
perceived importance by stakeholders interviewed. These influences include: a 
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champion leading institutional development from within an institution; the presence of a 
convening organisation that strengthens ties across a sector; the importance of good 
water quality; and the potential influence from executive power that can upend the 
typical functioning of a network. These factors are perceived as important, even if they 
are not immediately identified from network characteristics. Network analysis may 
provide some insight into conditions that support institutional development, but it does 
not capture everything. The combined methodology that incorporates qualitative 
analysis of stakeholder perspectives, however, helps to capture more.  
 7 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Comparative analysis investigates how network characteristics identified in ego 
networks of improving institutions are expressed in the ego networks of similar 
institutions that are either not improving or declining in performance. Institutions that 
have declined or failed to improve from low levels of performance in India and Bolivia 
offer the opportunity for comparative analysis. These cases can be used to consider 
differences in network characteristics between institutions that are improving and those 
that are failing to improve in similar contexts. Although comparative analysis was not 
the original intent of the research, and the number of cases is too small to offer 
conclusive findings, this chapter is used to consider how comparative analysis might be 
performed in order to develop hypotheses that might be tested in future research. The 
analytical process in this chapter will look at each country in turn to explore how the 
common network characteristics identified in the previous chapter are observed in 
institutions with different trends in their performance.  
7.1 India 
7.1.1 Differences in Institutional Performance 
The presence of multiple community arsenic filter operator committees in the same 
district allowed for comparison in India. Case study institutions were local arsenic 
removal facility operators in the 24 North Parganas District of West Bengal, India, 
where numerous communities in close geographic proximity are affected by high levels 
of naturally occurring groundwater arsenic. Multiple filtration units managed at the 
community level have been developed to respond to this need.  
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The number of community operator committees in the area made it possible to compare 
between committees that are either improving or declining in performance. Three 
groups of operator performance levels are compared in this section: 
1. The first group includes three lower performing operators that show different 
stages of performance: two have failed; and one is declining in performance. 
These are referred to in this section as ‘low performers’.  
2. In the second group, the community operator committee was previously 
declining in performance and had begun to improve at the time of research. 
Because it is improving performance, this operator was included amongst the 
case study operators in previous chapters, but here it is separated to provide an 
instance of middle ground between high performing and low performing 
operators. This one is referred to in this section as ‘recently improving’. 
3. The third category of operators includes the ones that are improving 
performance that were analysed in previous chapters. These are referred to in 
this section as ‘high performers’. 
7.1.2 Comparison of Common Network Characteristics 
Three common network characteristics described as supporting institutional 
development were identified in the previous chapter as existing in multiple case study 
countries, including India (Section 6.2). These three characteristics become the basis for 
comparative analysis in this chapter for both India and Bolivia. The three common 
network characteristics are: connections to local stakeholders; connections to 
stakeholders at higher levels of hierarchy; and coordination between strongly engaged 
higher-level stakeholders. Each is explored in turn.  
7.1.2.1 Information and Skill Ties to Lower Hierarchy Stakeholders 
Operators in India that are improving performance were found to have numerous skill 
and information ties to local stakeholders. This analysis can be applied to lower 
performing operators both visually and quantitatively, and the latter is presented in this 
section. The quantitative analysis compares the number of ties to lower hierarchy 
stakeholders present in ego networks of higher and lower performing operators.  
 
 Ties to local stakeholders in ego networks can be quantified to produce a histogram for 
higher and lower performing operators respectively (Figure 85). The distributions of the 
number of ties suggest a difference in the number of local information ties between 
higher and lower performing operators. Operators that are improving performance 
typically have more information ties to local stakeholders in their ego networks (Figure 
85). The quantification is only illustrative, however, because the number of cases is 
insufficient to produce statistical findings.  
 
Figure 85 – Distribution of local information ties for higher and lower performing 
operators in India 
Comparative analysis suggests that operators that are not improving have fewer local 
information ties. The implications of the number of local information ties on 
performance are logical. Receiving feedback could help operators to respond to 
customer needs and improve performance. Some interview participants specifically 
described the importance of information ties with local stakeholders, as presented 
previously (Section 6.2.1.3).  
Skill ties to local stakeholders are also investigated, and analysis finds no local skill ties 
present in the ego networks of lower performing operators (Figure 86). In comparison, 
the operator that had recently improved performance shows skill ties in its interactions 
with other local stakeholders. Operators that are improving performance all exhibit 
multiple local skill ties in their ego networks.   
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Figure 86 – Distribution of local skill ego net sizes for higher and lower performing 
operators in India 
Findings from comparative analysis for local skill networks echo the findings from local 
information networks. Lower performers have the fewest number of information and 
skill ties to local stakeholders, high performers have more numerous information and 
skill ties to local stakeholders, and the recently improving operator is between the two 
groups. The finding that lower performers generally have fewer ties is not statistically 
confirmed, but is supported by the available evidence.  
7.1.2.2 Information and Skill Ties to Higher Hierarchy Stakeholders 
The second common network characteristic is information and skill ties to higher levels 
of sector hierarchy. Analysis investigates how this characteristic is observed between 
high performing, low performing, and recently improving operators studied in India.  
The first step quantifies the number of information and skill ties that lower performing 
operators have with higher levels of sector hierarchy. Summaries for higher and lower 
performing operators are presented in Figure 87.  
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Figure 87 – Information network ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy for higher 
and lower performing operators  
Comparison of information ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy finds that lower 
performers are not necessarily different than high performers. The most common 
number of information ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy for high performing 
operators is the same value exhibited by the ego networks of two lower performing 
operators. The operator who has recently begun to improve also has two information 
ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy. The number of information ties to higher levels 
does therefore not immediately distinguish high performers from low performers.  
One difference stands out between the two groups: one of the lower performing 
operators, one who has ceased operations completely, exhibits no ties to higher levels of 
sector hierarchy. This operator is unique. The characteristic suggests that the complete 
absence of information ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy is a unique characteristic 
of a failed operator.  
These findings offer an interesting consideration even if they are not statistically 
significant. Borrowing language from the field of Qualitative Comparative Analysis, 
connection to higher level sector stakeholders may be an example of a necessary but 
insufficient condition. This means that the characteristic may have a positive benefit for 
operators improving performance, but it is an insufficient guarantee of success on its 
own. Other factors may need to exist in tandem. Conversely, without this characteristic 
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of ties to higher sector levels, performance might not improve even if other conditions 
are met. Ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy may be a supportive network 
characteristic, even if they are unable to drive performance improvements on their own. 
These possibilities are speculative, however, and data on more cases would be needed to 
test these hypotheses.  
Analysis of skill ties to higher sector hierarchy levels yields similar findings (Figure 
88). The figures are the same except for a slight difference in the number of ties in ego 
networks of high performing operators. The number of skill ties in the recently 
improving operator is also two.  
 
Figure 88 - Skill network sizes for ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy for 
higher and lower performing operators. 
The findings are consistent with the findings from information ties. Multiple 
information and skill network ties do not necessarily indicate a higher or lower 
performing operator. The complete absence of these ties might, however, be linked to 
lower performance. Analysis finds that a failed operator is the only ego network 
exhibiting no information or skill ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy.  
7.1.2.3 Coordination Between Higher Hierarchy Stakeholders Providing Strong 
Information and Skill Support 
This characteristic describes the connection between stakeholders strongly engaging a 
case study institution from a higher level of sector hierarchy, and the strength of 
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 information and skill ties between these stakeholders. Testing for this characteristic first 
considers who is strongly engaging case study operators from higher levels of sector 
hierarchy, and then investigates the strength of information and skill ties between these 
alters. An example illustrates this characteristic in one of the improving operator 
networks (Figure 89). 
 
Figure 89 – Combined information and skill ties between two higher level 
stakeholders that are strongly engaging a case study operator 
This network characteristic is not present in all operator ego networks. There are three 
reasons why coordination between higher level stakeholders might not be observed, 
depending on the number of alters in the ego network. The first possible reason is that 
no stakeholders engage the operator with strong information and skill ties from higher 
levels of sector hierarchy. The second possibility is where only one alter exists, and 
there is no other stakeholder strongly engaging an ego with both information and skill 
ties. The third possibility is where multiple alters are strongly engaging the operator but 
are not coordinated. This third possibility is not observed in India. Each case where 
multiple alters at higher levels of hierarchy engage an operator with strong information 
and skill ties also report strong information and skill ties between these alters. The 
distribution of these different possibilities for each operator type is presented in Figure 
90.  
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Figure 90 – Summary of coordination observed for each operator performance 
group 
Operators from all performance groups exhibit coordination between alters at higher 
levels of hierarchy that are supporting the operator. There are no examples of what 
happens when multiple stakeholders are strongly engaging an operator without 
engaging each other in the Indian context, which makes it difficult to confirm the effect 
that the absence of this network characteristic would have. More cases would be needed 
to study how absence of coordination relates to institutional development in the Indian 
context. In all cases, alters are either coordinated, or there are fewer than two alters 
engaging the ego with strong information and skill ties. Future research might be able to 
study this characteristic in more detail by identifying cases with a greater diversity of 
coordination in institutional ego networks. 
7.1.3 Summary of India Comparative Analysis 
Investigation of the three common network characteristics in the ego networks of case 
study operators in India shows slightly different characteristics between higher and 
lower performing operators. Analysis finds that the presence of each network 
characteristics corresponds to improved performance, and the absence of a characteristic 
is only observed with lower performing operators. The presence of a positive network 
characteristic, however, can also be associated with some lower performing operators. 
This suggests that any one network characteristic on its own might be insufficient to 
support performance improvements, even if it has some benefit to the operator. Future 
research could therefore be viewed through the lens of Qualitative Comparative 
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 Analysis to better understand how different combinations of certain characteristics 
support performance improvements (McNicholl, 2016). Overall, findings are 
inconclusive because of the small number of cases studied, but analysis of available 
data suggest that future research could consider how the absence of certain network 
characteristics impact the performance of these community operator committees.  
7.2 Bolivia 
7.2.1 Differences in Institutional Performance 
Case study institutions were rural municipalities in the Cochabamba Department of 
Bolivia. Three of these municipalities that are improving performance were analysed in 
previous chapters, and analysis of a fourth that has not been improving performance is 
included in this chapter for comparison. The municipality shows no evidence of 
improving its capacity to support management of rural water services. To quote this 
municipality directly: “The truth is that there is nothing that is improving.” In contrast, 
the three municipalities that are improving performance have all formed dedicated 
management units that include the hiring of new staff and additional budget allocations 
to support community operators that manage services. As with the comparative analysis 
of Indian operators, this section investigates differences between the three 
municipalities that are improving performance and the lower performing municipality 
from the perspective of the three common network characteristics. These two groups are 
referred to in this section as ‘high performing’ and ‘low performing’ respectively.  
7.2.2 Comparison of Common Network Characteristics 
7.2.2.1 Information and Skill Ties to Lower Hierarchy Stakeholders 
The first common network characteristic is the presence of numerous information and 
skill ties from the ego to alters at lower levels of sector hierarchy. In this case the egos 
are the municipalities, and the local stakeholders include community operators and 
users. Previous analysis found multiple information and skill ties to local alters in 
improving municipality ego networks (Section 6.2.1.4). By comparison, performing the 
same analysis on the low performing municipality finds no such connections. A 
distribution of information and skill ties to local stakeholders in municipality ego 
networks illustrates the difference (Figure 91). 
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Figure 91 – Distribution of municipality information and skill ties to lower levels of 
hierarchy by municipality performance 
The distribution shows that all municipalities that are improving performance have 
multiple information and skill ties to lower levels of hierarchy. The numerous 
information and skill ties of higher performing municipalities stand in contrast to the 
lack of ties exhibited by the low performing municipality. The available data suggest 
that a lack of local information and skill ties appears to be an indication of lower 
performance, but the number of cases is too small to state any finding conclusively.  
7.2.2.2 Information and Skill Ties to Higher Hierarchy Stakeholders 
Filtering for information and skill ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy similarly 
investigates the presence or absence of this characteristic in the four case study 
municipalities (Figure 92).   
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Figure 92 – Distribution of municipality information and skill ties to higher levels 
of hierarchy by municipality performance 
Quantifying the number of information and skill ties to higher levels of hierarchy shows 
that the lower performing municipality has fewer alters in its ego network than higher 
performing municipalities do. This suggests that relatively few information and skill ties 
to higher levels of hierarchy may also indicate a missing characteristic that might 
support institutional development. This network characteristic on its own, however, 
may not be enough to guarantee performance improvements, and additional case studies 
would be required to see how these influences operate independently in the absence of 
other network characteristics.  
7.2.2.3 Coordination Between Higher Hierarchy Stakeholders Providing Strong 
Information and Skill Support 
The coordination network characteristic is not explored in detail because it was not 
found to be strongly present for any municipality in Bolivia. Furthermore, coordination 
is not present in the ego network of the low performing municipality because only one 
alter from higher levels of hierarchy engages the municipality with both information 
and skill ties. Coordination between stakeholders engaging from higher levels of 
hierarchy therefore cannot be investigated because it is not relevant to this ego network.  
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7.2.3 Summary of Bolivia Comparative Analysis 
Comparing Bolivian case study municipalities finds that two common network 
characteristics present in high performing municipalities are either absent or relatively 
weak in the underperforming municipality. Higher performing municipalities exhibit 
multiple information and skill ties to both higher and lower levels of sector hierarchy; 
the underperforming one does neither. The third common characteristic, coordination 
between strongly engaged higher level stakeholders, was not found to be strongly 
present in either higher or lower performing municipalities.  
7.3 Chapter Summary 
Ego networks of institutions that are not improving or are declining in performance in 
India and Bolivia were investigated to explore how the three common network 
characteristics identified in the previous chapter are observed in these ego networks. 
Properties of ego networks for the non-improving institutions were compared to the 
higher performers from the perspective of the three common network characteristics. 
The small number of cases mean that findings are not conclusive, and comparative 
analysis is performed chiefly to consider how social network analysis might provide 
testable hypotheses for future research.  
Information and skill ties with local stakeholders was the first common characteristic 
investigated. Although some underperforming institutions in India also exhibited this 
characteristic in their ego networks, all institutions lacking this characteristic in both 
India and Bolivia were not improving performance. This suggests that the presence of 
the network characteristic is not a guarantee of success, but its absence might be an 
indication of an institution that is either not improving or is declining in performance.  
The second network characteristic describes multiple information and skill connections 
to higher levels of hierarchy. Analysis finds that all institutions improving performance 
in India and Bolivia have information and skill ties with alters at higher levels of 
hierarchy in their ego networks, and that the absence of this characteristic may be an 
indicator of lower performance. The underperforming municipality in Bolivia has few 
information and skill ties to alters at levels of sector hierarchy when compared to the 
number of ties exhibited by higher performing municipalities. In India, some lower 
performers exhibit ties to higher levels of hierarchy, along with all the higher 
performing operators, but the absence of these ties is only observed with an operator 
that has failed. These findings suggest that the absence or weak presence of information 
 and skill ties to higher levels of sector hierarchy describes lower performance. While 
the presence of the characteristic does not necessarily guarantee higher performance, its 
absence is linked to cases of lower performance.  
Comparative analysis of the third common network characteristic explores coordination 
between strongly engaged stakeholders at higher levels of hierarchy. The characteristic 
describes strong information and skill ties between the alters that are most strongly 
engaging the ego with both information and skill ties as perceived from the perspective 
of the ego. In India, this characteristic is observed in the ego networks of both high and 
low performing operators. One of the low performing cases, however, has no higher 
level connections, and the analysis therefore does not apply. In Bolivia, the 
characteristic is not observed at all because multiple alters at higher levels of sector 
hierarchy are not engaging any of the municipalities with strong information and skill 
ties simultaneously. The effect of this characteristic is therefore unconfirmed because 
there is no clear distinction between improving and non-improving institutions.  
Overall analysis finds that the first two common network characteristics may not be 
sufficient to indicate improving performance on their own, but their absence might 
indicate a lack of support of institutional development. The findings add credibility to 
the importance of the characteristics identified in the previous chapter to the extent that 
available comparative data allow. Future research might further investigate the 
importance of certain characteristics, possibly to a degree of statistical significance. 
These comparative findings should therefore not be considered conclusive, but rather 
seen as reasonable hypotheses, with some basis in available data, that could warrant 
exploration in future work.  
The next chapter, Discussion, explores relationships between the network characteristics 
identified in this research and other literature on conditions that support institutional 
development in the water sector. The intent is to consider findings in the context of 
other research, while considering the added value of interpreting influences on 
institutional development from a stakeholder network perspective. A visual 
representation of key findings is also proposed. The Discussion is meant to highlight 
where this research either confirms or challenges current thinking in this field, and how 
findings might be used in both practice and future research.    
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8 DISCUSSION 
This chapter considers the main research findings in light of existing literature, potential 
applications, research limitations, further reflections on the case studies, and concludes 
with recommendations for further research. These considerations situate this project in 
the broader context of research on water service delivery to reflect the potential value of 
the research contribution. Specifically, this chapter aims to characterise the added value 
that social network analysis brings to understanding environments that support 
institutional development in rural water service delivery. A visualisation of key research 
findings is also proposed as a set of network characteristics to look for when applying 
social network analysis to similar challenges in other countries.  
Further reflections on the research also consider how influences from stakeholder 
networks might apply differently to institutional development at different levels of 
sector hierarchy, and the potential effect of these developments on service delivery 
itself. These reflections are considered important because they capture additional 
perspectives of the researcher’s experience from each country that are not easily 
reflected in formal data analysis. The chapter aims to provide the reader with a sense of 
how the research might be applied, its limitations, and further considerations for 
influencing stakeholder networks in rural water service delivery.  
8.1 Relationship Between Findings and Other Research 
The primary findings from Qualitative Analysis (Section 6.2) are considered first to 
explore how these findings relate to current understanding of influences that support 
institutional development in rural water supply. The main findings from this research 
 are the three common network characteristics observed from this research in multiple 
countries. They are: connections to local stakeholders; connections to stakeholders at 
higher levels of hierarchy; and coordination between strongly engaged higher level 
stakeholders. Further review of literature considers how these findings compare to 
related research from perspectives other than social network analysis to see how 
existing research supports the primary findings of this project.  
8.1.1 The Importance of Being Connected 
The most straightforward finding is that it matters if an institution is connected. This 
applies to two of the common network characteristics – connections to local 
stakeholders and connections to upper level stakeholders – particularly for information 
and skill ties. Many stakeholders interviewed described the importance of these 
characteristics for sharing information, developing new approaches, accessing or 
providing technical support, and receiving feedback. These ideas can be related to 
existing literature describing the importance of connectivity for skill and information 
sharing in a service delivery context.  
Technical assistance and training, represented in this research by skill ties, is identified 
as important in the literature. Depending on the frame of reference, this can mean either 
connections between higher level sector stakeholders and an ego, or connections from 
the ego to lower levels. A consideration of six key roles of NGOs in infrastructure 
services identifies technical assistance and training as an important set of services that 
can assist both governments and local operators (Cousins, 1991). Support from NGOs is 
one possible origin of information and skill ties, however, and other stakeholders such 
as the private sector might participate in similar relationships.  
A more general investigation of system dynamics also finds ties between government 
and communities to be important for improving the management of water services. A 
proposed model identifies connections between government and communities as a 
positive influence, and that government and communities both directly and positively 
influence the management of services (Walters & Javernick-Will, 2015). These factors 
all relate to the long-term functionality of water systems.  
Backstopping is another term used to describe information and skill ties between 
stakeholders. This implies a type of backup support from higher to lower levels of 
hierarchy to help lower levels overcome various challenges. The concept translates 
equally well to local government receiving help from higher levels, such as with the 
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Technical Support Units in Uganda (Nimanya et al., 2011), or local government 
providing support to lower levels such as communities (Lockwood & Smits, 2011).  
Connections between stakeholders may also play important roles in the capacity of local 
systems to solve problems. Ties between different levels of hierarchy may be indicative 
of an environment suited to identifying and addressing challenges (Pahl-Wostl et al., 
2007). This may culminate in the development of new approaches suitable to local 
contexts that emerge from the process of interaction, similarly to the process of 
interactions such as Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (Andrews et al., 2012). 
The advantage provided by social network analysis is a straightforward means of 
visualising and quantifying these influences from stakeholder networks.  It becomes 
easy to identify which institutions are connected and which are not. Even if 
qualification is still needed to understand the nuance and value of particular 
relationships, social network analysis can show where ties are absent. For practitioners, 
the benefit may become greater still if stakeholder identities are known and can be used 
to identify specific gaps in network structures.  
8.1.2 The Importance of Being Coordinated 
The third common network characteristic describes coordination between stakeholders 
that are strongly engaging the same institution. The importance of working towards 
common objectives in a coordinated manner is intuitive. Duplication or active 
counteracting of measures taken by another would naturally pose a challenge to 
realising any objective. It is therefore no surprise that the importance of coordination is 
referenced in both academic and practitioner grey literature.  
Academic literature identifies the importance of coordination in both a generic sense 
and in application to specific case studies. The importance of coordination is sufficient 
for one paper to propose understanding organisational typologies by the formalisation of 
their coordination efforts (Mintzberg & Srinivas, 2009). Even if coordination is seen as 
important, some argue that the important area for investigation is not the intent to 
coordinate, but the ability to efficiently assess the degree of coordination, its gaps, and 
possibly prioritising amongst which stakeholders coordination needs to be improved 
(Koestler et al., 2010). This is echoed by another study that notes “a particular challenge 
is to identify potential partners to collaborate with” (Stein et al., 2011). Other studies 
also reference the importance of coordination, such as an investigation into multi-
stakeholder interactions present at multiple levels of sector hierarchy in Ethiopia (De 
 Cosmi & Reed, 2009), but these examples do not explore precise definitions of how 
these influences manifest from a network perspective.  
Practitioner literature from development agencies and think tanks is also important 
because it considers the relevance of coordination in practice. Harmonisation and 
alignment has gained widespread recognition following the Paris Principles (de la 
Harpe, 2011). The precise understanding of how these apply to the water sector is 
unclear, however, and there is some uncertainty about who should be included and how 
these principles are operationalised in practice (de la Harpe, 2011). The importance of 
mechanisms for coordination and partnership have also been highlighted by others as 
important institutional instruments for water sector governance (Plummer & Slaymaker, 
2007). There exists a recognition of the importance of responsibilities needing to be 
mapped out, assigned, and agreed upon (Danert, 2014). In addition to formalising roles 
and responsibilities, coordination is also recognised as important in the context of 
creating an enabling environment that can help service authorities to perform their 
functions effectively (Lockwood & Smits, 2011).  
Despite the prevalence of existing literature, both academic and grey, definitions of 
coordination are imprecise from a network perspective. This ambiguity creates space for 
a possible discrepancy between the coordination perceived by stakeholders and the 
actual network structures observed. It is unclear whether the different definitions of 
coordination mean that stakeholders are strongly connected and actively working 
together, are merely in touch to ensure efforts are complementary, or perhaps something 
else.  
A unique value of this research is therefore to provide a straightforward network test to 
understand coordination between stakeholders around a particular ego of interest. For 
example, if a group of stakeholders are interested in supporting performance 
improvements in a local government, network investigation could inform the current 
strength of coordination, who might be insufficiently connected to this network, and 
identify specific relationships to strengthen between particular stakeholders. A nuanced 
understanding of particular points of coordination may help these sectors to achieve 
coordinated efforts in a practical way.  
8.1.3 Summary of Relationship Between Findings and Other Research 
Existing literature suggests that the main research findings are reasonable.  The three 
common network characteristics identified relate to the importance of stakeholders 
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being connected to one another for skill and information exchange, as well as being 
coordinated to support common outcomes. The findings do not produce major conflicts 
with trends in existing literature on similar thematic areas.  
The contribution of this research is the ability to describe these influences from a social 
network perspective. This research provides specific methods for investigating the 
nature of these characteristics quantitatively in order to understand concepts such as 
coordination with greater rigour. Furthermore, network mapping methods allow a 
diagnostic investigation of relationships as they exist in practice that might challenge 
how stakeholders in a network assume coordination to be working. From this 
perspective, the research offers a potentially tangible contribution to the existing 
understanding of stakeholder relationships that support institutional development for 
rural water supply.  
8.2 Research Applications 
If the findings are reasonable in the light of existing literature, the next consideration is 
how research findings might be applied in practice. This section does so from two 
perspectives. The first provides a visual representation of how the three common 
network characteristics can be conceptualised; the second considers how research 
methods might be used by others to generate network data.  
8.2.1 Framework for Considering Network Characteristics 
The three common network characteristics can be visualised through a conceptual 
framework. The most common network characteristics relate to intuitive concepts that 
have an existing basis in the rural water sector. The framework is a tool for visualising 
stakeholder interactions around a particular institution of interest, and for considering 
the presence or absence of certain network characteristics that might support this 
institution to improve performance.  
The framework (Figure 93) has potential utility because it is visual, intuitive, and allows 
practitioners to consider somewhat abstract concepts of technical backstopping support 
and coordination amongst stakeholders through a visual thought exercise. It is possible 
that not all network characteristics will apply in every context, and the framework 
would allow practitioners knowledgeable of the local context to consider which network 
characteristics exist, which ones might be missing, and which ones might be desirable 
to strengthen in a specific network of interest. Ultimately, the framework still has to be 
 considered critically in any new context, but considering these common characteristics 
may still be useful for developing practical insights. Although network relationships 
still require qualification to understand if ties between stakeholders are achieving their 
intended purpose, considering relationships from a network perspective can help 
identify where characteristics that might support institutional development are missing.  
 
Figure 93 – Visual representation of the three common network characteristics 
(McNicholl et al., 2017) 
The framework identifies three levels of hierarchy with the institution as the ego in the 
middle, and refers specifically to ties of information and skills. This allows the ego of 
interest to be any institution in the rural water sector and for other stakeholders to be 
characterised relative to the stakeholder of interest. Network mapping, as conducted in 
this research, can be used to identify who the ego interacts with at levels of hierarchy 
both above and below it. The three numbered points describe the common network 
characteristics to look for in an ego network.  
Even without network mapping, the framework can be used conceptually as a tool for 
dialogue amongst stakeholders to intentionally shape network relationships. The 
framework can be used to consider current interactions, and how these might differ 
from a desired reality. Consideration would proceed by identifying an ego, identifying 
its alters, and then considering whether the three network characteristics are present or 
absent. Findings from this research suggest that the presence of these characteristics 
support institutions to improve performance, and stakeholders using the framework can 
consider if these characteristics apply in their specific context. They might realise that 
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the improvement of a particular institution’s performance is desirable, that certain 
characteristics are missing from its ego network, and decide to strengthen or introduce 
these relationships into the network.  
The framework can also be used over time. In a project timeline, for example, different 
stakeholders and relationships might enter and exit the network at different stages. The 
framework could be considered at different points in time to develop a strategy for how 
an ego network around a specific institution might look before, during, and after a 
project. For example, a municipal government in Bolivia might initially have an ego 
network with few local ties (Figure 94).  
 
Figure 94 – Example of ego network change over time: phase 1 
During early phases of the project, an INGO might begin supporting the municipality to 
develop its network to expand support to local operators in the area (Figure 95). 
 
Figure 95 – Example of ego network change over time: phase 2 
 In the third phase, local support networks are developed and the municipality grows into 
its role as a support provider to local operators. Simultaneously, the INGO works with 
the Department Government to help it take over the type of support role that the INGO 
has been playing with the municipality (Figure 96).  
 
Figure 96 – Example of ego network change over time: phase 3 
In the final phase, the INGO phases out of working with the municipality, leaving in 
place a stronger local support network, and ongoing support to the municipality from 
the department level of hierarchy, and coordination between key stakeholders at the 
department level who are engaging the municipality (Figure 97). 
 
Figure 97 – Example of ego network change over time: phase 4 
Considering network characteristics in this way might help to intentionally create 
supportive relationships so they remain in the network over time, and help specific 
institutions to improve performance. Network analysis might also be valuable for 
monitoring and evaluation, as well as communicating how institutional relationships 
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change over the course of a project. These figures are only an illustrative example, but 
there seem to be opportunities for the practical application of network methods that are 
worth exploring in future work.  
8.2.2 Methodology for Developing a Stakeholder Network Map 
Data collection methods used in this research offer an approach for generating detailed 
stakeholder network maps relatively quickly, and feedback from stakeholders that 
participated in interviews identified three types of value that the methods and findings 
might offer. The first type of value is reflection on an organisation’s own relationships. 
Some participants described the network mapping exercise as a new kind of reflection 
for them that offered potentially useful and actionable insights. A quote from an 
interview in Malawi illustrates this viewpoint:  
Malawi/INGO/National: I think it’s been a valuable exercise because it’s 
clarified a few things for me looking at this particular process… One of the 
things that leapt to my mind when we did this exercise is here, [points to a 
stakeholder in the ego network] because one of the things I have said is that 
they are a huge player and they do a lot of influencing, but for now I 
mean… we respect each other, but I think we need to move a step further 
into true collaboration, which we haven’t really invested time in trying to 
do. So I mean just looking at it I thought okay, we acknowledge these guys 
are big players, then why don’t we collaborate with them much more 
closely? And actually, seeing this now, I’m thinking we should be doing a 
lot of collaborating here to influence things here to go here. So we’ve been 
doing a lot here, and yet I know there are links happening here all the time 
[laughs]. And we’re not part of that. So it just made me notice that.  
The interview participant quoted above describes the reflection that the egocentric 
network mapping triggered for him. Even though he did not draw ties beyond his 
organisation’s immediate connections, he was able to consider how interactions beyond 
his immediate network probably exist, and how this might influence his prioritisation of 
who to strongly engage within the ego network. This type of reflective value is 
interesting because all data from the exercise come from the participant. It is the new 
framing of existing information that helps this interview participant to see his work 
from a new perspective that creates value for him.  
 The second potential type of value is opportunities for improved coordination and 
strategy development if whole networks are known. Although snowball networks do not 
capture data on whole networks, the ability to quickly identify stakeholders and their 
relationships has practical value for organisations seeking to work strategically in these 
networks. Multiple international organisations approached the researcher following 
discussions and conference presentations to ask about how these stakeholder network 
maps might be adapted to different contexts and how quickly such data could be 
collected. Simply identifying stakeholders and their relationships in a sector appears to 
have practical value for a variety of stakeholders in these networks.  
A third application is investigation of the presence or absence of specific network 
characteristics around particular institutions. This is particularly relevant for institutions 
considering their roles, and how these relate to the functions of others in the network. A 
government official in Ghana provided commentary on this type of potential value: 
Ghana/Government/Regional: Because this is the stage we are at the 
moment. In this new perspective where we are decentralising service 
delivery at the district level and these donors, NGOs… directly we deal with 
these to scale up service delivery. What do we want [ourselves] to be doing 
to keep that scaling up moving and manage the sustainability and the 
running of these fields? Your course is too timely. You do understand that. 
[We] would have been interested in your thesis and what you come up with. 
And your experiences in the other countries and maybe we can borrow 
something from you. 
Network analysis might help this official to understand institutional relationships as 
they currently exist in order to develop strategies for shaping these relationships and 
institutional roles in the future.  
8.2.3 Research Applications Summary 
The types of value identified by other stakeholders suggest that the research and its 
methods can be useful for different applications involving different amounts of effort. 
The most basic application is an institution considering its egocentric network and using 
this as a reflective tool for managing its relationships. A higher level of effort involves 
mapping stakeholder interactions in a sector to improve strategy development and 
coordination. The third type of potential value is analysis of ego networks around 
specific institutions to identify the presence or absence of specific network 
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characteristics that might support institutional development. This involves both a 
detailed understanding of the findings of this research, and multiple primary interviews 
to identify both ego-alter ties and alter-alter ties. Through direct collaboration with 
interested organisations, this research has the potential to be adapted to meet multiple 
needs and generate new lines of inquiry about the value of applied social network 
analysis in service delivery sectors.  
8.3 Research Limitations 
This research harboured aspirations to identify more nuanced influences on institutional 
development that might be less intuitive, perhaps something described by a complicated 
set of relationships in parallel that, when combined, supported institutional 
development. This section explores some limitations of the research to consider both the 
uncertainty of the key findings and the reasons why more sophisticated network 
characteristics did not clearly emerge.  
8.3.1 Limitations of Methods 
Research methods encountered practical limitations that arose from how data were 
collected. In particular, asking individuals within specific stakeholders to describe 
network characteristics they perceive introduces challenges. These challenges include 
the ability to recall network influences, the ability to perceive the effects of network 
characteristics on institutional development, and the ability to visually represent 
dynamic networks that change over time. Although these challenges are deemed to be 
acceptable, their presence should be clearly recognised.  
Asking individuals, as representatives of specific stakeholders, to describe network 
interactions necessarily involves approximations. The first approximation is the 
individual representing a larger organisation or group, and the second approximation is 
using the visual ‘snapshot’ of network relationships created during a network mapping 
interview to approximate dynamic interactions.  
Another challenge is participant memory at the time of the interview. The most obvious 
network characteristics are naturally the easiest to recall, but describing subtler 
influences depends partly on how frequently an interview participant considers their 
role from a network perspective, and depends partly on the types of things that the 
network drawing exercise prompts them to recall. People might forget important 
relationships. The research methodology is partly insulated from this challenge by 
 asking multiple stakeholders for their perspectives and only requiring a network 
characteristic to be mentioned twice for verification. The challenge remains, however, 
that an interesting network characteristic might be important but is not easily perceived 
or highlighted during interviews.  
Participants may also struggle to perceive the value of network characteristics. 
Institutions and individuals within them are shaped by both obvious and subtle forces, 
and the latter of these might be less easily appreciated. It is possible that some interview 
participants were benefitting from network characteristics that they lacked the ability to 
perceive from a network perspective, or perhaps lacked the language to communicate. 
The implication is that, again, more obvious characteristics are more easily highlighted, 
and subtler ones may be present but unconfirmed by this research.  
The researcher would sometimes spot what was considered to be an interesting network 
property, but the significance of these characteristics could not be verified. One 
example is instances of strong feedback relationships existing across lines of 
authoritative power. This is interesting, since one might assume that strong power 
dynamics might inhibit open dialogue. Another example is the presence of what seemed 
to be a broker that could relay information around strong power ties. A third example is 
attempts to develop a typology of stakeholders that interact with an institution based on 
the types of relationships in a stakeholder ego network. Perhaps there might be patterns 
in the types of stakeholders that interact with institutions that are improving 
performance. A typology was created, then used to quantify the number of stakeholders 
engaging each case study institution to produce a Venn diagram (Figure 98). The 
conclusions, however, were unclear. Even if the researcher saw something potentially 
interesting, there is no basis for confirming the importance of a network characteristic 
that the researcher alone perceives.  
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Figure 98 – Abandoned framework for categorising stakeholders based on their 
outgoing ties 
Speculations about characteristics that were not confirmed by others were ultimately 
abandoned. The significance of a potential network influence could not be known if no 
one had commented on it. Stakeholder networks involve complex dynamics, and the 
chosen analytical approach is designed not to draw conclusions that may be only weakly 
substantiated by data. 
8.3.2 Limitations of Findings 
Field research also found that factors beyond stakeholder network relationships were 
influencing institutional development, and narratives helped to identify these factors. 
While there seems to be unique value in social network methods, this perspective needs 
to be combined with other lines of inquiry to produce a fuller understanding of 
influences on institutional development. Some important aspects not included in this 
research on social network analysis are technology, financing arrangements, geography, 
politics, and history. The implication is that social network analysis provides useful 
perspective on stakeholder interactions, but only captures some of the factors affecting 
service delivery.  
Even the characteristics of social networks identified will not necessarily describe all 
cases. In some case studies, including India, network characteristics were identified that 
applied to a specific context but were not highlighted more generally. Findings from 
this research are not intended to suggest that there is one ‘correct’ network that applies 
to all institutions. Different relationships are likely to be important in different contexts, 
 and the main findings from this research therefore do not describe all network 
characteristics in all cases.  
Network characteristics identified in this research as supporting institutional 
development will also not necessarily guarantee successful outcomes. It is possible that 
an institution may not improve performance even if supportive network characteristics 
exist. This may be due to factors beyond the influence of the network, or perhaps if the 
supportive network characteristics are not strong enough to influence change. 
Institutional development remains a complex process that cannot be distilled to 
deterministic cause and effect formulas, even if social network analysis can offer insight 
into the nature of stakeholder interactions around institutions.  
8.3.3 Implications of Limitations 
The main research limitations relate to the challenge of interpreting which network 
characteristics support institutional development within a broad range of stakeholder 
interactions. The net result is that the most obvious influences are cited most frequently, 
as are the ones that most directly affect the stakeholder providing commentary. This 
does not preclude the identification of more nuanced factors, but the individual vantage 
points of stakeholders might limit their ability to observe and interpret the full scope of 
interactions across a sector. These limitations do not undermine the findings that are 
presented, but instead speak to the limits of what social network analysis as applied in 
this research can achieve on its own. Supplemental qualitative evidence will continue to 
be needed to understand how particular relationships influence institutional 
development. Factors beyond network characteristics are also likely to be critical for 
supporting processes of institutional development. Despite these limitations, social 
network analysis appears to offer unique value in understanding stakeholder interactions 
that support institutional development in rural water sectors, and these methods might 
be complemented with other approaches in future research to more holistically 
understand influences on institutional change.  
8.4 Reflections on Research Findings and Applications 
The quantitative and qualitative analysis applied so far does not tell the full story of 
each case study, and experiences the researcher gained through fieldwork should not be 
completely discounted. Even when combining quantitative network data with 
qualitative interview quotes, analysis lacks certain aspects of context, nuance, and 
consideration of how improved institutional performance links to improved service 
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delivery. Spending between a few weeks and a few months working within these case 
studies provided perspective not easily synthesised through research methods and not 
easily generalised across cases. For these reasons the perspectives of the researcher are 
also worth considering. The researcher is able to provide commentary from almost an 
ethnographic perspective of having lived within these systems, and experienced them 
from the many different vantage points of stakeholders interviewed. Researcher 
perspective is therefore used in this section to comment on characteristics of changes 
observed at each level of sector hierarchy, and how these possibly relate to service 
delivery outcomes. 
8.4.1 Change at National Level: Tajikistan 
8.4.1.1 Network Characteristics Influencing National Institutional Development 
The Tajikistan case study explored the reform of the national water policy as led by the 
central government institution for the water sector. Social network analysis has 
highlighted the importance of ties with stakeholders around this institution, but has done 
little to illuminate the broader political context that make such a reform possible. This 
context is considered essential, because the social network might only become relevant 
for supporting such a change when the context makes it possible to initiate such a 
reform effort.  
Tajikistan faces political pressure to improve management of its water resources. These 
pressures are both internal, and international amongst regional powers. Internally, 
Tajikistan requires water to grow its primarily agriculturally-based economy and to 
generate hydroelectric power. Unlike neighbouring powers, Tajikistan is not endowed 
with sufficient fossil fuel energy resources to meet energy demands. These factors 
combine to make management of water across multiple sectors important for Tajikistan. 
Regionally, responsible management of water resources affects downstream countries 
including Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. These transboundary watersheds 
have direct ties to the economy of each country, heightening the potential for regional 
conflict. Effective watershed management, and all the sectors that fall within this, 
therefore becomes important for Tajikistan in ways that may be less acute for other 
countries.  
Responsible water management is also backed by broader geopolitical interests. 
International organisations promoting responsible transboundary water management, 
such as the United Nations, have a vested interest in seeing Tajikistan succeed both 
 internally and regionally. Mismanagement and possible regional conflict would 
undermine the international water cooperation agenda as a case for why this does not 
work. Conversely, success would bolster the international water cooperation agenda by 
demonstrating that responsible water resource management can work across both 
sectors and borders. The international community wants to see Tajikistan succeed in a 
water sector reform.  
These factors combine to create a favourable context for reform, but individuals still 
need to lead the process. Government is strongly hierarchical in Tajikistan, and large 
reforms necessarily have to come from high up. Successfully initiating the reform 
therefore appears to have stemmed from one motivated individual of rank who could 
lead the process. It was frequently noted during interviews that much of the outcome 
hinged on the capability and conviction of one influential bureaucrat, although the 
importance of his individual role is not easily captured from the social network analysis 
alone.  
These two factors of favourable context and motivated individuals relate to concepts of 
windows of opportunity (Tavakoli et al., 2013) and political will (UNDP, 2004). It was 
the experience of this research that valuable insight came from identifying specific 
nodes and links in a network to uncover the variety of motivations and opportunities – 
sometimes down to the level of an individual. Political will is not monolithic, and 
opportunities are not open-ended. The context in Tajikistan that helped to initiate a 
reform involved a motivated individual in a position of power, and a broader 
recognition of the importance of reform in the Tajikistan water sector. It is the view of 
this researcher that the initiation of the national water policy reform required detailed 
understanding of the realpolitik down to the level of individuals within organisations 
and how appealing to their different interests, mandates, and resources could initiate a 
major policy reform. How the presence of multiple influential actors that could affect a 
policy reform is a consideration that can then be explored from a social network 
perspective.  
Specifically, the institution and individual leading the reform needs to coordinate and 
act as a broker to negotiate between other powerful actors. Coordination between 
development partners was supported in Tajikistan by the presence of a facilitator who 
helped to represent their combined interests when engaging and supporting the 
institution managing the reform. This facilitator possessed a combination of skills, 
experience, and relationships that allowed him to play a trusted brokering role between 
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multiple large donors and the government, helping to align interests around common 
goals. This also relied on the unique capability and conviction of a specific individual in 
a particular role. Between the engagement of the individual leading the reform within 
his institution, and the coordinated effort of development partners, the reform was 
eventually developed and approved.  
From the perspective of the researcher, change in the national water policy in Tajikistan 
proceeded as follows. Firstly, the country context necessitated a policy reform based on 
both national and international interests. The need for this reform was recognised by an 
individual with sufficient influence and formal authority to lead the process, and he 
committed to pursuing it. He provided leadership to develop and negotiate the structure 
of the reform amongst government agencies, while international development partners 
created a coordination structure amongst themselves to provide support to the reform in 
a unified manner. The result is an approved reform at the national level. Although 
reform is a long process that will take time to fully implement, these factors appear to 
be important ones thus far in Tajikistan.  
8.4.1.2 Relationship to Service Delivery 
The relationship of the reform to rural water service delivery is distant, but important in 
the long-run. Implementing the reform will directly impact the functions and capacities 
of the institution studied that will, in turn, affect multiple sectors, including rural water 
supply.  Competing interests for irrigation, drinking water, and energy needs will shape 
the development of Tajikistan in coming decades, and there is pressure to get this policy 
reform right because of its effect on multiple sectors.  
Having the right policies developed and implemented, however, does not guarantee that 
safe water access will improve. Sound policies are important but insufficient for 
achieving universal safe water access.  Policy reform is part of a bigger picture that only 
affects service delivery to the extent that it is implemented and results in meaningful 
changes at the point of service access. In the long-term, water scarcity itself may 
become a limiting factor, but in the near term there are likely more pressing challenges 
for Tajikistan in terms of rural water services specifically that the policy reform is 
unlikely to directly address.  
8.4.1.3 Implications for Reforms Elsewhere 
A favourable context is important for a major government institution to undertake a 
policy reform or other internal change, and this context is shaped partly by necessity. It 
 is worth considering how directly a reform might affect service outcomes, and who 
benefits – politically or otherwise – from a successful reform because of how these 
incentives might affect individual motivations. Actually approving and implementing 
reforms poses additional challenges. If there is little appetite in the context to change 
national institutions, it may be worth considering if such changes are essential to 
achieving service delivery outcomes. Improvements in service delivery may still be 
possible even if national institutions function imperfectly.  
If reforming national policies is an essential step for improving services, certain 
outcomes might be framed to directly appeal to influential policy makers. These 
individuals may stand to benefit politically from successful initiatives. Appealing to 
their interests is likely crucial, as someone needs to manage the process who has 
sufficient power and initiative to see it through.   
Social network analysis can play a role to help identify gaps in coordination and 
information relationships around key stakeholders. Influences on national government 
institutions can be complicated by the competing interests of multiple powerful donor 
agencies, and this can be partly addressed by developing a unified approach to 
supporting a reform. In Tajikistan, a specific individual was selected to represent the 
international agencies supporting the reform and to help facilitate interactions. The 
presence of this facilitator helps coordination without requiring everyone to be directly 
connected to each other in the network. 
Even with favourable context, a champion leading the change within the institution, and 
coordinated support, the process of change remains tenuous. A sudden change of the 
ruling political party, for example, could suspend the reform process indefinitely. The 
approval of a reform does also not guarantee its successful implementation. It is a long 
and uncertain process to successfully support a reform to conclusion where service 
delivery benefits are realised, even if supportive network characteristics are observed 
for the time being. This assumption – that policy reform and other national level 
changes will lead to service benefits – should be considered carefully when deciding 
how much effort to put into national institutional development versus more direct 
efforts closer to the point of service access.  
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8.4.2 Change at District Government Level: Ghana, Malawi, and Bolivia  
8.4.2.1 Network Characteristics Influencing Local Government Development 
Case studies in Ghana, Malawi, and Bolivia examined local governments. The 
combination of these cases considers network characteristics that support local 
governments to improve performance, and how these performance improvements might 
relate to improvements in service delivery. Local governments perform multiple 
functions in rural water service delivery. These functions include both managing 
projects to build infrastructure and supporting service operations after construction, but 
typically not managing services directly. The division is not completely clear cut. For 
example, experience implementing projects may provide further opportunities for 
developing relationships and skills relevant to ongoing service delivery support. As a 
result, stakeholders describing influences on local governments during interviews often 
referenced factors affecting both project implementation and ongoing service delivery 
without clearly distinguishing between the two.  
While infrastructure can be constructed with or without local government participation, 
ongoing interactions to support local service provision are most easily supported by 
local stakeholders, and it is here where local government has the opportunity to play a 
long-term supporting role. Interaction between local governments, communities and 
operators is where direct technical support and information is provided in the form of 
technical audits, community sensitisation, or other types of support. These activities can 
have valuable indirect benefit for service delivery by helping operators to improve their 
services and overcome challenges. 
Understanding the types of support that local stakeholders require can help local 
governments to develop their capacity to provide this support, and support from higher 
levels of hierarchy can help local governments to grow into their support providing 
roles. This was apparent in Bolivia where the decentralised municipal structure had the 
most autonomy to allocate resources to support water service delivery by hiring staff, 
and funding transportation and trainings. In Bolivia, pressures from both international 
NGO projects and government authorities were encouraging these municipalities to 
form management units that could actively support community water operators to 
sustain service levels in the long-term. Municipalities studied were responding to these 
influences.  
From a network perspective it is easy to identify ties between local governments and 
other local stakeholders. The key considerations involve ensuring that the right types of 
 support are being provided frequently enough to local operators and communities, and 
that local government is able to respond to the challenges faced by these local 
stakeholders. Support from higher levels of hierarchy can help local government to 
develop these capacities, but only if the vision for service delivery is clear. Building 
capacity to manage projects might involve different skills that do not achieve the same 
long-term objectives. This is where the concept of coordination between higher level 
sector stakeholders is important. If local governments are being encouraged to perform 
different functions by different stakeholders, the result might become a confused blend 
of these roles.  
Potentially conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders at higher levels of hierarchy 
were more apparent in Ghana and Malawi than in Bolivia. There are more nodes active 
in Ghana and Malawi stakeholder networks, and the international investment in 
developing water infrastructure has placed focus on project implementation capacities 
more so than the development of functional service models. This means that, although 
local governments studied in these two countries are improving relative to themselves, 
these improvements may have more to do with capacity for helping to implement 
infrastructure than supporting operators to manage services.  
Relationships with local stakeholders appear to be the crux of what helps local 
governments to play the right roles and improve their support over time. These 
relationships involve communities and service providers that can benefit from 
information and technical support. It is the view of the researcher that these 
relationships are critical for both improving services as well as institutional 
performance.  
Interactions with stakeholders at higher levels of hierarchy can also support and 
possibly incentivise local governments to grow into their support roles, but only if the 
vision for these roles is clear for all involved parties. Contradictory approaches and 
focus on projects over services can distort incentives in ways that undermine the 
development of local government in its service support role. Support to local 
government from higher levels can therefore be beneficial, provided that the risks of 
distorting incentives are understood and that the focus remains on developing the local 
relationships that will sustain services over time.  
National mandates are also worth mentioning. All local governments studied are 
compelled by national guidelines or policies to form some type of water and sanitation 
management team, often in collaboration with multiple local government departments. 
 218 
The consistency of membership, meeting schedule, and efficacy seems to vary by 
jurisdiction. This suggests that, although central institutions have direct authority, they 
are not necessarily able to exercise power directly to ensure practices are implemented 
as envisioned. A good idea in a ministry may not reach all corners of a country. 
National mandates can be important for validating practices, because local staff may be 
reluctant to do things not explicitly sanctioned by authorities, but these mandates still 
need to be translated into practice at local levels.  
8.4.2.2 Relationship to Service Delivery 
Beyond supporting infrastructure development, local government performance affects 
long-term service delivery to the extent that it helps operators or community 
management bodies to succeed in providing services. These can be system operators or 
waterpoint committees, depending on the management structure. Since local 
government is unlikely to have the capacity to directly manage all services in its 
jurisdiction, supporting others managing services to succeed becomes imperative.  
It is worth considering how fully a local government can play a support role with its 
existing capacity, and how flexible its capacity is. Local governments in Bolivia have 
autonomy to hire new staff and restructure resource allocation within municipalities to 
create management units with the explicit purpose of supporting local operators and 
infrastructure development. Local governments in Ghana, and Malawi in particular, 
have less flexibility. Districts in Malawi are also bigger, which stretches local 
government resources even further. Stronger local governments in Bolivia appear to be 
benefitting service delivery outcomes across their jurisdictions, but it is possible that 
even significantly stronger local governments in Malawi would still be insufficient to 
effectively support service operations across their larger districts. If local government is 
unable or unwilling to play required support roles, it is worth considering if other 
stakeholders might perform such functions.  
8.4.2.3 Implications for Similar Changes Elsewhere 
Practitioners can consider the roles of local government, and the effect these would 
likely have on service delivery if performed flawlessly. In the case studies of this 
research, local government performance mattered to the extent that it could act as 
technical backstopping support for community operators, in addition to supporting 
infrastructure development. Technical backstopping provided by other stakeholders may 
also be an alternative if local governments are unable or unwilling to provide ongoing 
support functions after infrastructure has been developed.  
 If local government is a good option for long-term technical backstopping support to 
local service operators, then its relationships can be considered from a network 
perspective. Networks can help practitioners consider who a local government connects 
with, what types of support these relationships provide, and the strength of these ties. 
Visualising and strengthening these local network interactions might be a useful 
management strategy for these local governments. It can help them to consider the local 
relationships they have, which ones should be strengthened, and how to manage this 
network in the future.  
Understanding these local government ego networks can also help to consider who 
supports these local governments to overcome technical challenges in their roles 
supporting local operators. Does local government need technical support, help 
developing management units, or information from higher levels of hierarchy? Findings 
from this research suggest that institutions without ties to higher levels of hierarchy 
might struggle to overcome challenges if they cannot access support.  
8.4.3 Change at Local Level: India 
8.4.3.1 Network Characteristics Influencing Community Operator Development 
The community operator committees studied in India directly provide safe and 
affordable water that is especially important because of groundwater arsenic 
contamination. Some of the influences on their performance are straightforward. They 
firstly need to provide a good service that is reliable and affordable. In return, user 
payments for water help to sustain operations. This relationship provides a direct 
incentive for operators to perform, and several successful operators were further 
extending services by hiring delivery agents to carry water to customers by rickshaw. 
Growing the number of users is a sign of improving performance, and provides further 
incentive for these local institutions to develop further.  
Beyond these strong relationships between operators and users, technical backstopping 
support from a larger organisation seems to be important. Local government was not 
identified as important for this role. Support providers are local organisations based in 
the state capital that operated support services on a cost recovery basis to provide 
technical assistance with facilities and education on arsenic issues to community 
members. This relationship helps local operators overcome difficulties when they 
struggle to resolve them independently, and to maintain specialised technical 
components. In return, payment from the operators to these support organisations helps 
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to sustain the relationship. This arrangement seemed to provide a more robust service 
model than simply leaving operators to manage the facilities independently.  
The overall model is straightforward: operators provide a good and affordable service 
and users pay for it. At the same time, a technical support relationship between a larger 
organisation and these operators provides assistance when needed. This support could 
potentially be provided by local government if its internal resources allow it to sustain 
support, otherwise an independent stakeholder can provide this service on a cost 
recovery basis. The result is that local operators can manage services, and their 
continued operation can benefit from access to technical support when needed.  
8.4.3.2 Relationship to Service Delivery 
The relationship between operator performance and service delivery is direct. More 
customers mean more households accessing safe water, and more revenue supports 
continuing operations and possible investment in facility expansion. Developing 
effective operators is therefore a crucial component of water service delivery.  
The trade-off is scale. Influencing national institutions could have a small, but far 
reaching effect on services within a country, whereas strengthening an operator 
committee only affects the users accessing that facility. The operators have a direct 
impact on services, but at a smaller scale that might be challenging and resource 
intensive to replicate.  
8.4.3.3 Implications for Similar Changes Elsewhere 
Practitioners can consider the quality of a service and the willingness of users to pay for 
it. Clean water at a reasonable price is appealing, especially with service conveniences 
such as home water delivery. A dedicated management system that is compensated for 
operating these services can, in turn, keep the quality of service delivery consistent.  
Set up is perhaps the easy part. Challenges arise in the longer term when maintenance is 
required or when relationships between users and operators may deteriorate. Ideally, 
operators would be able to work with community members to overcome these 
challenges, but sometimes external support may be required. A relationship with 
external support may be critical to prevent operators from discontinuing services in the 
long run. Furthermore, this external support must be able to sustain its own operations, 
either from remuneration by operators or with another revenue stream. If these 
relationships are in place and can continue to exist, it seems more likely that operators 
will be successful.  
 Practitioners can also consider other stakeholders that are engaging and potentially 
influencing operators. This was not seen as a serious issue in the Indian context, but 
elsewhere conflicting stakeholder interests might undermine operator willingness to 
develop their own robust management systems. For example, operators might be 
unwilling to perform maintenance if they can access new infrastructure freely from 
NGOs. It is therefore important to understand the full scope of interactions in operator 
ego networks to ensure that interactions from higher levels of sector hierarchy are 
supporting the same outcomes.  
8.4.4 Reflection Summary  
In all cases, ego network mapping seems useful for understanding influential 
relationships, and relationships that perhaps should exist but do not. Follow-up 
interviews then help to understand connections between alters. The ego networks for 
different types of institutions can then be considered slightly differently depending on 
their level of hierarchy.   
At national level, network understanding can be used to improve coordination and 
encourage a unified effort to improve policy and capacity development in key national 
institutions. It can help to consider if influential stakeholders are indeed coordinated 
around a common objective, and if particular stakeholders are excluded from processes 
that require their participation.  
Changes at national level may require additional contextual pressures that encourage 
reforms in institutions or policies. There may need to be sufficient benefit for 
individuals involved in order to motivate their participation, and certain key members 
may need sufficient motivation to lead the process. If the context is not right, even 
favourable network structures might not be enough to facilitate the desired change.  
At local government level, ego network mapping can help understanding of the 
connections to local stakeholders, as well as the stakeholders influencing the local 
authority from higher levels.  This understanding can help to consider how this network 
would be expected to function in an ideal service delivery arrangement, and where 
relationships are missing and might need to be developed. Similarly, it can identify 
coordination gaps between stakeholders that could undermine the development of local 
government roles. Understanding the full scope of interactions from a network 
perspective can be a helpful way to envision the transition of a local government from 
current to future roles in its local service delivery system.  
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It is important to consider the reasonable scope of what local government will be able to 
do. It is possible that even substantial increases in capacity will still be insufficient for 
local government to fully support operators and communities. In this case, alternative 
stakeholders may be able to play similar roles, and it is worth considering how strongly 
to invest in local government as an exclusive support provider.  
At the local operator level, ego net mapping can be useful to see who operators connect 
to, and how these stakeholders connect to each other. This can be used to assess 
connections to local stakeholders and to develop strategies for strengthening operator 
connection to users. It can also help assess who provides long-term technical 
backstopping and seek to reinforce this if needed. Support can come from government 
or any other stakeholder that can sustain this engagement in the long-term.  
8.5 Future Research 
This research has explored the potential utility of social network analysis to 
characteristics of stakeholder networks that support institutional development. Further 
inquiry can investigate how performance differs if some network characteristics are 
absent, and possibly different configurations of characteristics that achieve similar 
results.  
In particular, future research could include more comparative studies. Comparison 
would require having more consistent and accessible data on institutional performance 
over time, and the ability to also monitor stakeholder networks over time. This would 
allow a better comparative analysis, both across levels of performance and 
longitudinally to understand different configurations of network characteristics that 
support institutional development.  
It would also be desirable to define outcomes in terms of service provision. Obtaining 
reliable data on levels of service delivery was difficult, and therefore could not be used 
as the basis of positive outcomes defined in this research, but future opportunities might 
allow a more robust data collection framework through an action research approach 
facilitated by a larger organisation. Stakeholder networks might then be monitored to 
identify configurations of characteristics that correspond to different levels of service 
delivery.  
The quality of future research could also be improved by applying a fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) approach that includes non-network 
conditions. This would allow including social network characteristics along with other 
 factors such as financing arrangements, policy decisions, and technology, for example, 
to identify configurations that support improved service delivery. Applying fsQCA to 
identify configurations of successful WASH service provision is not new (Chatterley et 
al., 2014), but including conditions defined by social network analysis would be. Social 
network properties would fit well into fsQCA because these properties might be directly 
quantified from network data (McNicholl, 2016). 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
This research identifies three common network characteristics in multiple cases of 
institutional development, and each characteristic relates to existing literature that 
underlines the importance of these characteristics. The network perspective is valuable 
because it adds a specific quantitative and visual way of interpreting the presence or 
absence of these characteristics around an institution of interest. To this end, a 
framework is proposed to help others to consider stakeholder interactions and the effect 
of supportive network characteristics in an intuitive and visual way. Identification of 
these network characteristics has the potential to help practitioners create enabling 
environments that support the development of key institutions in rural water supply.  
The research also contains several important limitations. These primarily relate to the 
ability of individual stakeholders to perceive larger system dynamics and to identify 
salient influences. It is possible that certain social network characteristics exist in the 
case study locations that are either not perceived or verified by these research methods. 
Furthermore, social network analysis cannot capture all influences on institutional 
development. The research offers unique value by applying social network analysis to 
this particular sector, but it is not a complete solution for understanding all influences 
on institutional development.  
Despite these limitations, several stakeholders interviewed expressed their interest in the 
potential value of this research. Three types of value were identified. The first helps 
stakeholders to consider their relationships through the reflective exercise of egocentric 
network mapping. A second type of value would be to produce complete snowball 
networks that identify stakeholder names in order to develop strategies and improve 
coordination. This second type of value was not realised from this specific research, 
however, because of the anonymity of stakeholders in the final networks, but future 
work could identify specific stakeholders. A third potential type of value is in offering 
recommendations to service delivery stakeholder networks about specific types of 
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interactions that could be strengthened in order to support institutional development in 
critical parts of the sector.   
Further reflections on the case studies were provided from the perspective of the 
researcher to capture ideas that emerged from experience conducting the research. 
These highlight elements that seem to be contributing to change in different institutions 
at different levels of sector hierarchy. Reflections further speculated on the likely links 
between improvements in these institutions and overall improvements in service 
delivery. These ideas offer some recommendations on how to facilitate change at 
different levels of sector hierarchy, and how these should be prioritised to support 
overall service delivery.  
This chapter also identified opportunities for future research. Findings from this 
research have the potential to help practitioners rigorously consider enabling 
environments that help institutions managing services to improve performance, and 
intentionally manage relationships as a means of improving institutional performance 
for long-term rural water service delivery. Understanding complex stakeholder 
relationships from a social network has potential to make this complexity accessible to 
policy-makers and practitioners while maintaining rigour in the analytical methods. The 
full potential of future research applications remains to be seen, but preliminary interest 
from international organisations suggests there is an appetite for incorporating social 
network analysis into research for improving service delivery sectors.  
 9 CONCLUSIONS 
This project studied institutions in five countries to identify characteristics of 
stakeholder networks supporting institutional development. Social network analysis was 
the principal research method because of its emphasis on ties between actors. Applying 
social network analysis to the context of rural water supply explored the potential of 
these methods for identifying influences which support institutional development in 
environments where many stakeholder relationships can exist simultaneously.    
Existing social network data collection and analysis methods were adapted to the 
context of rural water supply and combined with qualitative methods for the study. 
These adaptations sought to identify relationships in stakeholder networks around 
specific institutions, to define characteristics of these networks, and to qualify the 
importance of these characteristics for supporting institutional development. Data were 
collected from 162 primary interviews in five countries and analysed to produce 
findings in response to the two research questions: 
1. What are common characteristics of stakeholder networks around specific 
institutions relevant to rural water supply that are improving performance? 
2. Which network characteristics are perceived by stakeholders in these networks 
as important for supporting institutional development? 
Quantitative network analysis was used to identify characteristics of the case study 
institution ego networks from a purely numerical perspective. Analysis of network size 
and homophily, both by level and type, produced general findings, indicating that the 
case study institutions typically have multiple information, skill, and authority ties that 
 226 
connect with different types of stakeholders at different levels of sector hierarchy. 
Resource ties, however, are less common, and characteristics of resource networks are 
less consistent across countries. 
Multiplex tie analysis, another quantitative measure, explored how frequently multiple 
tie types exist in parallel. Information ties are the most common, and multiplexity 
analysis finds that the presence of any relationship likely includes an information tie. 
Another measure, reciprocity, explored how often ties are one-way versus two-way and 
found that information ties are commonly reciprocated. The implication is that 
identifying undirected information ties between stakeholders will identify most 
relationships in water sectors. Limiting data collection to identifying undirected 
information ties might increase the ease and speed of data collection in future research.  
Qualitative analysis of commentary from interview participants was also combined with 
quantitative network findings to characterise network influences perceived as important 
for institutional development. Including qualitative analysis is important because 
quantitative characteristics are insufficient on their own for identifying the importance 
of network relationships for supporting institutional development. In this way, 
perspectives from stakeholders experiencing network interactions identify which 
network characteristics are significant.  
Three network characteristics were observed in case study institutions from multiple 
countries. The first network characteristic described the importance of information and 
skill ties between institutions and stakeholders at lower levels of hierarchy. These ties 
can help, for example, a district government to provide support to local operators, and 
receive feedback on how it can develop its capacity for providing better support. The 
second network characteristic described the importance of information and skill ties to 
higher levels of hierarchy. These ties can help, for example, community operator 
committees to access support for overcoming technical challenges. The third network 
characteristic described the importance of coordination between stakeholders supporting 
an institution. This specifically relates to strong information and skill ties between the 
two alters at higher levels of hierarchy that provide the strongest information and skill 
support to an institution. Practically, this characteristic highlights the importance of 
support providers being coordinated so they can complement, and not undermine, each 
other’s work. These three network characteristics emerged from network data in 
multiple countries, and were identified by interview participants as supporting 
institutional development.  
  
Social network analysis on its own, however, does not offer holistic analysis. This 
research has identified multiple limitations pertaining to both data collection and 
analysis, and three limitations stand out in particular. The first is the contextual nature 
of specific influences, where network relationships that matter in one context might 
matter less in another. For this reason, this research has not identified all network 
characteristics that might apply to institutional development. The second limitation is 
the presence of factors that cannot be identified through network relationships alone. 
Broader contextual factors such as political freedom, for example, can influence 
institutional behaviour, and social network analysis can benefit from combination with 
other types of analysis to identify a broader range of factors. Finally, social network 
analysis still requires qualitative interpretation to understand the significance of specific 
relationships. The presence of a network tie does not necessarily confirm its value, and 
social network analysis can benefit from combination with other methods such as the 
coding of stakeholder commentaries that was applied in this research.  
Social network analysis can, however, identify where relationships do not exist. 
Identifying missing links has the potential to offer considerable value for understanding 
environments that support institutional development from both academic and practical 
perspectives. Even if understanding existing relationships requires nuance and 
contextual understanding, missing network ties can indicate the absence of a 
relationship. From this perspective, social network analysis can be used to study the 
relationships of an institution to identify where certain network characteristics are 
missing. The absence of any of the three common network characteristics found in this 
research might indicate a missed opportunity for supporting institutional development. 
Practitioners might then intentionally create or strengthen particular relationships in the 
network.  
Institutional development will continue to be a complex and contextually dependent 
process, but social network analysis can provide insight into this environment in a 
rigorous yet practical way. Mapping ties between network actors using different tie 
types and strengths can describe qualitative relationships in network structures that can 
even be analysed quantitatively. This research included a broad scope of case studies, 
and findings are necessarily general, but future research could identify network 
characteristics in specific cases that can be statistically compared by both performance 
and over time. This research has found that social network analysis, particularly when 
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combined with qualitative methods, is a rich field for inquiry into influences on 
institutional development in rural water service delivery that future work can build on.  
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APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY INSTITUTION EGO NETWORKS 
 
Ghana District 1 Ego Networks 
 
Ghana District 2 Ego Networks 
  
Malawi District 1 Ego Networks 
Malawi District 2 Ego Networks 
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Bolivia Municipality 1 Ego Networks 
 
Bolivia Municipality 2 Ego Networks 
  
Bolivia Municipality 3 Ego Networks 
 
Bolivia Municipality 4 Ego Networks (Not Improving) 
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Tajikistan National Institution Ego Networks 
 
  
India Operator Committee 1 Ego Networks 
 
India Operator Committee 2 Ego Networks 
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India Operator Committee 3 Ego Networks 
 
India Operator Committee 4 Ego Networks 
 
  
India Operator Committee 5 Ego Networks 
 
India Operator Committee 6 Ego Networks 
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India Operator Committee 7 Ego Networks 
 
India Operator Committee 8 Ego Networks 
  
India Operator Committee 9 Ego Networks 
 
India Operator Committee 10 Ego Networks (Not Improving) 
 
 252 
 
India Operator Committee 11 Ego Networks (Not Improving) 
 
India Operator Committee 12 Ego Networks 
 
  
India Operator Committee 13 Ego Networks 
 
India Operator Committee 14 Ego Networks 
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India Operator Committee 15 Ego Networks (Not Improving) 
 
 APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM 
 
July%August*2015* * *
 
 
Participant Consent Form 
 
Network and Narrative Characteristics of Institutional Development for Rural Access to Safe Water 
 
 
Name of Lead Researcher: Duncan McNicholl  
 
 Please tick box 
1. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research and have had 
these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is anonymous and voluntary and that I am free to  
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree that parts of the interview may be audio-recorded and that notes can be taken.  
 
OR     I do not want any part of the interview to be audio-recorded. 
 
4.     I agree that data collected in the interview will be stored securely for 5 years 
 
 
5.     I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
_________________________    ______________________  ________________________________ ____  
 Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
(Please print) 
 
 
 
_________________________    ______________________  ________________________________ ____  
 Name of Research Team member  Date   Signature 
(Please print) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
